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Abstract
Authentication and privacy in wireless systems is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant field: More and more people are using more and more wireless systems on
personal devices that process vast amounts of personal data on a daily basis at
home and abroad. Laptops, smartphones, and tablet PCs are examples for devices
in the world of ubiquitous wireless services. With the growing amount of personal
data at risk, awareness for this issue is picking up with some users.
The goal of this thesis is to extend the state-of-the-art in the field of security and
privacy for wireless services and to show that achieving security and privacy is
possible even on hardware with a minimum of computational capabilities, and in
scenarios where it has not been considered so far to foster new research directions.
We will present self-contained and thorough solutions for authentication and privacy
challenges in three different scenarios. All these solutions fulfill desirable security
and privacy goals not achieved by prior works. All solutions are analyzed on a
theoretical and a practical level, i.e., the theoretical background of the solution
shows its feasibility and that it achieves the security and privacy goals desired.
Furthermore, all solutions are implemented on inexpensive commercially available
hardware and benchmarked for performance. Where possible, our new solutions
were compared to existing solutions. All the proposed solutions are meant to be
useful in the real world, i.e., we consider performance and user experience.
We first propose a protocol suite for wireless roaming. It allows clients of certain
home operators to access wireless networks of other operators without disclosing
their personal data to the local operators, and it prevents the home operators from
obtaining any information on the services used beyond the amount paid. The roam-
ing solution includes electronic payment and does not require prepaid credit. Attacks
on the wireless connection are prevented. When connected, users may also allow
their devices to act as access points for other users and, therewith, earn money. We
present solutions with and without the participation of the home operator in each
connection setup. We next propose a protocol suite for electronic health monitor-
ing. It allows secure and privacy preserving handling of real-time measured data on
bodily functions, e.g., the heart rate. The data never leaves the control of the user
unless it is explicitly authorized. Finally, we present a solution for time synchro-
nization in wireless sensor networks, which is the first to guarantee the privacy of
ix
x List of Tables
the nodes taking part in the synchronization. The individual nodes are unobserv-
able and cannot be influenced by an attacker through modifications on the wireless
channel.
Beyond the work on privacy, as an excursus, we present the implementation of an
attack on the authentication in Bluetooth, which, to the best of our knowledge and
belief, is the first implemented attack on the Bluetooth versions 2.1, 3.0, or 4.0. The
attack targets devices with numerical keyboards, e.g., wireless keyboards for tablet
computers, when the same PIN is used twice. Potential victims are devices with
fixed PINs and users who reuse the PIN. We present the first implementation and
evaluation of the attack and hope to raise awareness for this threat.
Chapter1
Introduction
Authentication and privacy in wireless systems is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant field, as more and more people are using more and more wireless system on per-
sonal devices that process vast amounts of personal data on a daily basis. Laptops,
smartphones, and tablet PCs are examples for devices in the world of ubiquitous
wireless services. While the need for authentication is understood by a majority of
users and authentication is supported by most applications, privacy is currently of-
ten overlooked. With the growing amount of personal data at risk, awareness for this
issue is picking up with some users. Other users have proclaimed a „post-privacy“
age, showing that they underestimate the potential consequences of a disclosure of
personal data, the amount of data available, and the deductions possible from large
amounts of personal data.
We will present self-contained and thorough solutions for authentication and privacy
challenges in three different scenarios. All these solutions fulfill security and privacy
goals not achieved by prior works. All solutions are analyzed on a theoretical and
a practical level, i.e., the theoretical background of the solution shows its feasibility
and that it achieves the security and privacy goals desired. Furthermore, all solutions
are implemented on inexpensive commercially available hardware and benchmarked
for performance. Where possible, our new solutions were compared to existing
solutions. All the proposed solutions are meant to be useful in the real world, i.e.,
we consider installation, performance, and user experience.
Before we discuss authentication and identity privacy in the wireless domain, we
first have to discuss the terms used. At first, informal definitions of the terms used
are given, and the differentiation between authentication and privacy is explained
in this chapter. We then describe three wireless scenarios where authentication and
privacy play a role, and the contributions made later. More technical definitions of
the goals along with their relation to a number of scenarios are given in the next
chapter on preliminaries for this thesis. Also, the scenarios and the technologies
used will be discussed there in greater detail.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Authentication and Privacy
Authentication is a security goal which provides assurance to someone that a
person (or entity) is actually the one he (or she) pretends to be. Authentication is
mandatory for all systems that are not free for public use. As a security goal, it is
not limited to information systems. E.g., door locks are a means for authentication:
Only persons who have a certain key are able to unlock or lock a door. In information
systems, authentication also matters for access control, i.e., when different users are
given different types or levels of access.
Authentication is especially important when paid services are used. Otherwise, users
could redirect bills to other accounts and therefore obtain services free of charge (for
themselves).
In general, privacy ensures that the identity of a person or other information about
a person is protected.
New technology introduced new ways to gather personal information, and there-
fore new threats on privacy have emerged. The first publication advocating privacy
was written in 1890 [153] in response to the spread of then-new technologies for
photographs and newspaper printing, which allowed for rapid distribution of inade-
quate photos. With the emergence of electronic data processing, it became feasible
for companies to collect large amounts of data from their customers, and to employ
them for for market research. Exchanging customers’ data with other companies
increased the amount of and improved the quality of data available about a single
person to a each company. Initially, there was little control over how this data was
collected, handled, and exchanged. However, many jurisdictions have imposed rules
on data protection in the meantime.
New technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet present new privacy chal-
lenges, but sometimes provide better services when privacy is not considered, e.g.,
location based social services. Information about social contacts, political views,
ethnicity, consumption habits, locations visited at certain times, finances, criminal
records, sexual preferences, substance abuse, and biological traits including health
issues are actively published in social networking and social media websites by some
users proclaiming a post-privacy age. Others users are concerned to protect their
privacy and refuse to share such information with any private company, especially
when the company makes it available for profit to a limited amount of persons, the
public, or paying clients.
In this general context, the goal of privacy protection in a broad sense is to prevent
that a particular data item becomes known about oneself to others, i.e., to prevent
that a subject has no longer control about the information about itself. However,
it is a common misconception that privacy is the same as confidentiality, which is
the goal of hiding information from external attackers. While confidentiality is well-
known and implemented in many products, the user’s privacy is often not considered
at all. Privacy in the narrow sense of the term protects information about a subject,
whereas confidentiality protects an arbitrary set of data. Thus, privacy protects the
identity of a subject and/or other information about a subject, e.g., its movement
profile.
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Westin [155] wrote: „Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to
social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person
from the general society through physical or psychological means, either in a state
of solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condition of
anonymity or reserve.“
There are technical definitions for the various aspects of privacy. The most important
ones will be briefly mentioned in the following. More detailed definitions can be
found in Chapter 2. Unless noted otherwise, the definitions are based on Pfitzmann
et al. [123].
Information privacy is the privacy of personal information. A subject’s personal
information that he (or she) considers private should be protected: It must not be
shared with others, and it has to be kept secret. Regulations exist for working on
private data, e.g., in Germany, a company may not give (or sell) a customer’s names
and other customer data to others without the customer’s explicit consent.
Anonymity: A user does not have to reveal its real name to another party. Thus,
anonymity allows a party to take part in a political debate without revealing its real
name. This also prevents a reverse lookup: What is the name of the person with
this opinion? Anonymity has been called a basic requirement for true freedom of
speech. The most famous law in this context is the First Amendment in the United
States of America, which protects the right of an author to remain anonymous [147].
Unlinkability: It is impossible to detect that two actions were performed by the
same user. When the time and place of the actions are known, unlinkability also
prevents disclosure of the user’s movement (called untraceability), e.g., in cellular
phone service, temporary identifiers are used and changed frequently to avoid linking
of service use by observers.
Undetectability: The existence of a user or action cannot be assured. Unde-
tectability does not only protect actions of a user, but even the existence of the user
itself. E.g., in most states, citizens are required to be registered with a state agency,
usually at birth. This ensures that the state is aware of the existence of a person,
and enables the person to recognize its civil rights.
These non-technical definitions give an understanding of what privacy is about and
the differentiation to confidentiality.
1.2 Authentication vs. Privacy
As we have seen, privacy protects personal information and ensures that a user
cannot be uniquely identified. On the other hand, in common IT systems, authen-
tication is usually achieved by proving an identity to another party. It is therefore
difficult to ensure that an authentication system retains user’s privacy.
Privacy protection in paid systems is especially difficult, as the service provider wants
to ensure that it will be paid when providing service. The real world examples are
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cellular phone services. Users may either have a long running contract and pay for
the services they have used at the end of every month, or they have prepaid cards,
which must be charged before usage. To get a contract, the users have to provide full
identification and banking information to the operator. On the contrary, prepaid
SIM cards can be acquired anonymously, and charged using token cards sold over
the counter, also anonymously. However, the prepaid customer always has to ensure
that there is sufficient credit left on his card. Therefore, the user has to give away
information about himself to obtain a better service. Similar scenarios are common
with hotels, gas stations, and restaurants.
On the other hand, even when a user actively wants to authenticate to a service
there are still limits to the amount of data a typical user is willing to share. An
example for this conflict are typical backup authentication mechanisms in online
services. Usually, a user would not like to share his telephone number, his birthday,
or his mother’s maiden name with a random company, but it is required as a shared
secret when regular login fails, i.e., when a user forgets his password.
Privacy and Authentication in Wireless Systems: In wireless systems, data
is exchanged over radio. Therefore, it is easier and more convenient to eavesdrop on
the data exchanged than in wired networks. This is an issue especially for wireless
systems that are used in public places, where anyone can be within radio range
without alerting the user or operator. Privacy is also especially important in wireless
systems when these systems are used from a mobile device that is bound to a user,
because the device can be used to obtain a vast amount of personal information
about the user, e.g., tracking his movement, and which other users he has interacted
with.
Therefore, it is a challenge to ensure that systems providing wireless services which
need authentication can be used without exposing the user to privacy risks. This
includes attacks on privacy by a third party, but also by a regular participant of the
system, i.e., the operator or other users.
To prevent disclosure of private data, we provide a variety of solutions for different
scenarios, which all cope with the requirements for real-world everyday use. The
scenarios are discussed in the following.
1.3 Scenarios and Contributions
In the rest of this thesis, solutions to achieve privacy and authentication in a number
of wireless scenarios will be presented. For each of the scenarios, retaining privacy
while achieving authentication is a unique challenge. In each case, a solution is
proposed, implemented, and evaluated.
1.3.1 Roaming in Wireless Networks
Roaming in wireless networks allows a user to access paid wireless networks outside
of its home network’s range. The user has to agree on a certain tariff with either
the local provider or his home network. The home network must have a roaming
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agreement with the local provider so that funds can be exchanged later. Therefore,
the user does not pay directly to the local provider; instead, the roaming charges
are added to his regular bill with his home network.
Wireless networks are already present in many locations visited by passers-by, e.g.,
in the WLAN case, in restaurants, airports, and train stations. However, it is usually
difficult to find out where to register to use these services and the registration process
violates the user’s privacy, as it requires identification. The authentication process
to the network is often insecure and the networks are usually not encrypted. The
user has to register for each new network, as there is rarely any roaming. The
operators have to deal with small amounts of service, and therefore pricing is either
expensive for a short term or based on a long-running contract with fixed monthly
payments, both of which are undesirable to the clients.
A mechanism is required for the user to discover the available networks and pricing
models while his device is not connected to the Internet. There is no pre-established
trust relationship between the mobile device and the local operator. A user cannot
know whether the access point is run by a legitimate operator, or by a nosy eaves-
dropper who just wants to access the data the user transmits to the Internet. When
payment is involved, the local operator must be sure that it will get paid, although
it does not learn the user’s real name. The home network may or may not take part
in the connection setup between the client and the local provider. Users who have
established a connection to the local access point can run a service on their device
so that other users can use it to access the service, when they cannot connect to
the local access point directly. The user is getting paid for the services he relays
between the access point and other users, but he still cannot be identified.
We present a solution that includes a discovery mechanism for wireless Internet
access networks and their tariffs. We propose the first mechanism to recommend
a suitable tariff for each connection out of the available tariffs to the user based
on Internet usage profiles. Mutual authentication between the user and the access
point operator is provided. The resulting connection is encrypted, thus hiding the
transmitted information from third parties. A user cannot be charged for services
he did not use, and the operator is guaranteed payment.
Compared to previous solutions, the user stays anonymous and unlinkable, the local
provider does not obtain billing information of the user, the home network of the
user does not obtain details about the services offered and used, the user is able to
negotiate a tariff with the local provider directly, and the local provider is unable to
detect if a device has been accessing his services before. No previous solution offers
both direct tariff negotiation between the user and the local provider and prevents
disclosure of the agreed tariff and service use data to the home network.
An extension of the roaming mechanism is presented where users can relay service
to other users. Users are able to resell service to other users to earn money while
retaining anonymity, but they will become trackable in the process. All security
and privacy goals for users are retained when they use other users’ devices to access
wireless networks.
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Variations of the roaming mechanism support connection setup both with and with-
out participation of the home network during connection setup both for direct con-
nections and with a user relaying service.
1.3.2 Electronic Health Monitoring
In the electronic health monitoring scenario, chronic patients wear sensors embedded
in their clothes for continuous health monitoring. The data collected is used for
alerts in case of an emergency, and for long-term analysis, e.g., in the case of a heart
insufficiency. The system can be used as an alternative to bed-side medical devices
for continuous monitoring to allow patient mobility. The same system can also be
used for athletes and other health-aware persons: They can share the data with
a personal trainer or other athletes for review, advice, and competition. During
competitive events, live data from the athlete can be used by the trainer to discuss
a strategy with the athlete.
In an aging society, health issues are becoming more common. For the affected
patients, retaining their personal mobility is very big priority for their quality of
life. The technologies required to implement mobile health monitoring systems have
become affordable and usable.
Many jurisdictions impose laws regarding the security and privacy of medical data.
Therefore, a secure and privacy preserving solution for mobile health monitoring is
desirable.
Medical data is highly critical with regards to privacy. The solution must be secure
although a wide array of technologies is used within the solution. The mobile devices
provide only limited capabilities, e.g., only battery power, lower computation speed,
and slower communication than on an regular PC. The usability must meet the
requirements of elderly users and athletes during a competitive event.
In our solution, observers cannot learn any data. Compared to existing solutions,
full disclosure of medical data to a single operator for all users is prevented. The
users are able to share certain data sets from their body monitoring systems with
medical professionals and spouses, but can avoid disclosure of more data to other
authenticated persons. The users can select which kinds of data to share with whom,
i.e., various sets for various persons. Measurement details not relevant to the therapy
are removed to prevent reconstruction of personal habits to protect the users privacy.
In case of an emergency, privacy is disabled, so that nearby emergency physicians
are able to access all data instantly.
1.3.3 Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Nodes are inexpensive low-power devices which perform measure-
ments on environment data. In some scenarios, the nodes will be deployed in a
hostile environment where they cannot be physically maintained, i.e., the batteries
cannot be charged or replaced. Because wireless communication is energy intensive,
the communication means are highly optimized to conserve energy. Depending on
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the purpose of the sensor network, the nodes may need to have a common time base,
e.g., to observe the path of an object through the network. In some applications, the
nodes do not communicate until a certain event was detected. In previous solutions
for time synchronization, all nodes actively communicate in regular intervals, thus
using additional energy.
Attacks on time synchronization can defeat the purpose of the sensor network or
lead to increased power use of the sensors, thus draining the batteries of the nodes,
which disables the sensor network. During active communication, the presence and
the location of the sensor nodes is revealed to an observer.
Wireless sensor networks are often used for surveillance, metering, and safety appli-
cations. In these applications, the existence of the network should be kept secret. It
is therefore useful to create a solution that remains hidden from observers, i.e., that
does not cause constant wireless traffic within the network. The network also has
to be robust against attacks, as the attackers have an incentive to defeat the sensor
network.
Also, any solution for wireless sensor networks must be energy conserving. There is
very little memory and storage space, and the computing abilities of the processors
used are limited. Therefore, the use of security mechanisms that are widely estab-
lished in fixed computers is problematic. Easy deployment of the nodes must be
considered, i.e., the network graph is not known beforehand, so that pre-installing
pairwise keys is difficult.
With the proposed solution, the wireless sensor nodes are able to synchronize to the
clock of a master node. The nodes remain silent, and an observer cannot detect or
locate them based on the radio transmissions exchanged in the process. An attacker
cannot manipulate the synchronization messages in an effective fashion.
Compared to existing solutions, no pairwise keys are required, node capture attacks
do not affect the security of the solution, and nodes cannot be detected or located
by an attacker through the time synchronization protocol alone.
1.3.4 Excursus: Attacking Bluetooth 2.1+ in Passkey Entry Mode
When a user wants to connect two Bluetooth devices with each other, a pairing
method is required at the first time. For devices with numeric keyboards, the pairing
method Passkey Entry is required by the current Bluetooth Standard 4.0 (and also
in 2.1 and 3.0). The user has to enter a 6-digit PIN on both devices. The pairing
protects the newly established connection and is supposed to prevent man-in-the-
middle-attacks. However, previous work shows that the PIN can be decoded from
the data exchanged during the pairing. The user will likely use the same PIN again,
and some devices even require a fixed PIN, thus exposing the devices to the risk of a
successful attack on authentication. Such an attack will reveal the data exchanged
to the attacker and also allow manipulation.
Passkey Entry is the pairing method required for Bluetooth devices with keyboards
since 2007. It is implemented in virtually all mobile phones, tablet PCs, and lap-
tops; and also in many wireless keyboards. As the error lies in the standard, the
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vulnerability will exist in all devices. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
implementation of the attack has been created so far.
Implementations of Bluetooth are closed source. Large parts of the functionality
are implemented in hardware and cannot easily be manipulated for the purpose of
security analysis. An implementation of Bluetooth from scratch requires a flexible
and freely programmable radio interface, which is hard to come by and often not a
finished product in itself.
We have created an implementation of the attack to reveal the PIN to an observer.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of the attack, and
also the first implemented attack on Bluetooth since the introduction of version 2.1,
which mitigated previously implemented attacks.
1.4 Outline of this Thesis
Chapter 2 precisely defines the security and privacy-related terms in the context of
the scenarios where they are needed. It includes an introduction of the technologies
used, from wireless technologies to security and privacy mechanisms.
The subsequent chapters discuss one platform and scenario each where the stress
field between authentication and privacy is an issue: Chapter 3 discusses anony-
mous roaming in commercial Wireless LAN networks for mobile devices such as
laptops, tablet PCs, and smartphones. Chapter 4 discusses automated analysis and
selective disclosure of human health monitoring data for smartphones. Chapter 6
discusses secure time synchronization in a wireless sensor network without disclos-
ing the amount and location of the wireless sensor nodes. Chapter 5 is an excursus
into the implementation of an attack on Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, which
has come to our attention during the work on health monitoring. The conclusion is
drawn in Chapter 7.
Chapter2
Preliminaries
This chapter explains the technologies, security goals, and privacy goals used in this
thesis in the context of the scenarios just described in the introduction chapter:
Roaming in wireless networks, electronic health monitoring, and time synchroniza-
tion in wireless sensor networks. The definitions of the security goals are based
on the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [109]. The privacy definitions are dis-
cussed based on Pfitzmann et al. [123]. Mechanisms for security and privacy will
be described later in this chapter. The goals, mechanisms, and notations given in
this chapter will be used again in each later chapter of this thesis, where they are
applied to develop a novel solution for each scenario. At the end of this chapter, the
notations and assumptions used throughout the thesis will be defined.
2.1 Roaming in Wireless Networking
In this section, the scenario for wireless roaming is explained and an introduction to
the technologies used for wireless Internet access is presented. This is the foundation
for the wireless roaming solution that will be presented in Chapter 3.
In the wireless roaming scenario, a mobile device has an account with a home net-
work, but is unable to use its home network’s service directly. Therefore, it will use
the services of a foreign network, which has a roaming agreement with the home
network. In commercial systems, the foreign network requires payment for the ser-
vice that the mobile device uses. In roaming systems, payment is provided by the
home network, which bills the user after the connection. In non-roaming systems,
the user registers with the foreign network and pays directly to the foreign network.
A good roaming solution shall guarantee to the user that the foreign network cannot
overcharge. The tariff (sometimes also called rate) to be used between the mobile
and the foreign network shall be known to both parties and negotiable for both
parties. When multiple tariffs are available, a recommendation shall be given to the
user in his interest by his device. The roaming solution shall not disclose personal
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information to the foreign network, nor should it to disclose tariff information to the
home network.
2.1.1 Wireless Internet Access
Early wireless networking products targeted point-to-point connections in scenarios
where cabling solutions were infeasible, i.e., connections between islands or connec-
tions to remote locations, e.g, ALOHAnet [21] in 1971. Later, commercial wireless
network connections have also been used to overcome regulations, monopolies, and
other market restrictions in the so-called last mile, which is the network connection
from a home user to an Internet service provider.
Wireless networking was first offered to a broad range of customers in Laptops in
the late 1990’s, with data rates of 11 Mbit/s. The Wireless LAN (WLAN) standard
defined in IEEE 802.11 [1] helped to make laptops desirable for home users, as they
could now also be used to access the Internet in many locations of the owner’s
domestic home and some outdoor locations.
In the 2000’s, Internet access on mobile phones became popular and handsets
adopted WLAN to overcome slower and more expensive mobile data services, e.g.,
GPRS and UMTS. However, for these small devices, WLAN has a considerable im-
pact on battery lifetime. WLAN has also become ubiquitous in laptop PCs. Public
access points called hotspots have started to appear at airports, hotels, and in busi-
nesses aimed at passers-by. Community projects emerged that tried to cover whole
cities with WLAN coverage.
In the 2010’s, WLAN from one access point per household has replaced wired net-
works in many homes even for fixed devices, e.g., desktop PCs, video game consoles,
Blu-ray players, and smart TVs. Smartphones and tablet PCs are now using WLAN
as well, while desktop PCs start to disappear from domestic homes. Also, LTE net-
works have been created to foster mobile data service on laptops and smartphones.
WiMAX is a wireless standard defined in IEEE 802.16. It is different and incompat-
ible to 802.11 (WLAN). WiMAX provides greater range and lower data rates than
WLAN, but still lower range and higher speed than UMTS. Therefore, WiMAX
is a good match for the last mile in urban areas. Although WiMAX services are
offered in rural areas around the world, WiMAX never had the market penetration
of WLAN or UMTS [159]. WiMAX will not be discussed further in this thesis,
although the same solutions as proposed for WLAN could be applied with minor
modifications.
2.1.2 IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN
Wireless networking today is mostly based on the IEEE 802.11 standard [1] and its
extensions, which offer data rates from 2 Mbit/s in IEEE 802.11-1997 up to 866.7
Mbit/s in IEEE 802.11ac. The extensions (IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, ...) are
merged into the main standard document regularly, and the resulting document
carries the year of the merge in its name, e.g., IEEE 802.11-2012. WLAN uses
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Figure 2.1: 802.11i Security Overview
the license free 2412–2484 MHz ISM band1 worldwide, the 4915–5825 MHz bands
(sometimes called 5 GHz or 5.8 GHz), which are subject to national regulation,
and very rarely the 3658–3691 Mhz band. Wi-Fi is used as a synonym to WLAN
in colloquial English. However, Wi-Fi originally is a brand name by the Wi-Fi
Alliance, which is a trade association founded in 1999 by various hardware vendors
that certifies WLAN devices and promotes the use of WLAN technologies.
The physical layer and media access control layers of WLAN are defined by IEEE
802.11. In IEEE 802.11, the set of all stations communicating with each other
is called basic service set (BSS). The MAC address of the access point is used as
identifier, which is called BSSID. Wireless networks can be peer-to-peer or use a base
station, which is called access point. In WLAN, peer-to-peer networks are called
ad-hoc or independent BSS (IBSS), and networks using an access point are called
infrastructure BSS. The area covered by unique BSS’s may overlap.
Devices accessing a WLAN are called mobile stations (STAs) in the standard, and
mobile devices (MDs) in this thesis. An established wireless connection is called an
association.
WLAN Security Architecture
We will now describe the currently up to date WLAN security architecture WPA2,
which is also called Robust Security Network (RSN). It was introduced in IEEE
802.11i and adopted into IEEE 802.11-2007 [1]. Previous solutions like WEP and
WPA have been shown to contain weaknesses, are no longer deployed, and will not
be described here. The description of RSN is based on Benton’s summary of the
standard [35].
After the association between the client and the access point, the authentication
and key agreement is executed according to the specifications of the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) between the supplicant, the authenticator, and the
Authentication Server (AuS) as shown in Figure 2.1. EAP is a framework on top of
which diverse EAP methods can be implemented to provide authentication and key
agreement according to various protocols, e.g., EAP-TLS uses the Transport Layer
1ISM (industrial, scientific and medical) radio bands are reserved internationally for industrial,
scientific and medical applications. The ISM bands were initially intended for other uses than
communications, e.g., energy intensive microwave ovens, but are used for communications nowa-
days as well.
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Figure 2.2: Key Hierarchy in 802.11i Robust Security Network [35]
Security (TLS) protocol [51]. EAP was first defined in 1998 in RFC 2284, obsoleted
by RFC 3748 in 2004, and updated by RFC 5247 in 2008. EAP runs on the data
link layer and thus does not use the IP layer. Instead, it directly operates on top of
the MAC layer.
In EAP, the party requiring authentication is called authenticator, which is the
access point in WLAN. The devices connecting to a WLAN are called supplicants.
The authenticator has a connection to an authentication server (AuS), which is
often implemented with the RADIUS protocol with EAP support. For the use of
EAP in WLAN, IEEE 802.1X defines the encapsulation of the EAP over IEEE 802,
which is also called EAP over LAN or EAPOL. The resulting key from the EAP
method is called Master Session Key (MSK).
There is a complex key derivation in RSN as shown in Figure 2.2. If 802.1X authen-
tication is used, the master session key (MSK) given by an EAP method is the
top key. A section of the MSK is used to derive the PMK, depending on the EAP
method used. When a pre-shared key (PSK) is used, the PSK is the top key, and
the PSK will be copied to the pairwise master key (PMK). The PMK is used to
derive the pairwise transient key (PTK), which is specific to the pair of station and
AP that uses it and to the association itself. Therefore, a group of clients using the
same AP using the same PMK will use different PTKs, and a client connecting to
same AP again will use a different PTK.
2.1. Roaming in Wireless Networking 13
Supplicant
Client
Authenticator
AP
1. ANonce, PMK-id
calculate PTK
2. SNonce, seqnum, IE, MICKCK
calculate PTK
3. ANonce, EKEK(GTK),IE,seqnum+1,MICKCK
4. seqnum+1,MICKCK
Figure 2.3: 4-Way-Handshake
For broadcast and multicast messages, an additional mechanism is required. The
AP generates a random group master key (GMK), and derives group transient keys
(GTKs) for each new client association and disassociation. Each connected client
will receive an updated copy of the GTK from the AP. The GTK is then used to
encrypt and decrypt broadcast and multicast messages.
The final derived keys are the EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key (KCK), the EAPOL-
Key Encryption Key (KEK), and the Temporal Key (TK). The KCK and KEK are
used to protect EAPOL frames. The TK is used to protect regular network traffic
to provide confidentiality and integrity protection. Such a protected connection is
called Robust Security Network Association (RSNA).
Two ciphers exist to provide the RSNA: CCMP and TKIP. CCMP (Counter Cipher
Mode with Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol) is a cipher us-
ing AES in Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (CCM). Block and key size is 128 bit.
Implementation of CCMP is mandatory for WPA2 devices. TKIP (Temporal Key
Integrity Protocol) was originally introduced in WPA as a drop-in replacement for
the defunct WEP encryption standard and is deprecated since 2009, with the im-
plementation optional in 802.11i-2004. Like WEP, TKIP uses RC4, but updates the
keys frequently. TKIP is a wrapper around WEP. Many WEP devices were updated
to TKIP by software updates alone.
2.1.3 RADIUS
Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) is an Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) standard protocol [131, 158] to facilitate authentication, autho-
rization, and accounting of users accessing network services. In the WLAN context,
it is often used for the connection between the authenticator to its authentication
server (AuS) while a supplicant is connecting to transmit EAP messages. In this
scenario, the access point acts as RADIUS client, and the authentication server acts
as RADIUS server. The access point unpacks EAP contents from RADIUS messages
sent by the authentication server and forwards them to the supplicant. Received
EAP messages from the supplicant are encapsulated into RADIUS messages and
sent to the authentication server. Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
(AAA) with RADIUS can be used between multiple authentication servers either of
a single operator, or between multiple operators.
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Figure 2.4: Direct Roaming Scenario
Figure 2.5: Roaming over a Hop Scenario
2.1.4 Wireless Roaming
Throughout this thesis, we will use the term Mobile Device (MD) for the WLAN
client. The provider who has a long-running contract with the owner of the MD is
called Home Network (HN). Usually, the HN will operate access points to allow the
MD to access the Internet. The MD is thought to be a laptop PC or smartphone.
In the direct roaming scenario, the MD uses access points operated by another
party, which is called the Foreign Network (FN). The MD and the FN do not have a
relationship beforehand. However, the FN and the HN must have a relationship with
each other so that HN’s clients are able to use FN’s access points, which is called a
roaming agreement. Usually, the HN will pay the FN for the services the MD used,
and the MD will pay the HN. An overview over the direct roaming scenario is given
in Figure 2.4.
In the roaming scenario over a Hop, the connection between the MD and the FN is
provided by another MD, which will be called a Hop as shown in Figure 2.5. The
Hop extends the range of FN’s wireless network. The MD and the Hop may be
clients of different HNs. These HNs both need to have a roaming agreement with
the FN, but are not required to have a roaming agreement with each other. MD’s
HN will pay for the services the MD used, and the Hop’s HN will pay for the services
the Hop used.
Both scenarios allow the clients of the HN to access the Internet in places where the
HN does not operate access points, and it allows the FN to sell services beyond its
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own client base. Roaming is widely established in cellular phone services worldwide.
The most popular roaming WLAN service is eduroam [54], which is free for users in
higher education institutions, e.g., universities. However, roaming is rarely found in
paid WLAN services.
2.1.5 Definitions of Security Goals in Wireless Roaming
In this section, the security goals that are required for the roaming scenario will be
defined. These security goals will be used again in the chapter on roaming.
Definition 1. Authentication ensures the identity of an entity [109].
In the WLAN roaming scenario, authentication ensures that the user is actually
entitled to use services, and that the access point is actually operated by a legitimate
provider approved by the HN. Otherwise, anyone could set up an access point and
snoop on the data transmitted by the users. When two parties authenticate to each
other at the same time, mutual authentication is achieved.
Authentication is often proven by authentication factors, e.g., physical possession of
a real-world key or a token, or knowledge of a secret key or password, or inherent
factors such as fingerprints. Authentication protocols are used in communication
networks to provide authentication services based on these authentication factors.
This security goal is also called Entity Authentication. Entity Authentication is a
term used as a distinction from Data Authentication, which ensures that a set of
data was actually created by the appropriate entity.
A common attack on entity authentication is impersonation, which is often exe-
cuted as a man-in-the-middle-attack. In an impersonation attack in a roaming
scenario, an attacker could set up a fake access point to impersonate the FN, thus
obtaining user credentials from the MDs and the data the MDs exchange with the
Internet. An attacker could also impersonate another MD to use services at the
MD’s cost. In a man-in-the-middle-attack, the attacker impersonates the FN to the
MD and the MD to the FN, effectively relaying some messages unchanged, and pos-
sibly manipulating others. This is an effective attack on many protocols including
common hotel WLAN login sites [67, 116].
Definition 2. Confidentiality: Only authorized entities are able to access infor-
mation [109].
In a scenario including wireless data transmission, the data exchanged needs to be
kept secret, i.e., protected from reading by others who are able to receive the radio
signals. In the roaming scenario, the customer’s long-term identifier should also be
kept secret from the FN, and the tariff agreed upon and the amount of services used
should be kept secret from the HN.
Attacks on confidentiality are called eavesdropping and are used to obtain infor-
mation during communication.
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In some sources, confidentiality is also called secrecy. In a limited number of
sources, confidentiality is also called privacy. In this thesis, privacy means some-
thing different, as described in Chapter 1.
Confidentiality is required by law in most countries in many fields, e.g., law and
medicine. Confidentiality can be achieved by physically denying access to informa-
tion, or by rendering the information useless to unauthorized entities, e.g., through
the use of encryption. In a wireless communication scenario, it is especially difficult
to physically deny access on information.
Definition 3. Integrity: Only unauthorized entities can create or modify data
[109].
When unauthorized modification of data cannot be prevented, Integrity requires
that any such changes will be detected. When unauthorized changes are detected,
the data must be discarded. Integrity protection against random changes, e.g., by
technical inaccuracies, is achieved using checksums for error detection and error
correction. Integrity protection against an attacker is achieved by message authen-
tication codes (also called message integrity codes) and digital signatures.
Attacks on integrity are called modification of existing messages (including inser-
tion, deletion, and substitution) and forgery of new messages.
In the wireless roaming scenario, Integrity assures that the traffic between the client
and the access point is protected from manipulation.
Definition 4. Non-Repudiation: An entity cannot deny having sent a message
[109].
Non-Repudiation convinces an entity that it can later prove to a third party that the
other entity has sent a message, even when the other entity denies it. This makes
protocols with non-repudiation similar to a signature on a contract, which can also
be verified by other parties. In the paid roaming scenario, it is important for the
FN to be able to prove to the HN that the MD actually used services and agreed on
paying a specific amount for them.
Non-Repudiation is achieved by the use of digital signatures or a third party trusted
by both communicating parties. Attacks on Non-Repudiation are called repudia-
tion attacks.
Definition 5. Perfect Forward Secrecy: A past session key cannot be recon-
structed by disclosing long-term keys [109].
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) ensures that the security goals of a past session
remain intact even when the long-term keys used during its setup become known to
an attacker. An attack on PFS would be the decryption of a previously recorded
encrypted session between two parties after the attacker has obtained the private
key of one of the parties (or both). In the roaming context, PFS prevents an attacker
from accessing a recorded session’s contents even after obtaining the private keys
used by the mobile device and/or the foreign network to create a session. PFS can
be achieved with the use of certain key agreement algorithms.
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Definition 6. Key Confirmation from entity A to entity B: Assurance for entity
B that entity A is in possession of the correct key [3].
Key confirmation ensures that at the end of a key agreement protocol, one party is
confident that the other party has obtained the same key. This can be achieved by
directly proving it to the other party, i.e., by using the freshly agreed key during the
key agreement protocol. Mutual key confirmation ensures that both parties are
convinced that the other has the correct key.
In an unknown key share attack, the attacker takes part in an key agreement protocol
such that at the end, (at least) one of the parties shares a key with the attacker
without realizing that the key is not shared with the other legitimate party. In a
WLAN roaming scenario, the connection would not work when the MD and the FN
have agreed on different keys, as the FN could not decrypt MD’s requests and the
MD could not decrypt FN’s messages.
2.1.6 Definitions of Privacy Goals in Wireless Roaming
The following security goals are required in a WLAN roaming solution: Information
Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability.
Definition 7. „Information Privacy is the interest an individual has in con-
trolling, or at least significantly influencing, the handling of data about themselves
[45].“
As a general requirement, no entity should obtain more information about other
entities than it needs to perform its task. Specifically, the HN does not require
information about the tariff that the MD and the FN have agreed upon, and the
HN does not require information about the amount of service that the MD used
with the FN, or about the time and location of any session.
Definition 8. „Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set [123].“
The anonymity set is the set of all possible subjects, e.g., someone who uses a WLAN
roaming service must be in possession of a WLAN capable device that was within
radio range to an access point at the time the service was used. In this definition,
„not identifiable“ means that the attacker cannot uniquely characterize a subject.
The subjects within the anonymity set are indistinguishable to the attacker.
In the context of personal devices like mobile computers, the identity of the device
is linked to the identity of the user. Therefore, the identity of the devices has to
be protected to protect the user. Wireless devices carry a number of different types
of identifiers, the most obvious being the MAC address of the WLAN interface,
which is set by the manufacturer, worldwide unique, and usually never changed.
Changing the MAC is possible and not explicitly forbidden in the relevant standards.
However, collusions with existing MACs must be avoided. The use of the original
MAC breaches Anonymity.
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In the paid WLAN roaming scenario, the MD should remain anonymous to the FN
and to observers, but not to the HN. The HN has to be able to identify the MD to
facilitate billing.
Definition 9. „Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., sub-
jects, messages, actions, ...) from an attacker’s perspective means that within the
system (comprising these and possibly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently
distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not [123].“
Unlinkability guarantees that two distinct actions performed by the same entity
cannot be recognized as such by the attacker, i.e., when two sessions with the same
FN are initiated by the same MD at different times, no one can recognize that they
were run with the same MD.
Anonymity of a subject regarding an attribute may be defined as unlinkability of
this subject and this attribute, i.e., „Sender anonymity of a subject means that to
this potentially sending subject, each message is unlinkable.“ [123]
Tracking is an attack on unlinkability. The attacker reconstructs the path of an
object between different locations at different times. In the roaming scenario, track-
ing allows the FN to reconstruct the geographic movements of the user when he uses
the same FN multiple times.
2.2 Electronic Health Monitoring
This section provides an introduction to the health monitoring scenario, the tech-
nologies and security and privacy definitions that are important for it. They will be
used in the description of our proposed solution for health monitoring in Chapter 4.
In the context of this dissertation, electronic health monitoring means automatic
continuous surveillance of a patient’s vital parameters using body sensors connected
to a personal mobile device. It enables patients who need continuous monitoring
to leave the hospital ward and take part in everyday life. Most importantly, they
are able to live in their own homes. Some systems for electronic health monitoring
are already available on the market, but none has gained an outstanding market
penetration. This is in part caused by the constant advances in technology that
quickly render systems obsolete but there are also legislative issues and concerns
by patients. With the rapid development of radio technology culminating in the
deployment of 3G cellular networks in the European and North American markets
in the early 2000’s, the connectivity required for telemonitoring systems beyond
the proximity of a building was established. With prices for data connections over
3G cellular networks dropping and affordable flat rates being available in many
countries, these systems have become feasible in terms of cost for a broad range of
users.
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2.2.1 Technologies in Electronic Health Monitoring
Body Sensors
Various sensors are used in the HealthNet project, each measuring one physiological
body trait: Electrodes for electrocardiography (heart rate), a combined temperature
and humidity sensor, and two 3D acceleration sensors. The sensors are embedded in
a T-shirt, which is worn like a regular T-shirt [89]. All the sensors are connected to a
master node on the shirt using conductive yarn. The master node is communicating
to a smartphone using a wireless Bluetooth connection. The sensors and the hub on
the T-shirt are battery powered, i.e., no wire connection is needed.
Smartphones
Mobile phones that offer more features than regular mobile phones are called smart-
phones. They are closer to mobile computers than to regular phones, i.e., placing
calls and text messages is not the main feature of the device anymore. Instead, the
operating system running on the device allows a broad range of modifications by
the user, i.e., applications can be installed by the user. Smartphones often employ
WLAN interfaces and touch screens, although the first smartphones did not. Besides
WLAN, smartphones usually offer Bluetooth connectivity.
A typical smartphone at the time of writing (Apple iPhone 5) offers a 1.3 GHz dual
core ARM CPU, 1 GB RAM, 64 GB flash memory, and a 4 inch color LCD screen
with a resolution of 640x1136. Besides display size, this specification is close to a
laptop PC roughly 10 years ago (FSC AMILO L 1300), which had a 1.3 GHz Intel
Celeron CPU, 512 MB RAM, 40 GB hard drive, and a 1280x800 15.4 inch screen2.
The main competing smartphone operating systems are Google’s Android, Apple
iOS, and Microsoft Windows Phone. They are optimized for touchscreen operation
and offer software purchases through individual App stores. Digital rights manage-
ment is used to protect the device from illicit software, although without complete
success [55].
2.2.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a standard for wireless data transmission aimed at point-to-point con-
nections between low-energy devices. It was developed at the same time as WLAN
and uses the 2.4 GHz band. However, Bluetooth is incompatible to WLAN, although
Bluetooth 3.0 has adopted the WLAN physical layer to speed up data transmission
between two Bluetooth 3.0 devices (up to 24 Mbit/s).
Bluetooth devices have a range below 100 meters, typically around 10 meters. Typ-
ical applications are audio headsets, data transmission between two smartphones or
one smartphone and a PC, and for wireless keyboards and mice. Bluetooth provides
a bandwidth of 1 Mbit/s with the basic rate, 3 Mbit/s with the enhanced data rate
2http://www.webcitation.org/6AOidOZRV
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(EDR) (introduced in revision 2.1), and 24 Mbit/s with the High-Speed alternate
MAC/PHY (introduced in revision 3.0).
Bluetooth devices most commonly act as pairs. When two devices are connected to
each other for the first time, they exchange user input and output capabilities and
then agree on a pairwise key which will be used to protect this connection and later
connections. This process is called pairing. The security of Bluetooth relies on
user interaction during the pairing process, i.e., verifying that two devices display
the same PIN (proven secure [100]) or entering the same PIN on two devices (secure
when used with a fresh PIN, discussed in Chapter 5). The pairing process generates
a key which is used for link layer encryption with the custom E0 cipher to facilitate
confidentiality.
In Health Monitoring, Bluetooth is used to transmit patient health data between
the controller of the body sensor network on the patients sensor T-shirt and a user
device. To exchange data between devices of different users, Bluetooth, WLAN, and
cellular data service can be used.
Brief History of Bluetooth
Version 1.1, finalized in 2002, was the first major Bluetooth release. Bluetooth 1.1
was updated to 1.2 in 2005, introducing adaptive frequency-hopping spread spectrum
to better cope with radio interference (e.g., from a nearby 2.4 GHz WLAN). All later
Bluetooth versions are still compatible to 1.2.
Version 2.0 [9], introduced in 2004, adds the Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) extension
for faster file transfers (increased from 1 Mbit/s to 3 Mbit/s) to the standard. All
Bluetooth versions up to and including 2.0 use the same pairing process for which
various weaknesses have been published in the past [84, 95, 138]. With growing
market penetration, implementations of these attacks on real-world devices appeared
and were covered in the mainstream media.
Thus, a new pairing mechanism was designed to prevent the known attacks, which
was called Secure Simple Pairing (SSP). It was introduced in Bluetooth version
2.1 [12] in the year 2007. In 2009, version 3.0 [15] introduced an alternate 802.11
physical link layer for faster data exchange once the Bluetooth connection is estab-
lished. The 2010 version 4.0 [16] added a complete alternate protocol stack called
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) mode to reduce power consumption. Both revisions
3.0 and 4.0 continue to use the SSP process without changes.
In the following, only Bluetooth versions 2.1 and later will be considered. One of
the four pairing methods introduced in SSP, the Passkey Entry method, has been
shown to be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack in 2008 [99]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no implementation of this attack was created and no efforts
have been taken so far to modify the standard to prevent this attack.
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Secure Simple Pairing
The SSP process establishes a shared secret key called link key between two pairing
devices A and B. SSP starts with a capabilities exchange and an initial Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange (explained in detail in Section 2.4) in which the devices
A and B exchange their public Diffie-Hellman values PKax and PKbx in the clear.
In the following authentication stage 1, the initial DH exchange is authenticated
using one of four supported methods called Just Works, Out of Band, Numeric
Comparison, and Passkey Entry, depending on the capabilities of the devices. In
authentication stage 2, the two devices confirm that they have indeed established
the same DH-key. The link key is ultimately derived from the confirmed DH-key.
Which of the four different modes for authentication stage 1 is used depends on
the input and output capabilities of the two pairing devices. Table 2.1 provides a
overview on the recommended selection of the modes for different combinations of
device capabilities. In the following, we briefly review three modes and detail the
fourth mode (Passkey Entry), which is of primary interest in the context of this
thesis.
The Just Works mode does not require a display or keyboard, and is most com-
monly found on wireless headsets today. It does not provide any means to authen-
ticate the initial DH-exchange and as such is naturally vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks.
The Out Of Band (OOB) mode uses another communication channel such as Near
Field Communication (NFC) during the pairing process to exchange fingerprints
of the exchanged public DH-values. To the best of our knowledge, OOB is not
implemented in any current devices on the market.
The Numeric Comparison mode requires that both devices have a display and a
yes/no button, but it does not require a numeric keyboard on any of the two devices.
After initiating the pairing process, both devices display a six-digit number, which
are computed from the public DH-values and freshly chosen nonces with the help
of a hash function. The user confirms that both numbers are the same by pressing
a button on each of the devices and thereby authenticates the initial DH-exchange.
An attacker cannot derive any information about the resulting link key from the
displayed numbers. The Numeric Comparison method was proven to be secure in
[100].
In Passkey Entry mode, authentication is provided using an numeric PIN: Either
one device displays a numeric passkey and the user has to enter it on the other
Capabilities of Capabilities of Initiating Device (A)
Responding Display Display and Keyboard
Device (B) Digits yes/no Keys Only
Display Digits Just Works Just Works Passkey Entry
Display, yes/no Keys Just Works Numeric Comp. Passkey Entry
Keyboard Only Passkey Entry Passkey Entry Passkey Entry
Table 2.1: Availability of Secure Simple Pairing Methods (Bluetooth Standard [12],
vol. 3, p. 207)
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Figure 2.6: Our HealthNet Scenario Overview
device’s keyboard, or the user has to enter the same 6-digit PIN on both devices.
The underlying protocol is the same in both cases, except that in the first case, the
number is chosen by the device and not by the user. The Passkey Entry mode will
be discussed and analyzed in detail and beyond the scope of the health monitoring
scenario in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
2.2.3 Details on the RWTH HealthNet Project
The scenario underlying the HealthNet project [88] is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The
HealthNet project is centered around the patient’s smartphone which has a wireless
Bluetooth connection to the body sensor network. The raw data from the sensors
is processed on the smartphone. After authenticating to his smartphone, the user
is able to manage the data and his contacts on the phones. He can also setup
which data sets to share with which contacts. This allows a close supervision for
some parties, i.e., the family, and a more generalized output for others, e.g., medical
professionals.
When an emergency is detected, the smartphone is able to automatically initiate an
emergency call and to play an audio message. Also, SMS can be sent.
There is also an interface for connections initiated by emergency physicians, which
allows connections with access to the full data set after a button was tapped on the
smartphone. Emergency physicians are identified and authenticated through the use
of pre-installed certificates on the patient’s phone. A revocation mechanism ensures
that devices stolen from emergency physicians cannot be used to read data from a
patient’s device.
Medical data is only stored in encrypted form on the devices such that a stolen
device will not reveal any data to outsiders3.
3when a good password was used
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2.2.4 Definitions of Security Goals in Electronic Health Monitoring
Authentication ensures that only entitled users can access the HealthNet system,
and thereby, the health data and the settings in the system. This applies for stored
data on the patient’s device as well as for data transmissions over any of the wireless
interfaces. In the HealthNet solution, different data sets can be made available for
different parties. Although the emergency physicians shall be able to bypass the
authentication required for regular users on the patient’s phone, they must have
physical access to the patient’s phone to tap a button. When the data was accessible
without authentication, the patient’s data would be public. This is undesirable for
most patients and illegal in many jurisdictions.
Confidentiality ensures that the medical data cannot be obtained by an attacker.
This applies both for data in storage and during data transmission to another device.
Integrity ensures that the recorded health data cannot be manipulated by an at-
tacker. Like Confidentiality, Integrity must be achieved during data storage and data
transmission. Otherwise, the manipulated data could lead to medical malpractice
of the patient, with possibly fatal consequences.
Perfect Forward Secrecy for transmitted data prevents decryption of exchanged
data by an attacker when he obtains a long-term secret. Perfect Forward Secrecy is
desirable for the data transmissions.
2.2.5 Definitions of Privacy Goals in Electronic Health Monitoring
As described before, „Information Privacy is the interest an individual has in con-
trolling, or at least significantly influencing, the handling of data about themselves
[45].“ Information Privacy is required in the processing of health data. It ensures
that the recorded data contains no unneeded details about the patient’s life, i.e.,
that no personal habits can be reconstructed. The measured medical data is pre-
processed on the patient’s device. This allows removal of unnecessary details under
full control of the owner.
Anonymity is required so that the data does not identify the patient. Also, it
should be impossible to use the data to uniquely identify the patient.
2.3 Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks
This section provides an introduction to the time synchronization in wireless sensor
networks scenario, and the technologies and security and privacy definitions impor-
tant in this context. We will reuse these in Chapter 6, where we propose a solution
for time synchronization in wireless sensor networks.
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2.3.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor nodes are inexpensive, autonomous devices which are deployed in
a monitoring environment and operate without user interaction. The nodes are
equipped with a wireless networking interface so that they are able to communicate
with each other. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are networks built by wireless
sensor nodes. Often, a gateway node is present, which serves as a bridge from the
WSN to another network, i.e., for analysis of the measurements within the WSN.
In some scenarios, the nodes will be deployed in a hostile environment where they
cannot be physically maintained, i.e., their batteries cannot be charged or replaced.
Because wireless communication is energy intensive, the communication means are
highly optimized to conserve energy and transmissions are reduced to a minimum. In
some applications, the nodes do not communicate until a certain event was detected.
2.3.2 Technologies and Limits
WSN deployments may or may not follow a pattern. Therefore, sensor nodes need
self-organizing networking capabilities. There is usually no central infrastructure
in WSNs except for the gateway to another network. Messages to the gateway are
relayed over the network by all the individual nodes. The gateway is used to forward
the services provided by the network to the outside, i.e., to the owner.
Due to the nature of this scenario, sensor nodes need a long battery life, which
implicates less powerful hardware than most other platforms. A typical sensor node
is the TelosB crossbow, which is based on an 8 MHz TI MSP430 microcontroller,
10 kB RAM, 48 kB program flash and 1 MB measurement serial flash memory,
and a IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee radio with onboard antenna. Power consumption is
especially low at 1.8 mA current draw during computing and 5.1 µA in sleep mode.
The devices are often powered by 2 household 1.5V AA batteries.
IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee radio is a standard [2] for low-power wireless networks in
either star, tree, or mesh configuration. ZigBee operates in the industrial, scientific,
and medical (ISM) radio bands: 868 MHz in Europe, 915 MHz in the USA and
Australia, and also 2.4 GHz worldwide. The data rate is comparatively low at either
20, 40, or 250 kbit/s, as the transmission was specified to be energy efficient.
ZigBee networks can be either beacon-enabled or non-beacon-enabled. In beacon-
enabled networks, special nodes act as routers which transmit periodic broadcast
messages. The regular nodes may switch off their radio interfaces between the
beacon messages to save power. Beacon intervals range from 15 µs to 13 minutes.
In non-beacon-enabled networks, the nodes must have their receiving radios switched
on all the time, which is more power consuming, but allows all nodes to reach all
other nodes at any time without having to wait for the next beacon. A collision
detection and avoidance mechanism is used during transmission.
Any solution for wireless sensors networks must be energy conserving. There is very
little memory and storage space, and the computing abilities of the processors used
are limited. Therefore, the use security mechanisms established in fixed computers
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is problematic. Easy deployment of the nodes must be considered, i.e., the network
graph is not known beforehand, so that pre-installing pairwise keys is difficult.
2.3.3 Time Synchronization
Time synchronization in wireless sensor networks is important for many applications.
In beacon-enabled mode, most stations are in a power saving sleep mode most of
the time. They can only communicate with each other when their radio interfaces
are switched on. A sensor node that cannot find out when to try to communicate
to other stations will either drop from the network or need to try over and over
again, which greatly reduces its battery life, as radio communication is the single
most power consuming task of sensor nodes. In both cases, the desynchronized node
quickly becomes useless for the purpose the sensor network was installed for.
With more accurate time synchronization, the wake up schedule will be executed
more efficiently. In addition, in many applications, data gathered by sensor nodes is
meaningless if it cannot be bound to the time when it was gathered. For example,
precise time tagging and thus synchronization is required for beam forming, tracking,
and locating an object.
Time synchronization must resist modification attempts by attackers, especially in
applications such as accounting, metering, and billing systems. In these applications,
an attacker could gain direct profit beyond obstructing services from tampering with
the time synchronization process.
2.3.4 Definitions of Security Goals in Time Synchronization
Authentication ensures that nodes will only synchronize to the clock of the le-
gitimate master node, i.e., attackers cannot force nodes to accept other values. By
impersonating the master node, an attacker could force a node to change its clock to
a different time. This would hinder operation of the node, because it will use more
power to connect to other nodes. Also, measurements performed by the attacked
node will be meaningless for the purpose of the network, and possibly obscure the
data collected.
The Integrity of the broadcasted timestamp is achieved so that it cannot be ma-
nipulated during transmission. Again, this prevents attackers from manipulating
the message contents.
In the context of time synchronization, the meaning of a message does not only
depend on its contents, but also on the time it was received. Client nodes are
therefore able to filter messages that have been delayed by an attacker4. Otherwise,
an attacker could replay an old synchronization message to adjust a client node’s
clock back by a great amount of time. This is called a pulse delay attack.
In a node capture attack, an attacker gains physical control over a sensor node.
The attacker is thus able to read, modify, and erase the contents of the memory
4when the delay exceeds a certain threshold
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on the sensor node and to manipulate the sensor node’s behavior. Some protocols
are only secure when less than a certain percentage of the sensor nodes have been
captured, because nodes place trust on their neighbors. Our solution should be
resistant to the capture of an arbitrary number of nodes, so that an attacker cannot
use captured nodes to influence the remaining nodes.
2.3.5 Definitions of Privacy Goals in Time Synchronization
Definition 10. „Undetectability of an item of interest (IOI) from an attacker’s
perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it exists
or not [123].“
Undetectability requires protection of the IOI as such, whereas anonymity and link-
ability only require protection of the relationships between IOIs, i.e., undetectable
messages must be indistinguishable from random noise.
In the time synchronization for wireless sensor networks scenario, undetectability
ensures that an attacker cannot determine whether a client node exists or not.
2.4 Definitions of Security Mechanisms
Security mechanisms are required to implement security goals. In the following, the
most common security mechanisms will be described from a high-level view. Because
of space constraints and readily available related work, no concrete algorithms will
be described. The mechanisms shown are only used as building blocks later in this
thesis and are not evaluated themselves.
Hash Functions
Definition 11. y = h(x) is a hash function when h maps the input x of arbitrary
(but finite) length to output of fixed length.
The output y is called hash value, digest, or just hash (of x). The same input will
always result in the same output.
Cryptographic Hash Functions
When a hash function meets the following criteria, it is called a cryptographic hash
function:
Definition 12. Preimage Resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is
computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., to
find any preimage x such that h(x) = y when given any y for which a corresponding
input is not known [109].
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Preimage resistant hash functions are also called one-way hash functions, or trap-
door functions. These can be used to store password files. This prevents an attacker
from easily logging into the system despite being able to access the password file.
Note that an attacker can compute outputs to arbitrary inputs and therefore invert
the hash function for such outputs. In a password file, attackers can use a dictionary
of the most common passwords and their hash values to find matches.
Definition 13. Second Preimage Resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find
any second input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given an
output y, it is not feasible to obtain an x′ so that h(x′) = y [109].
In the password file example, an attacker cannot find a password that matches the
stored hash of a password, even when the chosen password is not the actual password.
Definition 14. Collision Resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any two
distinct inputs x1, x2 which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x1) = h(x2)
[109].
Note that here there is free choice of both inputs. In an example where a hash of a
message is certified, an attacker can obtain certification for x1 but not for x2, then
claim that the certification holds for x2 when only the hash of the message is verified
against the certification.
Because hash functions have a finite output length, it is impossible to construct a
cryptographic hash function that is secure against an attacker with infinite resources.
All these goals can be broken by enumerating all possible input values. Therefore,
„infeasible“ is commonly understood to provide protection from an attacker with
the largest currently thinkable resources for a certain period of time. The period of
time has to be considered regarding the application, e.g., when the hash values are
used in an authentication protocol that takes at most ten seconds to execute, the
system could be considered secure if an attacker with large resources needs two days
to find a second preimage, which would allow him to obscure the authentication.
The effort largely depends on the output length, which is usually 128–256 bits.
Because of progress with parallel computing and in theoretical analysis, a number
of hash functions have been deprecated recently, e.g., MD-5, RIPEMD and SHA-0.
SHA-1 (160 bit output) is currently in wide use, with a migration going on to SHA-2
(224, 256, 384, or 512 bit output).
Secret Key Encryption
Secret key encryption (also known as symmetric encryption) facilitates confidential-
ity with the use of a secret key K. The key K is a subset of the key space κ. The
size of K is |K|, often 128 or 256 bit. The secret key is shared only between the
legitimate parties, i.e., only the parties allowed to access the data have knowledge
of one key. The same key is used to encrypt and decrypt. The encryption function
generates ciphertext c using the secret key K and the plain text.
Secret key ciphers are either block ciphers or stream ciphers:
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Block ciphers encrypt one block of the input m at once and output an encrypted
block of the same size n, i.e., AES uses 128 bit blocks. The key size is independent
of the block size. Formal description of block cipher encryption E of a data set Vn
(with n bits):
Definition 15. An n-bit block cipher is a function E : Vn × κ→ Vn, such that for
each key K ∈ κ,E(m,K) is an invertible mapping (the encryption function for K)
from Vn to Vn, written EK(m). The inverse mapping is the decryption function,
denoted DK(c). c = EK(m) denotes that ciphertext c results from encrypting plain
text m under K [109].
For correct operation on arbitrary plain text, the ciphertext block size cannot be
less than the plain text block size. Usually, the plain text block size equals the
ciphertext block size: |c| = |m|.
When the size of the plain text does not match the plain text block size, the plain
text must be divided into blocks and padded to fill the last block.
Various block modes are used for this purpose. Some of them require an initialization
vector (IV) to randomize the input, usually in the first block. The IV must be unique
for each encryption, i.e., it shall never be reused. In general, IVs need not be secret,
i.e., they can be transferred along with the ciphertext. Usually, the first block to be
encrypted is denoted m1, and its encryption is c1. Two block modes will be discussed
here:
Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode is the most simple block mode. Each block is
treated individually:
ci = EK(mi) (2.1)
mi = DK(ci) (2.2)
In ECB mode, parallel encryption and decryption of large messages (parallelization)
is possible. However, identical plain text blocks lead to identical ciphertext block,
thus revealing information to the attacker. When ciphertext blocks are reordered or
deleted, the decryption returns plain text that is accordingly shortened or permuted
without indicating an error. When the output can be mistaken for valid messages,
this allows for typing attacks.
In Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode, the previous ciphertext block is XORed on
the next plain text block. An IV is required for the first block: c0 = IV , which may
be transmitted in the clear.
ci = EK(mi ⊕ ci−1) (2.3)
mi = DK(ci)⊕ ci−1 (2.4)
Thus, deleted or ciphertext blocks result in garbled output (looking like random
data) in the affected blocks and each following one, which can be detected by ap-
2.4. Definitions of Security Mechanisms 29
plications/users that expect the output to have a structure. When two ciphertext
blocks ci, cj are reordered, the resulting plaintext blocks mk will be garbled for
i ≤ k ≤ j + 1. Parallelization is impossible for CBC encryption, but possible for
CBC decryption.
There are many more block modes which will not be discussed here.
The most common block cipher is AES [8], which is a standardized version of the
Rijndael cipher supporting 128, 192, and 256 bit key sizes with a 128 bit key size.
AES is used as a building block in many protocols, e.g., in the wireless standards
WLAN (CCMP) and ZigBee, but also in general computing with TLS and IPsec
[87], and also for storage encryption.
Stream ciphers use a derivation function F to generate a keystream which has the
same length as the data to be encrypted/decrypted. The keystream depends on the
secret key and an initialization vector (IV): ki = F (K, IV, i).
The keystream is then added to the data stream m, bit per bit, using the XOR
function: ci = mi ⊕ ki. Because of the symmetry of the XOR function, decryption
works just the same: mi = ci ⊕ ki.
However, the symmetry of the XOR function is also a fundamental drawback of
stream ciphers: A know plain text attack reveals the keystream: ci ⊕ mi = ki.
This allows an attacker to create valid ciphertext: c′i = m′i ⊕ ki. Manipulation of
ciphertext in a single step is also possible. The original ciphertext ci = mi ⊕ ki can
be manipulated to replace mi by m′i as follows: c′i = ci ⊕mi ⊕m′i.
Therefore, additional mechanisms are required to provide integrity protection of
the ciphertext, e.g., in Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the original protection
mechanism in 802.11 WLAN, a CRC-32 checksum was used.
Stream ciphers are not relied on as a security mechanism throughout this thesis,
although Bluetooth is used later, which uses the E0 stream cipher. Well-known
stream ciphers are One Time Pad (OTP), RC4 (SSL, WEP), and A5/1 (GSM).
Message Integrity Codes
Message Integrity Codes (sometimes called Message Authentication Codes, or MAC)
are a class of hash functions which use a secret key as additional input. MACs can
be used to provide integrity of the message contents, but also to authenticate the
sender of a message. Thus, they facilitate Integrity, but they can also be used for
authentication protocols. A typical MAC is the hash-based message authentication
code defined in RFC 2104 [94]:
HMAC(K,m) = H((K ⊕ opad), H((K ⊕ ipad),m)), (2.5)
where H is a cryptographic hash function, K is a secret key which is padded to
the input block size of the hash function using extra zeros, or the hash of the
original key if it is too long, m is the message to be authenticated, ⊕ denotes
bitwise exclusive or (XOR), opad is the outer padding (0x5c5c5c...5c5c, one-block-
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long hexadecimal constant), and ipad is the inner padding (0x363636...3636, one-
block-long hexadecimal constant).
As the key is known to more than one party, Message Integrity Codes cannot be
used to facilitate non-repudiation.
Public Key Encryption
Public key encryption systems provide a key setup mechanism, an encryption func-
tion, and a decryption function. The key setup mechanism generates a public and
private key pair for a party X.
The public key can be distributed freely by X or anybody else. It is used to encrypt
messages m for X: y = EX(m)
To decrypt the message y, the private key of X is required. This is the decryption
key, and it must not be shared with other parties. The decryption returns the
original message m: DX(y) = m
Without knowledge of the private key, it is impossible to determine the original
message.
Well-known public key encryption schemes include schemes based on RSA [132],
DSA [6], and ElGamal [56].
Public key encryption can be used to obtain confidentiality, or as a building block in
authentication protocols. The main advantage of public key encryption compared
to symmetric key encryption is that there is no need to transmit a secret key to the
other party [52]. However, implementations of public key encryption are slower/more
resource consuming than symmetric key encryption ones. Therefore, often a new
symmetric key will be generated and used to encrypt plain text data, and only the
new key will be encrypted using a public key cipher. These schemes are called hybrid
encryption schemes.
Digital Signatures
Digital signature systems provide a key setup mechanism, an signature creation
function, and a signature verification function. The key setup mechanism generates
a public and private key pair for a party X.
To create a signature of message m, the private key of X is required. This is the
signature creation key, and it must not be shared with other parties. The signature
creation function returns the signature of message m: sigX(m) = y.
The public signature verification key can be distributed freely by X or anybody else.
It is used to verify the signatures created by X: sigX(m).
Without knowledge of the private key, it is impossible to generate signatures of a
self-chosen message.
Well-known digital signature schemes include ElGamal [56], RSA [132], ECC [90,
113], Rabin [127], and Cramer-Shoup [48].
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Digital signatures can be used to obtain authentication, or as a building block in
authentication protocols. The mathematical foundations of digital signature schemes
work like public key encryption with the private and public keys interchanged.
Public Key Certificates
A public key certificate must contain at least an identifier of a party and its public
key. The certificate is signed by a certification authority (CA), to which the verifiers
know the public signature verification key. Certificates are used to bind an identity
to a public key. Possession of the public key of a CA implies trust in the CA’s
signing process, i.e., verification if the signed identifier and public keys are indeed
correct.
The public keys of CAs are known to clients because they are stored in the CA
certificates (also called root certificates) which are preinstalled in many clients, e.g.,
in operating systems or web browsers. These CA certificates are self-signed, or
unsigned. Certificates are helpful in making public key systems work on a large scale,
as they enable secure connections between parties who have not had a connection
of any kind before.
Certificates usually also contain the identifier of the issuing CA, a serial number,
the purpose of the signed key (encryption or signature verification), the algorithms
the key is meant for and that was used to create the signature on the certificate,
and timestamps for their creation date and an expiration date.
Certificates can be revoked by the CA, e.g., when the private key to a certified public
key was lost or compromised. To revoke a certificate, a revocation certificate is
issued, and the certificate’s serial number is added to the CA’s certificate revocation
list (CRL), which also contains a validity period and which is signed by the CA.
CRLs are automatically created by the CA when new certificates are revoked and
before the validity period of the last CRL has expired.
Clients can verify the validity of a certificate by connecting to the CA, i.e., using
the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), or by verifying the current CRL.
CRLs may be used oﬄine, without a connection to the CA, but the CRLs should
be updated frequently.
Public key certificates are standardized in ITU-T X.509 [80], of which the most recent
and popular specification is defined in RFC 5280 [46]. Other standards include the
PKCS standards [133], Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [41], and the ETSI standards
[11, 14].
Another approach to public key distribution is the web of trust as introduced in
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) toolkit defined in the OpenPGP standard RFC 4880
[41], which does not need CAs. The web of trust provides a decentralized public key
authentication system by allowing users to sign the public keys of each other with
various levels of trust.
A certificate issued for a party under a pseudonym is called a pseudonym certificate.
A party may also have an inventory of pseudonym certificates each issued on a
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different pseudonym. Unlinkability can be achieved when the same pseudonym is
never used more than once with another party.
Cross Certificates
A cross certificate is a certificate issued by one certificate authority for the signature
verification key of another certificate authority. It allows users who trust the issuing
certificate authority to verify certificates issued by the certificate authority that
the cross certificate was issued for. Therefore, users are able to use public key
encryption/signatures with systems issued by other operators. E.g., certCA-A(CA-
B) is a certificate issued by the CA of A for the CA of B. It allows users who have
the public key of CA-A to obtain the public key of CA-B, which can then be used to
obtain and verify public keys of entities certified by CA-B, e.g., with certCA-B(B1)
for entity B1.
Assuming an entity A1, which has the public key of CA-A preinstalled, connects to
an entity B1. A typical signature verification path for this scenario would be:
• A1 connects to B1. B1 sends a cross certificate certCA-A(CA-B), a certificate
certCA-B(B1) and a digital signature by B1: sigB1(data), data.
• A1 verifies the signature that CA-A created on the cross certificate for CA-B,
certCA-A(CA-B), using the preinstalled public key of CA-A.
• A1 extracts the public key of CA-B from the cross certificate and verifies
signature of CA-B on the certificate of B1 certCA-B(B1).
• A1 extracts the public key of B1 from the certificate of B1 and verifies the
signature of B1 on sigB1(data).
Key Establishment
Key establishment protocols are run by two or more parties who want to engage
in a secure communication session by establishing a secret key between them. Key
establishment protocols can be either key transport protocols or key agreement
protocols. In key transport protocols, at least one party does not influence the key;
instead, the key is given by another party. In key agreement protocols, all parties
influence the resulting key.
A popular mechanism to establish a secret key on a public channel is the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement [75]. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement works like this:
Two parties A and B want to establish a secret key over a public, but authentic
channel. This means that an attacker is able to listen on the messages sent, but
he cannot impersonate any of the parties. Both parties agree on a generator g and
large prime p, with 2 ≤ g ≤ p− 2. These values result from a key generator and can
be sent in the clear.
Both parties pick a random number between 2 and p − 2, rA and rB. These are
called the private DH values. Party A computes grA mod p = tA, Party B computes
grB mod p = tB. These are called the public DH values. Both parties sent their
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A B
1. tA
K = tA
rB
2. sigB(tB, tA, A)
K = tB
ra
3. sigA(tA, tB, B)
Figure 2.7: The BCK Key Agreement Protocol
A B
1. tA
K = tA
rB
2. MICK(sigB(tB, tA, A))
K = tB
rA
3. MICK(sigA(tA, tB, B))
Figure 2.8: The ISO/IEC 11770-3 Key Agreement Mechanism 7
public DH value to the other party. Party A computes tBrA mod p = K, Party B
computes tArB mod p = K. Now both parties are in possession of a shared key K.
Proof that both parties agree on the same key:
tB
rA = grB ·rA = grA·rB = tArB mod p (2.6)
The key K cannot be calculated without knowledge of one of the private DH values.
Thus, K is a secret key. As both parties have influence on the outcome of K, this
is a key agreement protocol. When at least one party uses a random value for its
private DH values, the key K is fresh.
However, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol does not provide authenti-
cation: The parties cannot verify with whom they agree a key. Thus, an attacker
could take part in the protocol and act as another party, who would share a key
with the attacker in an unknown key share attack. Therefore, key establishment
protocols must also ensure authentication.
The BCK protocol [36] is such an authentication and key establishment protocol
based on Diffie-Hellman, which is shown in Figure 2.7. It facilitates secure authenti-
cation and key establishment over an insecure channel when two parties are in pos-
session of each others’ public signature verification keys. The security of the BCK
two party authentication and key agreement protocol is well researched [34, 42]. It
provides no key confirmation, so a key confirmation mechanism must be added if it is
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desired. The ISO/IEC 11770-3 Key Agreement Mechanism 7 [4] is a variant of the
BCK protocol with added explicit key confirmation using message authentication
codes, which is shown in Figure 2.8.
A well-known example for an authenticated key establishment protocol is the Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) protocol suite [51], which is used to secure commonly used
protocols such as HTTP and SMTP.
Key Derivation
When two parties share a secret key and want to use it for different purposes, e.g.,
integrity protection and encryption, key derivation should be used. Assume two
parties share a key K and want to use different keys KI for integrity protection
and KE for encryption. Then, KI and KE will be generated from K using a key
derivation function. Thus, an attacker recovering KE cannot reveal KI at the same
time (and vice versa).
Key derivation functions are standardized, e.g., in IEEE KDF1 [7]. Some key deriva-
tion functions use cryptographic hash functions, building on their pre-image resis-
tance property.
2.5 Definitions of Privacy Mechanisms
Privacy mechanisms are used to achieve privacy goals. In the following, the mecha-
nisms used as building blocks later in this thesis will be described from a high-level
view. No concrete algorithms will be described or evaluated.
Trusted Third Party
A trusted third party (TTP) can be used as a middle man between the user and the
service. When authentication is required, the TTP must be trusted by both parties.
The TTP will forward payload or compute on input given by the others parties, but
avoid disclosure of information that might help one party identify the other.
An example for a privacy service based on a TTP mechanism is a commercially
operated access point for Internet users in the roaming scenario. The user pays to
use the service but does not give his payment credentials to the operator of the access
point. The user’s home network acts as a trusted third party, as it will vouch to the
operator for the user’s payments, and acknowledges to the user that the operator of
the access point is trustworthy.
Pseudonymity
Definition 16. „A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other than one of the
subject’s real names. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identifiers.“ [123]
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In general, pseudonyms may contain side information, e.g., user chosen pseudonyms
may indicate cultural preferences. Random bit strings should be used. For a device,
the „identity“ usually means a unique identification, e.g., the MAC address of a
network device or the IMEI of a mobile phone.
Pseudonymity is not a privacy goal like anonymity. Pseudonymity is simply a mech-
anism for identity management. A pseudonym may be used by a single holder at
one time, or by a group of holders. Multiple users may transfer a pseudonym be-
tween each other, i.e., a transferable pseudonym. Each entity may hold a single
pseudonym, or multiple pseudonyms.
When a pseudonym is used by a group of users, this group defines the anonymity
set, as the attacker cannot distinguish which user has performed an action using the
pseudonym.
Examples for the use of pseudonyms to facilitate privacy is the Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) mechanism in GSM and UMTS. The TMSI is a 32 bit
random number assigned to a user by the network, and it is used as an identifier
within a location area. The TMSI is updated frequently. This prevents an attacker
listening on the radio interface from tracking the user. The user’s globally unique
long-term identifier, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), is only
used after the cellphone was switched on, or when the TMSI becomes corrupt.
2.6 Electronic Tick Payment
In general, electronic payment systems are used to transfer funds over a data con-
nection, or rather to provide cryptographically secured guarantees that real-world
payment will be made later. In this thesis, electronic payment is used in the wireless
roaming chapter. A payment consists of the payer ID, the payee ID, the amount and
currency to be paid, a proof that only the payer could have created, and possibly
more information, e.g., a timestamp for the time of payment.
Types of Payment Systems
In general, there are three types of electronic payment systems: Prepaid systems
require the user to buy credits for a certain purpose in advance when connected to
his bank so that he cannot run into debts at the service provider by using services.
A mechanism to prevent double spending is required for prepaid systems. Examples
of these mechanism are user selected serial numbers which are signed by a bank
after being blinded by the user as in Digicash [43], or a online connection to bank as
in Millicent [66]. A problem of prepaid systems is that there will often be leftover
credits. Therefore, some users try to avoid prepaid systems when they are not sure
that they will use them frequently.
Pay-now systems guarantee that funds are transferred at the time of purchase.
These systems require the bank to be online (connected to payer or payee) at the
time of purchase [81, 83]. It is required to avoid double spending and overspending.
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The bank will check if the demanded funds are available before authorizing the
transaction.
In postpaid services, the funds are transferred after the purchase, e.g., in form of a
bill. For postpaid services, double spending is not an issue: The user will be billed
by his bank for the services he has used regardless of whether he is able to pay each
exact amount. Usually, some a credit check is run on potential new costumers by
the bank to avoid large shortfalls in payment.
In credit based systems, the user is billed at the end of each billing period for his
new purchases. The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [5] is a standard protocol
for credit card transaction processing that hides credit card numbers from the mer-
chant and order information from the bank, but it requires the bank to be online
during each transaction.
Micropayment and Tick Payment
Micropayment refers to the payment of very small amounts of money, i.e., well below
1 e, in the single-digit cent range or even lower. A fundamental requirement for
a micropayment system is a low transaction cost. Otherwise, the transaction cost
exceeds the transaction values, thus rendering the system inefficient. The most
popular micropayment application at the time of writing is flattr5, an online micro
donation service. Its users pay a fixed self-chosen monthly amount (current minimum
2 e) and then share it among self-chosen receivers who display a Flattr button on
their website. Receivers are usually content providers, e.g., bloggers and artists.
Tick payment is a financial transaction that consists of frequent chronological trans-
actions of fractions of the sum during a certain amount of time, e.g., paying 1 cent
every minute to access the Internet. The user can start using the Internet service
right after the first tick payment of 1 cent and continues sending tick payments until
he does not want to use more service.
Tick payment protocols combine some advantages of prepaid and postpaid payment
systems, as the user does not have to buy credit in advance somewhere, and he does
not risk receiving poor service or no service after paying the full amount in advance.
When the service is poor, the user can just stop using the service and stop sending
further ticks, thus only paying a fraction of the total cost, e.g., only service of 1
minute instead of one hour. Therefore, tick payment protocols are well suited for
telecommunications, as the payment amount is constantly growing and it can be
aborted at any time by both parties.
The tick payment protocol by Pedersen [119] is a well-researched and efficient pro-
tocol for tick payment, which will be used in the solution for the wireless roaming
scenario. It uses a hash chain for the tick payments. To initialize the payment proto-
col, the payer generates a payment hash by randomly choosing α0 and an IV which is
used in the hash function H. The payer calculates αi = HIV (αi−1), i ∈ {1, . . . , T},
where T is the maximum amount of hashes in the payment chain. When pairs
αi = αj , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} , i 6= j appear, the payer selects new random values and
5http://flattr.com
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Payer Payee
1.Request new tick
αT−i−d = H
T−i−d(α0)
i := i+ d
2.New tick: αT−i−d
verify:
Hd(αT−i−d)
?
= αT−i
i := i+ d
Figure 2.9: Tick Payment Protocol
starts over. The payer commits to the payment data αT , IV by calculating a signa-
ture on it and sending it to the payee.
In the following, the hash function H is always used with IV, but IV is omitted
from further descriptions. The IV is included to mitigate attacks using dictionaries
of preimages. The amount of hash iterations per tick is denoted d, which the payer
and payee have agreed on.6
The first payment of a tick is made by sending aT , aT−d to the payee. The payee
verifies that Hd(aT−d) = aT . When the verification is completed successfully, the
payer provides service to the payee. Both parties save i = d.
When a service interval is used up, a tick payment is requested by the payee by
requesting a new tick as illustrated in Figure 2.9. For the second service interval,
the payer sends αT−2d, and the payee verifies that Hd(αT−2d) = αT−d. Both parties
save i = 2d.
After id ticks were used, the payer provides a new tick payment to the payee by
calculating αT−i−d = HT−i−d(α0) and sending αT−i−d it to the payee. The payee
verifies that Hd(αT−i−d) = αT−i. Both parties increase i by d and store i. This can
be repeated until i > T , when the payment chain is used up. To continue payment,
a new payment chain must be generated. Because of the low cost of generating
a hash chain sufficient for overlong use, this is not an issue in practical systems,
i.e., current PCs are capable of millions of hash operations per second, with GPUs
computing even billions per second [25]. Therefore, T should be chosen sufficiently
large to avoid the need to generate a new hash chain during the connection.
The payer always has to keep track of the service it uses so that it cannot be
overcharged by the payee, and the payee has to keep track that it receives sufficient
and valid tick payments from the payer.
Formal proofs of the security properties of this tick payment protocol can be found
in Section 3.8.5.
6In Pedersen’s paper, the values of d can be adjusted for individual payments, thus representing
different monetary values per payment. However, we do not use this and assume that d is a
fixed value during a connection, e.g., d = 1.
38 Chapter 2. Preliminaries
2.7 Notations and Assumptions
2.7.1 Message Passing
The messages described in Figure 2.10 mean the following:
• Message 1 is sent from A to C directly. The presence or participation of B is
not required.
• Message 2 is sent from A to C, with B forwarding it.
• Message 3 is sent from A to C, with B forwarding it, and message 4 is sent
from B to C. B may also delay sending message 3 until message 4 is ready and
then send both messages at once.
2.7.2 Definition of Terms
We will use the following cryptographic primitives, of which implementations are
widely available.
m1,m2 is the concatenation of m1 and m2. This is sometimes denoted m1|m2 or
m1||m2 elsewhere.
Symmetric Encryption
EK(m) is the encryption of message m using a symmetric cipher with the key K,
and DK(c) is the corresponding decryption.
Digital Signatures
sigx(m) is a signature of the contents m that was created with the private signature
creation key of entity x. It can be verified with the public signature verification key
of x and knowledge of m.
sigx(m) means the signature itself, it does not include the contents m that was
signed.
sigx(m),m would include the signed contents.
sigx(m1,m2),m1 includes only one part of the signed contents.
A B C
message 1
message 2
message 3
message 4
Figure 2.10: Notations for Message Passing
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The public signature verification key of party x is denoted PK(x).
Hash Functions
y = h(x) and a = H(b) are cryptographic hash functions.
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Chapter3
Roaming in Wireless Networks
This chapter will describe a solution for roaming in wireless networks with a special
focus on privacy, but also on security and ease of use. We will first cover roaming in
general and then describe a solution for roaming in WLAN networks. Variants for
roaming with and without participation of the home network will be presented, as
well as extensions to use regular user devices as relay stations.
The basic principle of roaming enables a mobile device (MD) which has a contract
with a home network (HN) to access roaming services provided by a foreign network
(FN). This requires the FN and HN to share a roaming agreement. It is our goal to
incorporate three requirements into the roaming scenario which are novel compared
to existing and proposed solutions:
First, in our scenario, the MDs and the FNs are be able to negotiate directly on
the tariff to use for the next connection. In the context of wireless roaming, tariff
describes the unit type, unit size, and unit price a user has to pay for using a
provider’s mobile data services. E.g., a tariff could be time based (type) at 2 cent
(unit price) per 60 seconds (unit size). In current mobile telephony networks, the
tariffs are negotiated between the FN and the HN instead. Enabling negotiation
between the MDs and the FNs directly allows for much more flexibility in traffic
shaping, i.e., the FN can adjust the tariffs it offers according to its current load. The
idea here is that the FNs broadcast service advertising messages which contain their
roaming partners and current tariff options in cost per minute or per data volume to
the public. The MD selects a suitable tariff from the list of tariffs currently offered
by the FNs within its range depending on the user’s choice or preferences (tariff
selection).
Second, the users can be aided in this selection between multiple tariffs by the
help of a recommendation system running on the roaming client software. The tariff
recommendation is based on the tariffs available at this moment and the user settings
and history regarding his service usage.
Third, in current mobile cellular networks, the HN will receive all information about
MD’s service use in foreign networks. In addition, the FN receives the correct long-
term subscriber identifier of the MD and is able to track the MD’s service use
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over several connections. These disclosures are unnecessary. Therefore, we aim at
a comprehensive roaming and accounting solution that incorporates the following
privacy requirements: The HN can neither find out where, when, and what specific
services a user used at a specific FN nor what tariff was negotiated between the user
and the FN. The FN cannot identify the user of an MD but only the correct HN of
that user. In addition, the FN cannot link different service uses of the same MD.
Parts of this work have been published in [30] and [31]. A part of the implementation
was created by Andreas Straub in his bachelor thesis [142].
3.1 Introduction
This Section will describe the principles of roaming and the current practice in
wireless roaming. We then derive the requirements for our WLAN roaming solution.
3.1.1 Background on Roaming
Roaming was originally introduced by the GSM cellular phone standard and is widely
established in mobile phone networks. No payment is exchanged between the MD
and the FN; instead, the HN guarantees payment to the FN for the services provided
to the MD. The roaming agreement is a contract between two operators which also
includes agreements on accounting interfaces and on the cost of the connection, i.e.,
on the share the FN receives. As these are long-running contracts, the fees cannot
be adjusted without additional effort. This has two consequences: The operators
cannot adjust the tariffs as a means for traffic shaping, i.e., increasing fees at times
of high system load, and the roaming fees have remained high compared to non-
roaming connections. The roaming fees are often an order of magnitude larger than
regular fees, which has caused regulation in some jurisdictions. Some users even
obtain a regional SIM/USIM card for their device when traveling abroad to avoid
roaming fees.
In GSM/UMTS/LTE roaming networks, the user usually cannot select a roaming
partner himself. He is always bound to his contract partner within his home country,
and to its roaming partners when traveling abroad. Also, the user is informed about
the prices charged when roaming with each connection, and he cannot select a
tariff matching his needs even when the FN would offer different tariffs to its own
clients. When multiple FNs are present, the user cannot select the one with the best
matching service and pricing model.
Roaming is a threat on privacy, as a company other than the user’s trusted HN may
acquire sensitive personal information about the user. Some information disclosure
cannot be avoided, i.e., that a device is using services, and that it is a client of
an HN that the FN has an agreement with. The information which of these HNs
the user is a client of can be avoided with schemes where the user pays directly to
the FN, e.g., using a credit card. However, giving payment information such as a
credit card number to the FN is a greater privacy risk than the disclosure of the
actual HN, as the credit card information allows identification of a unique person
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Figure 3.1: Phases of the Roaming Solution (Simplified)
and also contains the real name. It would also be a security threat, as the credit
card information can be abused by anyone, and anyone can operate an access point.
A different problem is that the propagation of wireless signals is often limited in
buildings, for both cellular and WLAN services. Current solutions do not allow
user equipment to relay signals for other users, although the hardware on consumer
devices is capable of providing such a service. This would help increase the signal
strength for users inside of buildings, or with a greater distance to the access point.
3.1.2 Our Approach
In this section our approach to roaming is described from a high-level point of view.
Later, details of the solution will be discussed.
Users operate Mobile Devices (MDs) such as laptops or smartphones with a wireless
interface. Each user has a trust relationship with one operator, referred to as the
Home Network (HN) of that user’s mobile device. In particular, the HN has issued
initial credentials for the MD, knows the user’s identity, and is able to (legally)
enforce billing against the MD1. Any wireless access network operated by an operator
other than MD’s home operator is called Foreign Network (FN).
As in any other roaming solution, our goal is to enable the MDs to obtain service
not only from their HN but also from FNs. The roaming agreement establishes a
trust relationship between the FN and the HN: The FN trusts the HN to reimburse
the FN for the service the FN provides to HN’s MDs. The HN in turn bills the MD
for its service usage at the FN. Naturally, the FN must be able to verify that an MD
is entitled to use its services, i.e., that it is registered with an operator with which
the FN has a roaming agreement. Vice versa, the MD has to be assured that the
FN is indeed a network operator with which the HN has a roaming agreement. A
roaming agreement includes a clearing interface between operators.
Each FN advertises its services and tariffs using a broadcast message which can be
received by all MDs within radio range. These service advertising messages received
from different FNs allow the user of the MD to select an FN based on the tariffs
offered for each connection. This allows the FNs to change their tariffs at any time,
1Note that the home operator does not necessarily have to operate a wireless access network itself.
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and provides the user with transparency about the tariff to be used. The client
software on the MD uses a recommendation system to help the user in selecting a
suitable tariff when more than one tariff is available.
Our solution consists of a protocol suite for mobile devices detecting available net-
works, selecting an appropriate tariff, connecting to a foreign network, a tick pay-
ment protocol for continuous payment during service usage, and clearing protocols
(as shown in Figure 3.1) that offer the aforementioned features. Each part of the
protocol suite is specific to the underlying scenario, i.e., whether the connection from
the MD to the FN is made directly or over a Hop, and whether the HN is taking
part during the connection setup. Therefore, there are four different solutions, but
all of them intend to achieve the same goals.
3.1.3 Derived Requirements for the Proposed Solution
In the following, we will focus on a WLAN consisting of one or more access points
(APs) as the access network. A protocol suite for roaming WLAN devices which
overcomes the limitations described above must fulfill the following requirements:
The security goals authentication (MD, FN, and HN are certain that they are com-
municating with the right parties), confidentiality (exchanged data is protected from
eavesdropping), non-repudiation (MD and FN cannot dispute the tariff they agreed
on), perfect forward secrecy (a disclosure of long-term keys after a session was
recorded does not reveal session contents), and key confirmation (the parties are
certain that they established the same keys) must be achieved, which are defined in
detail in Section 2.1.5. The proposed solution must also support a secure payment
between roaming devices and network operators, meaning that the MD always has
to pay exactly for the services that it did use, not more and not less. The MD
cannot avoid payment, and the FN cannot overcharge.
Also, the operator must be able to change its tariffs depending on current demand.
The users must be able to choose between different operators and select from different
tariff options on a per-connection basis. This selection is aided by a recommendation
algorithm.
In addition, service usage within buildings should be improved by allowing user
devices to relay signals for other user devices, and by providing an incentive for
them to do so.
Our protocol suite has to offer a very high degree of privacy protection by revealing
only strictly required information to the participating parties. The HN can neither
find out where, when, and the amount of services a user used at an FN nor the
tariff used between the user and the FN. The FN cannot identify the user of an
MD but only the correct HN of that user. In addition, the FN cannot link different
service uses of the same MD. Still, law enforcement requirements have to be met on
a case-by-case basis.
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3.1.4 Basic Assumptions on Prerequisites
Our approach uses public key primitives, but does not require a full public key
infrastructure to be in place, i.e., the operators do not have to rely on a centralized
certification authority. In the variants of the solution where the HN takes part in the
connection setup, no certification authority and no revocation mechanism is needed
at all. Instead, we assume that each operator runs its own certification authority
service. All certificates issued by these authorities are issued on signature creation
keys and contain signature verification keys. Each MD stores the public key of its
own HN. Each operator runs its own authentication server AuS, which has access to
the private key of its operator. Each AP is connected to the AuS of its respective
operator.
The MDs are not required to obtain certificates of the FNs and vice versa. No public
key of the FN has to be known to the MD, and no public keys of the MD have to
be known to the FN. No shared secret keys need to be preinstalled anywhere.
The MDs carry an identifier which is known to the HN, i.e., a serial number given
by the HN. The MDs can also be issued multiple identifiers by the HN. Each MD
carries a signature creation key, with the corresponding signature verification key
known to the HN. The MD knows its HN’s signature verification key. These can be
set up from the HN to the MD using a SIM card, by installing a client software,
or by a similar mechanisms. The public keys can be kept up to date using existing
mechanisms.
To enable roaming among their users, operators have to exchange the public keys of
their CAs (but not their MDs) among each other and keep them up to date using
suitable mechanisms.
For the integrated payment system, the HN has to vouch for its MDs to the FN.
Therefore, the HN must verify that its MD is solvent (post-paid contract) or that
its MD has made a deposit with its HN beforehand (pre-paid contract).
We assume that access points are able to broadcast service advertising messages. In
our WLAN implementation, this is achieved using an efficient encoding scheme in
the SSID (see Section 3.3.2) so far, although other mechanisms can be used.
The HN may take part in connection setup (called „HN online“) or not („HN of-
fline“).
3.1.5 Outline for the Chapter
In the remainder of this chapter, related work is discussed in Section 3.2, including
tariffs in telecommunication and roaming networks. The outline of our solution to
roaming in WLAN will be clarified in Section 3.3. Multiple solutions will be pre-
sented and evaluated, one for each of four different WLAN roaming scenarios: The
connection between MD and FN can be direct or over other MDs, which then act as
relay stations. Both variants work with the home network online using remote veri-
fication during the connection setup or oﬄine using a broadcast of cross certificates
and CRLs between the roaming partners.
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These are the four roaming scenarios to which a solution will be presented:
• Direct Connection, HN online: Section 3.4
• Connection over another station, HN online: Section 3.5
• Direct Connection, HN oﬄine: Section 3.6
• Connection over another station, HN oﬄine: Section 3.7
The Payment Protocols are described in Sections 3.8 for direct connections and in
Section 3.9 for connections over another station. A comparison of the solutions is
presented in Section 3.10. The implementation of the direct connection HN online
solution is described in Section 3.11. Further concerns are discussed in Section 3.12
and the conclusion is drawn in Section 3.13.
3.2 Related Work and Current Solutions
In this section, we will compare our solution to existing academic and non-academic
roaming approaches and show that none of these approaches simultaneously meets all
the features our solution offers: (1) secure payment, (2) short-term, on-demand tariff
shaping for operators, (3) direct tariff selection on a per-connection basis for users,
(4) a tariff recommendation system to aid the user in this, (5) operator selection by
users based on tariffs offered, (6) advanced privacy protection, and (7) support for
user devices acting as relays.
The building blocks we use in our protocol, namely the authenticated key establish-
ment and payment systems, are discussed in Section 2.4 and 2.6 of the preliminaries
chapter.
3.2.1 Wireless Community Networks
Wireless community networks try to establish an infrastructure of free wireless access
over wireless technologies, usually using WLAN in metropolitan areas. Volunteers in
such projects allow strangers to access the Internet using their wireless home routers,
and in exchange gain permission to use the access points run by other participants.
Another approach is a not-for-profit organization setting up a wide are wireless
network using communal resources or sponsors.
Examples for these projects are FON2, Openwireless in Switzerland3, SFlan in San
Francisco4, NYCwireless in New York City5, Google WiFi in Mountain View6, and
many more.
2http://www.fon.com
3http://www.openwireless.ch
4http://sflan.org/
5http://www.nycwireless.net/
6http://wifi.google.com/
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There are some free WLAN initiatives, such as [157], with a wider coverage area.
Some free WLAN networks require a registration procedure which requires the user
to give personal information to the operator, often due to legal requirements [129].
Community networks are usually provided free to use for citizens, and sometimes
visitors. Some of them suffer from excessive use by their users, as described in the
tragedy of the commons [71]: a shared resource (bandwidth) is depleted by greedy
users. Internet users in general use more service when they do not have to pay for
additional service use [44].
One approach to limit the impact of greedy users is a lower limit on the bandwidth
per device, e.g., to 1 Mbit/s in the Google WiFi project [23], which allows up to 10.8
GByte per day. Only 4% of the users transmit more than 1 GByte per day. This
ensures that a single user cannot drain the bandwidth available at an access point,
which is usually 11 Mbit/s or larger.
Another approach to prevent users from using more resources than they offer is to
route the traffic over the community network into the individual user’s home, and
then to the Internet over his own home connection as shown in Figure 3.2. This
approach also avoids responsibility issues for illegal activities on the Internet when
using a community network. The use of a tunnel between the mobile device and the
trusted Internet access point also facilitates confidentiality against the operator of
the local access point. This routing approach is used, e.g., in RWTH Mobile Access
[154] and in the solution proposed by Manulis et al. [103]. However, because each
data packet is first routed through the community network to the home access point
of the MD, and then to the Internet gateway again through the community network,
the traffic within the community network is doubled. Also, the total downstream
bandwidth is reduced to the minimum of the upstream bandwidths encountered.
Routing over another access point increases the round trip time of the connection,
especially when the mobile device is far from its home access point.
Public Wifi Berlin7 is an approach for a sponsored city-wide WLAN with no user-
provided infrastructure. To prevent overuse by a minority of the users, the amount
of service per single user is limited: A user may only use 30 minutes per day. It is
unclear how this achieved. As no individual registration is required, a MAC filter is
probably used, which can be circumvented easily by MAC address spoofing8.
3.2.2 Current Operational Roaming Solutions
The use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol [20] in 802.11i WLANs allows for
authentication and key agreement between a foreign network and a mobile device
with the help of the home network of the user. In this case, the foreign network
and the home network each operate an EAP server. Authentication requests from
a roaming mobile device are proxied through the foreign network’s EAP server to
the home EAP server, such that the EAP method is carried out between the mobile
device and its home EAP server. The home EAP server indicates a successful
7http://www.mabb.de/publicwifi.html
8Changing the MAC to access free WLANs with limited use is possible even on Android smart-
phones with MAC changing apps, i.e., [22]
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Figure 3.2: Wireless Community Network with Fairness Routing
authentication to the foreign EAP server. This EAP-proxy-based approach does not
support tariff shaping or tariff selection per se and does not support the advanced
privacy protection.
Eduroam [54] is an operational wide area WLAN roaming solution, but it is not
paid and may only be used by students and staff of universities. Commercial paid
WLAN services are often found in hotels and airports. These are mostly pre-paid or
credit card based, and often insecure [67, 116]. They typically require full disclosure
of the user’s personal data to the WLAN operator. Also, many paid WLAN services
are cumbersome to set up, and usually very few tariffs are offered.
Often, the access points are concentrated in a region, so that frequent travelers need
accounts with many operators. As a possible countermeasure, the Wireless Roam-
ing Intermediary Exchange (WRIX) by the Wireless Broadband Alliance [160] is a
modularized standard service specification to allow global WLAN roaming between
WBA members (operators) based on EAP with a foreign operator, e.g., iPass and
Boingo. These operators typically offer flat rate accounts or a monthly allowance
regarding time or traffic, but no dynamic pricing.
Commercial B2B Services aid owners of businesses that are not primarily access
providers in providing WLAN access to customers within the business location,
e.g., WLAN service in a hotel or a restaurant. Besides providing an authentication
and billing backend, some of these providers also set up the hardware required
to facilitate Internet access on the site. Examples for these B2B service providers
are Anacapa9, The Cloud Networks10, and Hotsplots11. Authentication is facilitated
9http://www.free-hotspot.com
10http://www.thecloud.de
11http://www.hotsplots.de
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after the connection to an open WLAN was established over an automatic redirection
to a web interface, which adds exceptions for valid consumers’ MAC addresses.
The authentication depends on the MAC address and can be bypassed by using
MAC spoofing. Also, the open WLAN does not provide privacy protection and no
confidentiality for the data transmitted during the session. As a countermeasure,
Hotsplots operates a VPN server that the user may connect to over the WLAN,
which provides confidentiality against the local provider, other users in the WLAN,
and outsiders. However, setting up a VPN is not easy for every user and not for
every type of device, e.g., tablet PCs and smartphones.
Some (mobile) phone operators operate access points for their clients, e.g., [24, 148],
but there is no roaming: The clients cannot use the access points of other operators.
Swisscom has enabled EAP-SIM on smartphones sold to its clients for handover
into WLAN when access points of Swisscom were present. However, data use over
WLAN was billed like cellular usage, which has lead to some criticism [145]. The
solution lacks tariff selection and tariff transparency.
The Wi-Fi Alliance has created the Hotspot 2.0 specification to foster the use of
EAP-SIM for seamless handover from 3G networks to WLAN networks, using the
credentials on the MD’s SIM/USIM card for authentication [39]. The Wi-Fi Alliance
has also set up a device interoperability certification brand called PassPoint for
vendors of clients and access points, which has begun mid-2012. PassPoint focuses
on ease of use, with use of elements of IEEE 802.11u during network discovery [156].
Individually negotiated tariffs per connection are not supported.
The mobile telecommunication networks such as the GSM or UMTS networks enable
international roaming in a way that is convenient for users and just works out of the
box without any cumbersome configuration. 3GPP [13] relies on stored customer
profiles to facilitate billing and user authentication. It requires very little user in-
teraction, and users receive a single monthly bill through which they pay both for
the services of the operator they subscribed to and for the services used with for-
eign networks. However, the roaming approach used in the GSM and UMTS mobile
telecommunication networks has several disadvantages:
• Tariff selection on a per-connection basis for users is possible according to the
standard, but not used in practice. The users could dial a special code on their
MD to activate various options, e.g., to purchase an amount of data volume. In
today’s networks, the tariffs for roaming users are always negotiated between
operators, and not between users and operators. As a consequence, users
cannot directly influence the tariffs they use in a foreign network. Users also
often cannot choose between different foreign operators but are instead forced
to use the single foreign operator with whom their home operator has made an
agreement, although the user may be in the range of more than one network
operator. The tariffs used abroad are known to user’s home operator, as well
as the amount of service used.
• For operators, there is no flexibility in tariffs and the life time of tariffs, as
roaming agreements negotiated between operators are rather long-term agree-
ments. This prevents traffic shaping using variable tariffs, i.e., higher tariffs
when demand is high. This slows down competition on the market.
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• It is hard for the users to tell how much they have to pay for new connec-
tions. Recently, tariff indication via SMS has become a requirement in some
jurisdictions, and an annoyance for cross-border commuters.
Due to these reasons, competition on the market was low, and the prices for roaming
in cellular connections have remained high (both for data and voice service), and
not followed an exponential decline as seen in national (non-roaming) calls.
In addition, the TMSI mechanism does provide some privacy protection against
passive eavesdroppers tracking the device, but active attackers and the FN are able
to track mobile users. Also, the HN always obtains all connection details and FN
always obtains the subscriber’s longterm identifier.
3.2.3 Proposed Academic Roaming Solutions
A variety of roaming protocols specified in the wireless research community do not
support payment initialization and tariff negotiation. These include for example the
protocols suggested in [33, 69, 72, 74, 103, 136, 152, 162]. As the integration of
payment is one of the most crucial features of our proposed roaming solution, we
only discuss those protocols in more detail that also include secure payment. Unless
mentioned explicitly, no implementation of the following solutions is known.
In Buttya´n-Hubaux [40], a (potentially oﬄine) customer care agency provides tickets
to mobile devices. These tickets can be used by the mobile device to roam to different
networks. The customer care agencies also have the tasks of user identification and
billing, like our HNs. The protocol is preserving the privacy of the user to the
visited network, but not to the customer care agency, which will always receive
information about the tariff. This is the most important difference to our solution.
The protection of the MD against tracking is based on so-called tickets, which are
multiple identifiers used by the MD. However, revocation of stolen unused tickets is
not discussed. There is a single tariff chosen freely by the involved stations at each
new connection, but no influence from the user on the selected tariff. A vulnerability
in the signature and hash chain based payment system used in [40] was discovered
in [111], which also proposed a solution.
The EAP-TLS-KS solution [111] avoids certificate verification paths on the MD
by using a key splitting method unique for each FN, distributed decryption, and
distributed signatures for mutual authentication of the MD and the FN. During
each authentication, the HN is required to be online. This mechanism trades network
round trips for additional cryptographic operations. An implementation of the DHE-
RSA case showed superior performance to EAP-TLS [47]. EAP-TLS-KS can include
any accounting method and proposes a more secure variant of the Buttya´n-Hubaux-
Protocol [40].
Huitema et al. [77] propose an architecture for automatic and dynamic negotiation
of compensation agreements by integrating agreement negotiation, agreement real-
ization, and an overall compensation process. Operators are flexible with respect
to charging depending on demand, and users may choose tariffs freely. There is
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no integrated payment or authentication/key establishment, instead the solution is
meant to operate on top of existing compensation systems.
Fu et al. [61] present a policy language to obtain inter-operator roaming agreements
through policy based negotiation spontaneously when requested by a user. A nego-
tiation between the user and the operator is not supported.
Wan et al. [150] propose a hierarchical ID-based roaming protocol with a trusted
party and an oﬄine HN to protect the user’s privacy. The protocol execution requires
pairing operations and public key cryptography. A hash based payment scheme is
included, but no tariff negotiation is performed.
Yang et al. [161] present a work built on identity-based signatures. It allows the MD
to access services at the FN without active participation of the HN. The FN certifi-
cates are broadcasted by the access points. A micropayment scheme is integrated
so that the services are paid while they are used. An extension provides anonymity
using a group signature scheme. An implementation of the signature scheme was
created.
Manulis et al. [103] propose a solution for wireless roaming via tunnels from the
MD to the HN over the FN, so that all the data is routed over the HN. Tariffs and
payment are not discussed, but an outline of a proof by the FN to the HN about the
time the tunnel connection by the MD was active, which could be reimbursed and
billed by the HN. An implementation of the roaming protocol is described in [112];
the EAP setup between a Lenovo Ideapad S10-2 laptop and an Linksys WRT54GL
wireless router takes 4.15 seconds.
3.2.4 Related Work with Hops
The solutions discussed so far did not discuss connections established over other par-
ties. This research area concerning connections established over other parties (Hops)
is generally covered by wireless mesh networks (WMNs), where independent stations
are also routers, even when they have only a single network interface. The classic
definition of a router includes forwarding of packets between different networks,
therefore, multiple network connections would be required. Our Hop extension is
not part of a WMN architecture, as it is limited to a single Hop.
Another bordering field is that of wireless ad hoc networks, where individual devices
establish wireless links to each other without any infrastructure. As the individual
devices are considered equal, there is no provider. Therefore, the scenario does not
work for wireless Internet access.
When the individual devices are allowed to move and route traffic for each other, the
scenario is called mobile ad hoc network (MANET). Both types of ad hoc networks
deal with routing issues, i.e., on the link layer.
Internet based mobile ad-hoc Networks (iMANETs) consider connections to a single
upstream node for Internet access, but not in a roaming scenario, where multiple
gateways operated by different entities are needed.
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ARSA [163] is a roaming solution based on identity based cryptography. Brokers,
connected to each other and to the operators, are used so that no agreements between
operators are needed. Aliases are used to achieve unlinkability of the users against
the operator. A micropayment scheme is included. The Hops are not paid by the
mobile device, but by the FN, which is thought to be more efficient for a large
number of Hops and computationally weaker mobile devices as it is placing more
load on the FN. Tariffs are announced, but only a single tariff priced per data volume
is available per operator. Our approach avoids brokers, as all the participants would
have to settle on the same one and would have to pay them a share, and rather uses
the HN with a connection to the FN and a bilateral agreement, which are easier to
set up.
The solution by Pierce-O’Mahony [124] combines roaming in GSM multi-hop net-
works with multiparty micropayment. Two MDs are connected to each other over a
number of hops, and the initiator pays a large amount to the first hop, which keeps
some of it, and forwards the rest to the next hops, who repeat this process. The
system is prepaid. The MD’s demand regarding quality of service influences the
tariff, but the MD cannot directly choose a tariff, as the tariffs are chosen by the
hops. The system is single-operator, which is hard to establish for a large audience
in the real world. There is no protection against tracking of the MD.
Jakobsson et al. [83] encourage collaboration in multi-hop networks using proba-
bilistic micropayment, where the operator is capable of detecting and punishing
misbehaving stations. The Hops between the MD and base station are paid for a
random fraction of the packets they forward. The solution does not address tariffs,
authentication, and privacy.
3.2.5 Recommender Systems
Our solution shall contain a tariff recommendation mechanism in the roaming client
software to help the user in selecting an appropriate tariff. Especially data volume
based tariffs are hard to estimate for some users. The tariff recommendation is a
recommender system. In general, recommender systems are information filtering
systems that try to predict the rating a user would give to something they do not
know yet [130]. They either use characteristics of the object in question (content-
based approach), characteristics of a social collective (collaborative approaches), or
elements of both (hybrid systems). The most prominent recommender system is
probably the feature „Customers who bought this item also bought“ in shopping
websites, which is an example for the collaborative approach.
There are works on recommending web services to a user, e.g., Zheng et al. [164].
The recommendation is done for each new session as in our solution, however it is
only based on quality of service performance alone and not on pricing.
To the best of our knowledge, recommender systems have not been applied to
telecommunications pricing for individual connections so far. The closest ongo-
ing work is on recommender systems for telecommunication service provisioning by
Barlow et al. [27], which outlines the requirements for a recommender system for the
services users subscribe to: Customers are provided with information about available
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services and have access to an automated purchase process. However, the subscrip-
tions to these services will be made on a long-term basis and not freshly for each
session as in our approach. To the best of our knowledge, no tariff recommendation
system for mobile data services exist.
3.3 Outline of the Solution for WLAN
We will use the requirements for a roaming system discussed so far to create a
new roaming solution for wireless networks. It will be aimed at roaming in WLAN
networks. This section describes the architecture of our proposed solution.
3.3.1 Roaming Protocol Suite
The roaming protocol suite consists of service announcement, recommendation, and
selection, a connection setup protocol, a payment protocol, and a clearing protocol.
Each of them is specific to the scenario used: Whether the HN takes part in the
connection setup, whether the MD is connected directly the FN’s access point or over
a Hop, and whether the session is aborted or the MD takes part in the clearing. This
leads to four different connection setup protocols, two different payment protocols,
and eight different clearing protocols. Figure 3.3 and the Tables 3.1–3.3 provide a
high level overview of the protocol suite and the entities (optionally) involved in the
different protocols.
The connection setup protocol (CSP) provides mutual authentication and key es-
tablishment between the MD, the HN’s AuS, and the FN’s AuS to establish a secure
connection between the MD and the FN. The CSP is implemented in WLAN as a
new key-generating EAP-method. The key established during the protocol is used
to generate the pair-wise master key in the 802.1X four-way handshake to establish a
confidential and integrity protected connection between the MD and the AP. Beyond
authentication and key establishment, the connection setup protocol includes secure
tariff negotiation between the MD and the FN as well as the secure initialization of
a tick payment scheme while protecting the MD’s privacy.
The payment protocol is based on a secure tick payment scheme. It consists of a
payment and a clearing phase. In the payment phase the MD uses the ticks to pay
for the next unit of service and the FN provides the service only if it received the
corresponding ticks. In the clearing phase the FN presents the ticks received from
the MD to the MD’s HN and is reimbursed. The clearing phase may take place
immediately after service usage or periodically, so that multiple sessions can be
cleared in one connection between the FN and the HN. The MD in turn reimburses
the HN using an existing billing relationship between the MD and the HN.
3.3.2 Tariff Announcement
The tariffs are announced over a broadcast channel in service advertising messages.
The service advertising messages contain the identity of the FN, a list of offered
54 Chapter 3. Roaming in Wireless Networks
Visitor
MD
Hop
Hop
Visited Operator
FN
Home Operator
HN
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Tariff Recommenda-
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Tariff Selection, Key Setup, Initialization
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Service Usage Phase
Clearing Protocol
billing (oﬄine)
Figure 3.3: Phases of the Roaming Protocol Suite. The participation of the Hop in
general, the participation of the HN in the connection setup protocol, and
the participation of the MD/Hop in the clearing protocol are optional.
When a Hop is present, the FN does not participate in the announcement
Direct Over Hop
HN online Section 3.4 Section 3.5
HN oﬄine Section 3.6 Section 3.7
Table 3.1: Overview of Setup Protocol Variants
Direct Over Hop
both Section 3.8.3 Section 3.9.2
Table 3.2: Overview of Tick Payment Protocol Variants
Direct Over Hop
HN online Section 3.8.4 Section 3.9.3
HN oﬄine Section 3.8.6 Section 3.9.5
Table 3.3: Overview of Clearing Protocol Variants, each consisting of a graceful end
and an abort protocol
tariffs, and a list of the supported HNs. In contrast to established systems, our
solution allows the FN to adjust the tariffs they offer to the MD for each new
connection without interaction with the HN. This helps operators gain customers
for their access points by offering low prices, but can also be used to increase cost
when demand is high (tariff shaping).
In our WLAN solution, we use the SSID as the broadcast channel, which has a 32
byte size limit. Thus, the information has to be encoded using a space saving code.
The identifiers of the FN and the HNs are given as 16 bit numbers. We propose
an efficient tariff encoding using 1 byte per tariff. In this encoding, the unit sizes
available in the tariff encoding are chosen user friendly and have a wide spread to
cover a wide range of applications. The unit prices cover a wide range, but also
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allow exhibit fine granularity so that tariffs can be adjusted slightly. The encoding
scheme is described in detail in Section 3.11.4 about the implementation.
The proposed scheme does not allow an FN to offer different tariffs to clients of
different HNs per se. However, FNs are able to offer different tariffs to the clients of
different HNs by using multiple service advertising messages: Each service advertis-
ing represents one group of target HNs and the tariff model offered to their clients.
When WLAN is used as the access network, the use of virtual interfaces allows the
implementation of this feature without additional hardware.
3.3.3 Tariff Recommendation Algorithm
Out of the potentially large number of tariffs offered by the FNs present in a single
area, the MD has to pick one. This is a difficult process for not so technically adapt
users, and we therefore suggest to aid the users with a recommendation system. For
many users, it is especially difficult to estimate the amount of data volume needed.
Therefore, the solution offers a list of recommended tariffs based solely on user value.
Users are still able to override the recommendation, e.g., to avoid certain FNs they
find problematic. A rating function can be implemented on the MD to allow users
to rate the service provider after ending a session with it.
A new tariff pre-selection and representation algorithm for the MD is proposed as
follows:
1. All tariffs offered by all operators are collected from the operator’s service
advertising messages.
2. Tariffs from operators not supported by the HN and blacklisted FNs are
dropped.
3. The tariffs are normalized to a large service interval, e.g., cost per hour for
time based tariffs and cost per Gigabyte for volume based tariffs.
4. Tariffs that exceed certain bounds will be dropped, e.g., attempted fraud by
very high rates. These bounds are preconfigured, but can be user configurable,
e.g., WLAN use on an airplane will be more expensive than in a shopping mall.
5. Tariffs that are strictly more expensive than others of the same operator are
dropped, e.g., 4 Euro per hour in units of 60 seconds will be removed when 3
Euro per hour in units of 60 seconds is also offered. This also holds for unequal
unit sizes, e.g., 4 Euro per hour in units of 60 seconds will be removed when
3 Euro per hour in units of 30 seconds is also offered.
In order to be removed, the tariff has to be more expensive for every possible
amount of service usage, e.g., 2 Euro per 30 minutes unit will not be removed
when 3.99 Euro per one hour unit is also offered.
The reduced list is called „minimized list“. The minimized list will be grouped by
type and sorted by normalized cost first (ascending) and unit size second (ascending).
Advanced users can directly choose a tariff from this list, which will present the FN
name, the normalized price, and the unit size for each tariff.
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For average users, a recommendation system based on usage profiles is proposed. The
usage profiles represent common activities by the user on a WLAN, e.g., chatting,
video, and e-mail. Each of these profiles contains the name, the estimated data
volume, and the estimated duration. The values are preconfigured, user configurable,
and can be updated by the MD client software automatically with every use: At the
end of a session, the usage data can be updated to reflect the actual usage.
The recommendation mechanism estimates the cost of a typical user session with
each of the tariffs offered and recommends the cheapest one. These results are
presented in a table showing the cost to expect from each tariff with each profile.
There is a general profile for unspecified user behavior, which will be used as a default
when the user does not make a choice, with usage data based on the averages from
earlier sessions. The general profile can also be used for automatic connections.
The expected cost costx of a session using the service amount x is calculated as:
costx =
⌈desired service amount x
unit size
⌉
· unit price (3.1)
To consider borderline cases where a slight deviation in the amount of service usage
will cause a large deviation in cost, the price is not only calculated for the estimated
amount of service usage, but also for larger and smaller amounts of service usage.
E.g., when the estimated usage value fits exactly into a single unit, using a little
bit more service than estimated will double the cost. To consider this, the cost is
calculated for x, (1± ) ·x, and (1± 2) ·x of the estimated service usage. The value
of  can be adjusted to account for the deviation in user behavior. This results in
five prices per tariff and profile.
E.g., with  = 0.1, the cost of 80%, 90%, 100%, 110%, and 120% of the desired
service usage is calculated.
A probability distribution is used to obtain probabilities ρ−2, ρ−1, ρ0, ρ1, ρ2 for each
of these prices. The corrected expected cost cecx of a session with desired service
amount x is calculated to:
cecx = ρ−2 · cost(1−2)·x + ρ−1 · cost(1−)·x + ρ0 · costx+
ρ1 · cost(1+)·x + ρ2 · cost(1+2)·x
(3.2)
To obtain values for ρi, we use a normal distribution:
f(x) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2 (
x−µ
σ
)2 (3.3)
Where µ denotes the expected value and σ the standard deviation. With µ = 0 and
σ = 1 the standard normal distribution is described.
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Figure 3.4: Example for Session Cost Depending on Service Usage and Tariff
Cost [e] for Session Length of cec100%x
Tariff Description [ect] 80%x 90%x 100%x 110%x 120%x [e] rank
Time A 9.2 per 60 s 0.736 0.828 0.92 1.012 1.104 0.92 3
Time B 23 per 150 s 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.15 1.15 1.012 5
Time C 0.61 per 42 s 0.732 0.793 0.915 0.976 1.098 0.9028 2
Data A 5.1 per 28 kB 0.765 0.867 0.918 1.02 1.122 0.9384 4
Data B 9.2 per 55 kB 0.736 0.828 0.92 0.92 1.012 0.8832 1
Figure 3.5: Examples for Corrected Estimated Costs cec
When we use the above example  = 10%, and ρx = f(x) = 1√2pie
− 12x2 , we obtain
the following values:
ρ−2 = 0.05, ρ−1 = 0.25, ρ0 = 0.40, ρ1 = 0.25, ρ2 = 0.05, (3.4)
so that:
cecx = 0.05 · cost0.8x + 0.25 · cost0.9x + 0.40 · costx+
0.25 · cost1.1x + 0.05 · cost1.2x
(3.5)
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The results per tariff and profile are sorted, and the tariff with the lowest cec for
the profile selected is recommended to the user.
An example is given in Figure 3.4, which presents five artificial tariffs for the profile
x = (600s, 500kB). The five tariffs shown have almost equal values of cost100%x
(from 0.915 to 0.92 e), but vary greatly in their cec100%x (from 0.8832 to 1.012 e).
The tariffs are plotted depending on the amount of service used. (Note that only
the marked points are based on actual data. The lines help recognizing which tariff
the points belong to. The lines do not represent actual values.) Data tariff B would
be recommended to the user for the profile x = (600s, 500kB), as it has the lowest
cecx value of 0.8832 e.
3.3.4 Tick Payment and Accounting
We use the well-researched and efficient tick payment protocol introduced by Ped-
ersen [119] (described in Section 2.6) for the payments from the MD to the FN. The
payment initialization is digitally signed by the MD, so that the FN can prove later
that it received payments from the MD and what they represent.
The micropayment approach in our solution allows incremental payment during the
service usage phase. This guarantees awareness of the user about the service cost,
as the user has to select the tariff at the beginning of the connection and the MD
is actively paying ticks to continue service usage. The resulting cost can be shown
on the device for the active connection and for the billing period. Warnings can
be displayed when spending over a certain limit, or when spending at a higher rate
than pre-defined.
After the service usage phase, the clearing phase is executed between the FN and
the HN. The MD can optionally generate a graceful ending message to hide the tariff
and the amount of its service use from the HN. It contains only information about
the whole service usage phase that has just ended, and not about the tariff, the
number of ticks, or the value of the ticks. Thereby, the HN cannot learn the details
about MD’s service usage from the payment.
Through the payment initialization and micropayment tick payments, the FN is
still able to prove to the HN that it is entitled to receive funds, even when the MD
generates an illicit ending message. The HN verifies the proof by the FN (or by the
MD when a graceful ending message was sent) and transfers the payment to the FN.
The HN will later bill the MD.
3.4 Roaming with HN Online Directly
We will now discuss the most straight-forward roaming scenario: The home network
takes part in the setup protocol, and the mobile device is directly connected over
a wireless link to the access point of the foreign network as shown in Figure 3.6.
In this section, we will first explain the scenario and define the security and pri-
vacy requirements. Then, the connection setup protocol is presented and discussed
according to the requirements.
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Figure 3.6: Phases of the Direct Roaming Protocol Suite with HN Online During
Setup
The other scenarios (HN oﬄine and/or connection over a Hop) will be discussed
in the same manner in the following three sections. The payment protocols will be
discussed thereafter for the service use phase and the clearing phase (Sections 3.8 for
direct connections and 3.9 with Hop). Later, the solutions for the different scenarios
will be compared (Section 3.10). Finally, the implementation of the HN online direct
connection solution (which is presented in this section) is described (Section 3.11).
3.4.1 Scenario and Requirements
The FN and the HN have a constantly available connection and a mutual roaming
agreement. Thus, the FN and the HN have exchanged their public keys in an
authentic fashion. The MD is within the range of the access point of the FN, and
the MD has a contract with the HN. Thus, the MD and the HN have exchanged
their public keys in an authentic fashion.
In this scenario, the following security goals (Sec-i) and privacy goals (Pri-i) are
defined based on the definitions in Sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6:
Sec-1: Mutually authenticated key establishment between the MD, the FN, and
the HN.
Sec-2: The MD can avoid an FN that performed poorly in the past.
Sec-3: Outsiders cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic (Confidentiality, In-
tegrity).
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy
Sec-5: Key Confirmation between the parties
Pri-1: The MD must stay anonymous to anybody (Anonymity).
Pri-2: The MD must stay untrackable to anybody (Unlinkability).
Pri-3: No one can learn details about MD’s session with the FN, e.g., the HN
(Information Privacy).
Pay-1: The MD will never have to pay for services it did not use.
Pay-2: The FN will be paid by the MD for the services the MD uses according
to the tariff they agreed on (Non-Repudiation).
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Pay-3: The FN cannot charge more than negotiated in the tariff with the MD
(Non-Repudiation).
3.4.2 Connection Setup Protocol
The connection setup protocol (CSP) is executed over a publicly visible, unen-
crypted, and unauthenticated wireless channel. It includes discovery of tariffs,
authentication, key establishment, tariff selection, payment initialization, and the
first tick payment. Immediately after the CSP is executed, the MD can send the
first data request.
Recall that the HN is required to have an authentic copy of the current public
signature verification keys of the FN and the MD. Furthermore we assume that
the MD and the FN have an authentic copy of the HN’s current public signature
verification key.
The connection setup protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The message exchange is
described in detail in the following using the notations summarized in Table 3.5.
1. The FN continuously broadcasts service advertising messages, which are a list
of the HNs whose MDs are allowed to use FN’s services and the tariffs offered
for these services. The MD downloads these broadcast messages from all the
APs within its radio reception range.
2. The MD selects an FN AP which allows clients of the MD’s HN and which
offers a suitable tariff. The MD chooses rMH , rMF ∈R Zp and calculates
tMH = grMHmod p, tMF = grMFmod p for the HN and the FN, which are sent
to the FN and relayed by the FN to the HN. The ID(HN) is included in the
message so that the FN can verify that it has a roaming agreement with HN,
that it knows where to forward the message to, and where to do the clearing
after the connection ends. The ID(FN) is also included. (A stateful connection
between the FN and HN is assumed, so that following messages will not need
routing information, e.g., TCP.)
3. The HN chooses rHM ∈R Zp and calculates tHM = grHMmod p. The HN
calculates KMH as a derivation of tMHrHMmod p. tHM is sent to the FN.
3a. The FN chooses rFM ∈R Zp, calculates tFM = grFMmod p, and sends tHM
and tFM to the MD. The FN calculates KMF as a derivation of tMF rFMmod p.
4. The MD calculates KMH as a derivation of tHMrMHmod p and encrypts its
identifier ID(MD) for the HN using KMH to hide it from the FN and eaves-
droppers. The MD also calculates KMF as a derivation of tFMrMFmod p and
encrypts b for the FN using KMF , thus hiding it from the HN. After receiving
message 4, the FN decrypts b and verifies that the MD’s payment chain is
correct for the selected tariff.
The MD creates payment data b by choosing random IV and α0, to create
a payment chain α, starting with α1 = H(α0), α2 = H(α1), ..., ending with
αT = HT (α0), where T refers to the maximum amount of hashes indicated
by the selected tariff. The MD also generates the first tick payment αT−d =
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term definition
tariffs list of: type of tariff (per data volume, time, packets, etc), unit
price (amount, currency), unit size (in seconds, bytes, etc), max-
imum amount of hashes T (connection limit), hashes per tick d,
e.g.: charged per time, 0.01 e, per 30 seconds, 14400 ticks total,
1 tick per unit
rxy private Diffie-Hellman key chosen by party x for setting up a key
with party y
txy the public Diffie-Hellman key of party x corresponding to rxy
shared with party y: txy = grxymod p
p publicly known large prime
g publicly known generating element of a finite group G where the
discrete logarithm problem is hard
IV initialization vector chosen randomly by the payer
H i(m) preimage resistant hash function with input m and initialization
vector IV , iterated i times
α0 root of the payment hash chain, chosen randomly by payer
αT last generated element in the chain: αT = HT (α0)
αT−d first tick payment
b concatenation of payment initialization data and tariff chosen by
MD: b = (ID(payee), chosen tariff, IV, αT , αT−d).
h(x) cryptographic hash of input x
EK(m) symmetric encryption of plain text m with key K, e.g., AES
sigX(m) signature of m by party X, does not include unhashed message m
KMF symmetric key which is being established between MD and FN
during the protocol run
KMH symmetric key which is being established between MD and HN
during the protocol run
ID(MD) identifier of MD, i.e., serial numbers known only to MD and HN
ID(FN) identifier of FN, i.e., its unique brand name
ID(HN) identifier of HN, i.e., its unique brand name
Table 3.5: Overview of Terms in Roaming
HT−d(α0) as requested by the tariff. In the following, payment and tariff
information is noted as b = (ID(FN), chosen tariff, IV, αT , αT−d).
For message 4, the MD creates a signature of the hash of b, the public DH
parameters tMH , tHM , tMF , tFM , ID(FN), and ID(HN) as well as the MD’s
hidden identifier EKMH (ID(MD)) known to the HN.
Note that in our notation, sigX(m) does not contain m, but only the hash
of m and the signature of the hash of m. Therefore, the message must also
contain tFM and h(b), so that the HN can verify the signature.
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5a.EKMF (h(tFM , b))
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802.11X four-way handshake, MSK
derived from tFM
rMF , payment chain α
CCMP protected connection
Figure 3.7: Connection Setup Protocol, Signatures denoted red
4a. The FN generates a signature on tMF , tFM , ID(FN), and EKMH (ID(MD)).
The signature is sent to the HN instead of the MD because the MD does not
have knowledge of the FN’s signature verification key.
5. After receiving message 4, the HN decrypts EKMH (ID(MD)) using the freshly
established KMH . The identifier ID(MD) is used to look up the public signa-
ture verification key of the MD, which is used to verify the signature. The HN
also verifies that the MD has credit left and which FNs it may use. The public
DH values tMH and tHM must match the values received in message 2 and
sent in message 3. The received ID(HN) must match its own ID and ID(FN)
must match the FN which delivered the message. Hd(αT−d) must match αT .
After receiving message 4, the HN verifies the signatures sent by the MD
and the FN. The HN creates a signature to authenticate the key agreements
MD-FN and MD-HN, and to confirm to the FN that MD’s signature is cor-
rect and that the MD is creditworthy. To enable the FN to validate MD’s
signature without knowledge of the ID(MD), h(b) is signed instead, which
was sent by MD to FN and signed for HN in message 4. The HN includes
EKMH (h(ID(MD))) to achieve key confirmation with the MD.
5a. The FN verify the HN’s signature and encrypts h(tFM , b) for the MD to achieve
key confirmation with the MD.
When receiving messages 5 and 5a, the MD also decrypts the key confirmation
blocks from the FN and the HN. Then, the MD verifies the HN’s signature. When
the verifications were successful, the MD and the FN use a derivation of tFMrMF =
tMF
rFMmod p as the MSK in an 802.1X four-way handshake. FN provides the first
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service interval to the MD at the tariff selected by the MD. Further service intervals
and the clearing phase are discussed later in Section 3.8 on payment.
3.4.3 Discussion of the Connection Setup Protocol
The connection setup protocol illustrated in Figure 3.7 is based on the BCK protocol
([36], Section 2.4) for authentication and key establishment. The required security
and privacy goals are met:
Sec-1: Entity authentication is achieved as the MD, the FN, and the HN include
ephemeral public keys from messages 2, 3, and 3a and identifiers of the participating
parties within the signed parts of messages 4, 4a, and 5. Therefore, all parties are
aware that the other parties they established keys with are actively participating in
the current protocol run. This is similar to two runs of the BCK protocol [36]. Note
that h(b) is used as temporary identifier of the MD. Because of the requirements for
the payment chain α, b and thus h(b) will be fresh and unique as well. Therefore,
it is not a problem that the HN does not sign MD’s encrypted long-term identifier
EKMH (ID(MD)), and that the FN cannot verify MD’s signature.
The MD and the HN can collude in an attack where the HN accepts an invalid
signature by the MD. However, this violates the trust assumption between the FN
and the HN. In case of a large-scale dispute, the HN could be obliged to disclose the
MD’s public key to prove that the MD did create valid signature.
The keys KMH and KMF established during each protocol run are fresh as the
ephemeral DH parameters are chosen by the MD, the FN, and the HN for only
this session. Also, KMF is exclusive to the MD and the FN as it can only be
calculated by a party that knows the corresponding private DH parameter to the
public ephemeral key a party sent. The same holds for KMH , which is exclusive to
the MD and the HN.
Because the HN verifies the FN’s signature for the MD, the HN is able to impersonate
the FN. But as they have a roaming agreement, the HN and the FN already trust
each other, and there is no financial gain in this attack for the HN that it could not
gain by operating an access point under its own name. The MD will only pay the
amount agreed on.
Impersonation of the MD is impossible, as the MD is required to create a signature
matching a public key known to the HN. An attacker impersonating the HN (and
possibly the MD at the same time) to the FN will be detected because he cannot
create the signature in message 5.
Sec-2: The FN announces its ID in the service advertising broadcast message. The
ID(FN) is confirmed and signed during the connection setup by the HN in message
5, which only HN can generate. An FN cannot change its ID, as it is part of
the roaming agreement with HN. Therefore, the MD can avoid an FN that acted
dissatisfactory in the past.
Sec-3: At the end of the protocol run, a derivation of the established key tFMrMF
is used as MSK in the 802.11X four-way handshake. The following connection
64 Chapter 3. Roaming in Wireless Networks
is CCMP protected, and thus outsiders cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic
(Confidentiality, Integrity).
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy is achieved as the long-term keys are not used
to calculate the session keys. All the session keys are created using a Diffie-Hellman
key agreement mechanism, which provides perfect forward secrecy. The long-term
secret that an attacker could obtain is the private signature creation key of any
party. This does not reveal the private DH parameters used before, and therefore
does not lead to the keys agreed within any of the protocols. The legitimate parties
have to discard the private DH parameters after use.
Sec-5: Key confirmation is achieved by the encryptions with KMH in the mes-
sages 4 and 5 and with KMF in the message 4 and 5a. The FN and the HN prove
their possession of the keys to the MD by decrypting and encrypting using the
newly established keys. The MD proves its possession of the keys by encrypting
with them and verifies its ability to decrypt using the newly established keys. As
entity authentication of the MD, the FN, and the HN is given, mutual belief in the
keys is achieved.
Pri-1: The FN does not learn the MD’s ID because it is encrypted with the key
KMH that the FN cannot obtain. MD’s ID is only disclosed to the HN. Passive
eavesdroppers will only learn the MAC address of the MD. Therefore, MD stays
anonymous to anybody.
Pri-2: FN does not learn a constant pseudonym of the MD. The FN only learns
EKMH (ID(MD)), which is different each time, as it depends on KMH , which depends
on the DH parameters freshly chosen freshly by the MD and the HN. However, in
a WLAN implementation, the FN and passive eavesdroppers will learn the MAC
address of the MD. For the MD to stay unlinkable from passive eavesdroppers it has
to change the MAC address between two connection setups12. Thus, the MD stays
unlinkable to anybody.
Pri-3: The billing information that the MD and the FN agree on is encoded in b.
The HN and observers obtain h(b), but no one can compute b from it. Thus, no one
can learn details about MD’s session with the FN (Information Privacy).
As a practical goal, tariff negotiation is done by the FN sending a list of supported
tariffs and the MD committing to one of these tariffs. The MD creates a signature
on h(b). The payment init block b contains the description of the selected tariff.
The HN creates a signature on this for the FN. Therefore, the FN is able to verify
the authenticity of the MD’s choice of tariff. However, from the connection setup,
the HN does not learn anything about the tariff chosen by the MD, or the payment
data generated by the MD, as the HN only knows h(b), but not b. This is meant to
protect the privacy of the MD.
Note that there is no integrity protection for announced tariffs. The tariff list re-
ceived by the MD in the service advertising broadcast message could be have been
modified from what the FN sent. A modification attack on the broadcast could
be detected, but not prevented. When the MD has agreed on a tariff that the FN
originally did offer, all is well. When the MD has agreed on a tariff that the FN
12For a discussion of MAC address changing see Section 3.12.2 on side channel attacks on privacy.
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originally did not offer, FN will abort the connection setup, and no harm is done
beyond denial of service. As denial of service cannot be prevented in general (and
especially not in wireless networks), we chose not to protect the service advertis-
ing broadcast messages against manipulation. Not connecting at all when the tariff
announcement has been modified would prevent all service usage as well.
The goals for payment, Pay-1, Pay-2, and Pay-3 are discussed in the section
discussing the clearing protocol, Section 3.8.
3.5 Roaming with HN Online over a Hop
In this section, we propose a new Hop extension to the roaming solution described
above. This proposed extension allows any MD connected to a participating WLAN
to act as an access point itself. We refer to such an MD as a Hop. These Hops
increase the area covered by WLAN, increase the operator’s number of potential
clients, and can help to create ubiquitous access. The owner of a Hop is reimbursed
for acting as a Hop such that our approach does not suffer from missing incentives
to share connectivity like many free WLAN initiatives discussed in Section 3.2.1 on
community networks do. A client using a Hop will still receive a single bill from his
home network.
Acting as a Hop, i.e., forwarding WLAN data, is feasible with current off-the-shelf
laptops and smartphones. Many mobile devices of the 802.11g generation support
virtual interfaces in their WLAN module or can use multiple different network in-
terfaces at the same time. This means that these devices are able to act as client
and access point in different networks at the same time.
The extension is not straightforward, as the Hops — as opposed to the FNs — do
not have a trust relationship with the HNs of other MDs. Also, there is a higher
risk that the Hops act maliciously than that the FNs act maliciously as the latter
can be considered to care about their reputation as they want to stay in business.
3.5.1 Scenario and Requirements
In the following, the term MD is always used for a device that uses a Hop and
has no direct wireless connection to the FN. The Hop is a regular MD currently
connected to the FN, and is owned and operated by an end user. Depending on
the tariffs offered by the FN, acting as a Hop might even be a business model, i.e.,
setting up devices to act as Hops in highly frequented places along the borders of
any FN’s network coverage. The MD’s home network will be called GN (guest
network) in the following, and the home network of the Hop will be called HN.
No roaming agreement is required between the HN and the GN, but both need a
roaming agreement with the FN. Figure 3.8 provides a high level overview of the
protocol suite in this scenario.
As a Hop is using resources to provide service to an MD (battery life, system load),
an incentive is required for the MDs to become Hops. This is achieved by paying a
small portion of each service interval to the Hop.
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MD Hop FN
(Hop)
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(MD)
GN
Tariffs
Tariff Recommenda-
tion and Selection
Connection Setup Protocol (part 1):
Tariff Selection, Key Setup, Initialization
Payment and
Service Use
Tariffs
Tariff Recommenda-
tion and Selection
Connection Setup Protocol (part 2):
Tariff Selection, Key Setup, Initialization
Payment and Service Usage Phase
Clearing Protocol(participation optional)
billing (oﬄine)
billing (oﬄine)
Figure 3.8: Phases of the Roaming Protocol Suite (HN online during setup with
Hop)
It is interesting that a station cannot be prevented from taking multiple roles, as
it is easy to buy an MD with a contract that runs as a Hop. This leads to some
considerations about the setup of the payment to the Hop:
• If the incentive for the Hop would be paid by the FN, it would be subtracted
from the FN’s profit, and enable attackers running an MD to pose as both
a Hop and an MD at the same time. Using two devices, the attacker could
pocket the Hop incentive himself and effectively get a discount for the FN’s
services. Therefore, the MD has to pay the small fee to the Hop directly.
• The MD has to pay the regular fee to for the services it uses to the FN. If
there was a discount for the MDs using a Hop to access the FN, an attacker
could pose as an MD and a Hop at the same time, and pocket the discount
for using a Hop service. Therefore, the MD has to pay the full regular fee to
the FN as if the MD was connected directly.
• As the Hop is paid and the MD gets no discount, the MDs have to pay more
for services used over a Hop compared to a direct connection to the FN. The
FN could also setup access points that act as Hops to try to charge the MDs
more. However, we neither consider this realistic nor an attack per se, as the
FN can already freely set its tariffs and the MD agrees on the tariff it pays.
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The amount paid by the MD to the Hop is chosen by the FN and advertised in FN’s
service advertising broadcast message, e.g., 10% of the regular fee. Therefore, the
Hop cannot freely choose the amount it earns. This prevents the Hop from charging
disproportionate fees from careless MDs, which may harm the FN’s reputation as
well. However, the Hop can choose to accept or reject individual tariff options
advertised by the FN before forwarding them to the MD, e.g, only time tariffs, or
only tariffs above a certain compensation level. This would be decided by the Hop’s
owner.
The original connection setup protocol is modified so that the MDs can later act as
Hops. The Hop setup protocol between the MD, the Hop, and the FN establishes
a wireless link between the MD and the Hop, and a secure connection between the
MD and the FN, e.g., an IPsec tunnel.
Our extended roaming protocol suite aims to meet the following goals:
Sec-1: Mutually authenticated key establishment between the MD, the Hop, the
FN, the HN, and the GN
Sec-2: The MD can avoid a Hop that acted dissatisfactory in the past.
Sec-3: Outsiders and the Hop cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic and Out-
siders cannot read or modify the Hop’s traffic (Confidentiality, Integrity).
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy
Sec-5: Key Confirmation between the parties
Pri-1: The MD and the Hop must stay anonymous to anybody (Anonymity).
Pri-2: The MD must stay untrackable to anybody (Unlinkability).
Pri-3: No one can learn details about MD’s and Hop’s session with the FN and
each other, e.g., the GN and the HN (Information Privacy).
Pay-1: The Hop will never have to pay for services it did not use, e.g., the services
the MD uses with the FN.
Pay-2: The FN and the Hop will be paid by the MD for the services the MD uses.
Pay-3: The FN and the Hop cannot charge more than negotiated with the MD.
3.5.2 Hop Setup Protocol
The Hop Protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.9, again using the notations from Ta-
ble 3.5.
1.–5. These messages are similar to the connection setup protocol as discussed in
Section 3.4.2, except for the added public key of the Hop PK(Hop), and the
use of the Hop’s pseudonym PID(Hop) instead of its encrypted identifier. The
tariff list now also includes rates indicating how much the Hops must be paid.
The HN confirms that the Hop is entitled to act as a Hop by confirming its
PID(Hop).
5.–10. These messages contain two entwined runs of the roaming mechanism discussed
in Section 3.4.2 between the pairs MD, Hop and MD, FN. These are similar to
the two-party protocol, but now the Hop uses the static identifier PID(Hop)
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issued by the HN instead of the encrypted identifier EKMH (ID(MD)) that the
MD used in the basic protocol. This enables the MD to recognize and avoid
certain Hops. MD generates two new, different tick payment chains β (between
the MD and the FN) and γ (between the MD and the Hop) in a manner similar
to the two-party case. Payment information is shortened to bMF (between the
MD and the FN) and bMHop (between the MD and the Hop) in the following.
In the following, messages 6.–10b. of the protocol are described.
6. Like the FN, the Hop continuously sends a service advertising broadcast mes-
sage, e.g., using a special encoding in the SSID. It contains the pseudonym
ID of the Hop PID(Hop) issued by the HN of the Hop, a (possibly) reduced
set of tariffs from the FN’s broadcast called htariff, the ID of the FN, and a
list of allowed GNs (HNs of MDs), which are taken from the FN’s broadcast
(message 1.).
7. The user of the MD selects a suitable tariff from message 6. The MD chooses
private DH values rMHop, rMF , rMG ∈R Zp, and calculates public tMHop =
grMHop , tMF = grMF , tMG = grMGmod p. The public DH value tMHop is meant
for key establishment with the Hop, tMF for the FN, and tMG for the GN. The
MD sends the IDs of the Hop and the FN, the public DH values to the Hop,
and the identifier ID(GN) of its HN so that the FN will know where to forward
messages 7 to. The Hop forwards the message to the FN when PID(Hop) is
correct. The FN verifies that it has a roaming agreement with the GN, and
forwards the message if it does.
8. The GN verifies that it has a valid roaming agreement with the FN. The GN
creates private rGM ∈R Zp and public tGM = grGMmod p DH values and
calculates KMG as a derivation of tMGrGMmod p for use with the MD. The
public DH value tGM is sent to the FN.
8a. The FN creates private rFM ∈R Zp and public tFM = grFMmod p DH values
and calculates KMF as a derivation of tMF rFMmod p for use with the MD.
The public DH values tGM , tFM are sent to the Hop.
8b. The Hop creates private rHopM ∈R Zp and public tHopM = grHopMmod p DH
values and calculates KMHop as a derivation of tMHoprHopMmod p for use with
the MD. The public DH values tGM , tFM , tHopM are sent to the MD.
9. The MD calculates KMF ,KMHop,KMG accordingly. The MD generates the
payment data according to the tariff selected bMF for FN with the payment
chain β, and bMHop for the Hop with the payment chain γ. bMF and bMHop
also contain an identifier of the tariff selected by the MD.
The MD creates a signature on its encrypted identifier, hashes of bMF and
bMHop, all the ephemeral DH public parameters t∗, the ID of the FN and
GN, and PID(Hop). The payment data bMF is encrypted for the FN and
bMHop, bMF are encrypted for the Hop. The MD sends this signature, its iden-
tifier encrypted for the GN, hashes of bMF and bMHop, and the two ephemeral
DH public parameters not seen by the HN so far tFM , tHopM to the GN. This
data is required by the GN to verify the signature.
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Figure 3.9: Hop Setup Protocol, Signatures denoted red, changes to Connection
Setup Protocol (Fig. 3.7) in messages 1–5 denoted blue.
9a. The Hop decrypts and verifies bMHop, bMF . bMHop and bMF must have se-
lected the same tariff, the payee in bMHop must be PID(Hop), and the first
tick payment in bMHop must be valid. The Hop creates a signature on the
MD’s encrypted identifier, the ephemeral DH public parameters the Hop used
tMHop, tHopM , the ID of the FN and the GN, and PID(Hop). The Hop sends
this signature and message 9 to the FN.
9b. The FN verifies bMHop and the signature of the Hop from message 9a using
the public key from message 4, which was confirmed by the HN in message 5.
The FN creates a signature on the MD’s encrypted identifier, the ephemeral
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DH public parameters the FN used tMF , tFM , the ID of the FN and the GN,
and PID(Hop). The FN sends this signature, message 9, and 9a to the GN.
10. After the GN verifies the signatures by the MD and the FN from message 9
and 9b, the GN creates a signature on all ephemeral DH values, the identifiers
of the GN, FN, Hop, and the encrypted identifier of the MD, and the hashed
payment information bMHop and bMF , which is sent to the FN. The FN verifies
the signature by the GN and forwards it to the Hop when the verification
succeeds. The Hop forwards the message to the MD, who verifies the GN’s
signature.
Now that the parties have authenticated, established keys, and initialized pay-
ment, the MD and the Hop execute an 802.11X handshake using a derivation of
tMHop
rHopM . The payment chain γ is used for tick payment between the MD and
the Hop during service use. The MD and the FN set up an IPsec tunnel using a
derivation of tMF rFM and use the payment chain β during the service use phase.
3.5.3 Discussion of the Hop Setup Protocol
The Hop setup protocol is built on similar goals as the basic roaming mechanism
described above. We will now discuss how the security and privacy goals in Sec-
tion 3.5.1 are achieved.
Sec-1: Mutual authentication and key establishment between the MD, the Hop,
the FN, and the GN is achieved as all parties include ephemeral public keys from
the messages 2–3 and 7–8 within the signed parts of the messages 4–5 and 9–10.
Some signatures cannot be verified directly because some verifiers cannot access
the appropriate signature verification keys. Instead, these signatures are verified by
parties that are trusted by the MD (GN verifies FN’s signature), Hop (FN is trusted
via HN’s roaming agreement, FN verifies GN’s signature), and GN (FN verifies
Hop’s signature). The FN verifies Hop’s signature using the PK(Hop) supplied in
message 4 and confirmed by the HN in message 5. Furthermore, all signatures
contain ephemeral public DH values chosen by the signer; thus, they cannot be
reused by an attacker. Therefore, all parties are aware that the other parties are
actively participating in the current protocol run.
The keys KMHop, KMF , and KMG established during the protocol run are fresh, as
the ephemeral public DH parameters are chosen by all parties for only this session.
Also, the keys are exclusive as they can only be calculated by a party that knows
the corresponding private ephemeral DH parameter r corresponding to the public
parameter t it sent.
The verification of the MD’s signature on h(bMHop) and h(bMF ) sent in message
9 is interesting. Only the GN is able to verify MD’s signature directly. The GN signs
hashes of the payment data h(bMHop) and h(bMF ) sent by the MD in message 10,
which can be verified by the FN, but not by the Hop. Therefore, another mechanism
is needed. The Hop includes h(bMF ) and h(bMHop) in its signature in message 9a,
which the FN verifies. After verifying message 9a and 10, the FN knows that the
MD has committed to the same tariff to both the Hop and to the FN.
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Sec-2: The Hop announces its PID(Hop) in the broadcast message 6. The PID(Hop)
is confirmed and signed during the connection setup by the HN in message 5, which
only the HN can generate. A Hop cannot change its PID(Hop), as it is part of
its customer relationship with the HN and verified by the HN for the FN during
the connection setup (messages 4 and 5). It is in the duty of the HN not to allow
multiple PID(Hop) for a single Hop. The FN verifies that PID(Hop) as understood
by the MD is the same as the PID(Hop) verified by the HN earlier: The FN verifies
GN’s signature (message 10), which contains the PID(Hop) as understood by MD
(signed in message 9). Therefore, the MD can avoid a Hop that acted dissatisfactory
in the past.
Sec-3: At the end of the protocol run between MD and FN, a derivation of the
established key tFMrMF is used to establish an IPsec tunnel which provides en-
cryption and integrity for the following service use phase. Even the Hop cannot
read or modify traffic between the MD and the Internet, as it cannot obtain tFMrMF .
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy is achieved as the long-term keys (signature
keys by MD, Hop, FN, HN, and GN) are not used to calculate the session keys. All
the session keys are created using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement mechanism, which
provides perfect forward secrecy.
Sec-5: Key confirmation between the Hop and the FN is achieved by the en-
cryption of bHopF and h(tFHop, bFH) as in the Direct Connection Protocol. The
FN encrypts h(tFHop, bFH) instead of h(bFH) for the Hop because the Hop has sent
h(bFH) in the clear in message 4. Therefore, it would not prove FN’s ability to
decrypt.
Key confirmation between the MD and the GN is achieved by the encryption of
ID(MD) and h(ID(MD)).
Key confirmation between the MD and FN is achieved by the encryption of bMF
and h(tMF , h(bMF )). The FN encrypts (h(tMF , bMF )) instead of h(bMF ) for the MD
because the MD has sent h(bFH) in the clear in message 9. Therefore, it would not
prove FN’s ability to decrypt.
Key confirmation between the MD and the Hop is achieved by the encryption of
bMHop and h(tMHop, bMhop). The Hop encrypts h(tMHop, bMhop) instead of h(bMHop)
for the MD because the MD has sent h(bFH) in the clear in message 9. Therefore,
it would not prove the Hop’s ability to decrypt.
Thus, mutual belief in the keys KMHop, KMF , and KMG is achieved.
Pri-1: The MD stay anonymous to the Hop, the FN, and observers, as ID(MD)
is only sent encrypted with KMG, which is only known to the GN. The Hop stays
anonymous as the meaning of PID(Hop) is only known to the GN.
Pri-2: The MD stay untrackable to the Hop, the FN and observers, as KMG is
fresh for each new session, and therefore, the encryption of EKMG(ID(MD)) will also
be unique in each session. The MD needs to change its MAC address between two
protocol runs.
The Hop stays anonymous, as PID(Hop) does not contain a real name. However,
Hop carries only a single PID(Hop) and cannot generate more of them. It is issued
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by the Hop’s HN and is intended to make the Hop linkable to MDs. When the Hop
claims to have lost its PID(Hop), the HN has to issue a new one, and needs to stop
accepting connections with the old PID(Hop). For this purpose, HN carries a list of
revoked PID(Hop).
The practical goal of tariff negotiation between the Hop and the FN is achieved
in a similar way as in the direct connection protocol as discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Tariff negotiation between the MD and the Hop is done by the Hop sending a list
of supported tariffs and the MD committing to one of these tariffs. The Hop may
only offer tariffs originally offered by the FN; i.e., the Hop cannot introduce new
tariffs. Each tariff offered by the FN also contains the share to paid to the Hop by
the MD. The Hop cannot steal the first tick payment in bMF from the MD to the
FN, as MD’s signature on it is bound to the intended payee, FN.
More details and the goals for payment, Pay-1, Pay-2, and Pay-3 are discussed in
the section discussing the payment and clearing protocols over a Hop, Section 3.9.
3.6 Roaming with HN Oﬄine Directly
We will now present a variant of the connection setup protocol where the home
network HN does not take part in the connection establishment phase. In this
section, the MD is connected to the FN over a direct wireless link. Connections over
another Hop are discussed in the next section.
3.6.1 Scenario and Requirements
In the HN oﬄine solution, the HN will only be contacted during the clearing phase.
This reduces the overhead of communication between operators, and the connection
to the HN does not have to be established for every individual connection but only
in regular intervals, e.g., daily. A high latency in the network connection between
the FN and the HN will not delay the oﬄine connection setup protocol, which is
especially interesting when the FN and the HN are geographically distant. The
scenario is also interesting when HN does not have a high-bandwidth connection
itself, e.g., for HNs that do not operate any access points themselves. A similar
concept is established in cellular phone networks, where these operators are known as
Virtual Network Operators (VNOs): VNOs pay for use of the network infrastructure
instead of owning it.
Figure 3.10 provides a high level overview on the protocol suite and the entities
involved in the different protocol phases. Like the HN online roaming protocol
suite, the oﬄine roaming protocol suite consists of a connection setup protocol, a
tick payment protocol, and two different clearing protocols. Also like the HN online
protocols, the connection setup protocol can be implemented as a new key-generating
EAP-method for use in WLAN. The key established during the protocol could then
be used as pair-wise master key in the IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake to establish a
confidential and integrity protected connection between the MD and the AP of the
FN.
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Figure 3.10: Phases of the Direct Roaming Protocol Suite with HN Oﬄine During
Setup
The oﬄine connection setup protocol also includes secure tariff negotiation between
the MD and the FN as well as the secure initialization of the tick payment. The
tick payment protocol is also set up similar to the online case.
The oﬄine roaming protocol suite aims to meet the following goals:
Sec-1: Mutually authenticated key establishment between the MD and the FN
Sec-2: The MD can avoid an FN that acted dissatisfactory in the past.
Sec-3: Outsiders cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic (Confidentiality, In-
tegrity).
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy
Sec-5: Key Confirmation between the parties
Pri-1: The MD must stay anonymous to anybody (Anonymity).
Pri-2: The MD must stay untrackable to anybody (Unlinkability).
Pri-3: No one can learn details about MD’s session with the FN, e.g., the HN
(Information Privacy).
Pay-1: The MD will never have to pay for services it did not use.
Pay-2: The FN will be paid by the MD for the services the MD uses (Non-
Repudiation).
Pay-3: The FN cannot charge more than negotiated with the MD (Non-
Repudiation).
In the following, we will first describe some foundations of certificates used in the
HN oﬄine solution. Then, the protocol will be presented and discussed in detail. An
extension of the HN oﬄine connection setup protocol (described here) to allow con-
nections over a Hop is presented in Section 3.7. Details on the payment mechanism
during service use and clearing are discussed in Section 3.9.
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Cross Certification and CRLs
As a new requirement over the HN online scenario, the operators that want to enable
roaming among their users issue cross-certificates to each other. For the operators A
and B to cooperate, certA(B) and certB(A) are created. Operator A is distributing
certB(A) to its APs. These certificates are then transmitted via one-way broadcast
by the APs such that the MD can obtain them before transmitting any signals, and
before authenticating to a WLAN. E.g., the APs of Operator A are broadcasting
certB(A), which all MDs of Operator B will be able to verify using the public key
PK(B) of Operator B that they store.
The are two kinds of certificate revocation lists (CRLs): CRLs of revoked FNs,
and CRLs of revoked MDs. Both are shared between the operators. The CRLs of
revoked MDs are only shared between the operators and not published in any way.
Each operator is broadcasting in its network the current CRLs of revoked FNs, which
are generated by all the operators that have cross certified this operator. These CRLs
can be obtained by any MD within the range of FN’s access points. Each MD is
able to verify the CRLs using the public key of its home network PK(HN) it already
knows. MDs must use services with a network whose operator presents an invalid
certificate or no current CRL of the HN. All CRLs are signed by the issuing party
and have timestamps for their creation and expiration times.
Pseudonym Certificates
The MDs carry a list of pseudonym certificates (called PCs in the following) and
the corresponding signature creation keys. The PCs are used by the MD to achieve
anonymity against the FNs, i.e., they do not contain the user’s real name, so that
the FN cannot learn the true identity of the MD. When the MD uses a different PC
each time it visits an AP run by the same FN, the FN is also unable to track the
MD. These certificates and keys are issued by the HN and can be used in any order
by the MD to authenticate to FNs.
The HN is able to revoke PCs when the corresponding MDs are stolen, overspending,
or fail to pay after the clearing phase was executed. The FN keeps track of the PCs
revoked by the HN with the help of the CRLs discussed above and will refuse new
connections with an MD using a revoked PC.
3.6.2 Oﬄine Connection Setup Protocol
Like the online connection setup protocol, the oﬄine connection setup protocol is ex-
ecuted over a publicly visible, unencrypted, and unauthenticated channel. It includes
discovery of tariffs, certificates, and CRLs; authentication and key establishment,
tariff selection, payment initialization, and the first tick payment. Immediately after
the oﬄine connection setup protocol is executed, the MD can access the Internet
via FN’s access point.
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Figure 3.11: HN Oﬄine Connection Setup Protocol, Signatures denoted red
The oﬄine connection setup protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.11 and the message
exchange is described in detail in the following. Throughout the protocol description
the notations summarized in Table 3.5 are used.
1. The MD downloads the service advertising broadcast message from all the APs
within its radio reception range. These broadcasts from the FNs each contain
cross certificates, CRLs, and offered tariffs. When cross certificates are present
in the broadcast, the MD executes the oﬄine setup protocol.
The MD selects an FN AP that offers a suitable tariff (decided by user pref-
erence), which has sent a recent CRL signed by its HN and an unexpired and
unrevoked cross certificate certHN (FN) which was created by the HN of the
MD. If the verification of the CRL and cross certificate succeeds, the MD es-
tablishes a connection to the FN. The MD selects one of the tariffs offered by
the FN to use for this connection, possibly with the help of a tariff recommen-
dation system.
2. The MD chooses the private DH value rMD ∈R Zp and calculates the public
DH value tMD = grMDmod p, which is sent to the FN in message 2.
3. The FN chooses the private DH value rFN ∈R Zp and calculates the public
DH value tFN = grFNmod p. The public DH value tFN is signed by the FN
and sent to the MD.
4. The MD verifies the signature by the FN from message 3 with PK(FN) from
the FN’s cross certificate. The MD selects a pseudonym certificate PC to use
for this connection.
The MD generates a payment chain in a similar way as in the HN online
direct connection solution: MD chooses random values IV and α0 to calculate
α starting with α1 = H(α0) and ending with αT = HT (α0), where T refers to
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the maximum amount of hashes as indicated by the selected tariff. No value
may appear twice in the payment chain α, because it would create a loop. If
there is a loop, new values for IV and/or α0 must be chosen. The first tick
payment is αT−d = HT−d(α0). The payment information is summarized in
b = (IV, αT , αT−d, selected tariff).
The MD calculates K as a derivation of tFNrMDmod p, and uses K to encrypt
PC and the payment information b for the FN. The MD signs all public DH
values, a hash of b, the ID(FN), and its PC. The data is sent to the FN.
5. The FN calculates K as a derivation of tMDrFNmod p, and uses K to decrypt
the PC and the payment information b from the MD. The PC must be a
certificate that is signed by a CA that the CA of the FN has issued a cross
certificate for. The PC must not be revoked. The public key from the PC is
used to verify the signature by the MD. The received ID(FN) must match its
own ID. Hd(αT−d) must match αT , and the values must be new.
When all verification steps were successful, the FN generates message 5: The
FN encrypts a hash of the PC and the payment information b for the MD
to facilitate key confirmation. The FN creates a signature on the public val-
ues tMD, tFN , its ID, MD’s PC, and a hash of the payment information b to
authenticate MD’s public value and the identifiers.
The MD will then verify the signature by the FN for authentication and the
value inside the encrypted block for key confirmation.
At the end of the protocol run, a derivation of tMDrFNmod p is used as the MSK
for an 802.11X four-way handshake. When the MD and the FN have completed
the four-way handshake, the FN provides the first service interval to the MD at the
tariff selected by the MD. Further service intervals and clearing are discussed later
in Section 3.8 on the payment protocols.
3.6.3 Discussion of the Oﬄine Connection Setup Protocol
The oﬄine connection setup protocol illustrated in Figure 3.11 offers the following
security and privacy features:
Sec-1: Mutual authentication is achieved as both parties include the ephemeral
public keys from messages 2 and 3 within the signed parts of messages 3, 4, and 5.
Therefore, both parties are aware that the other party is actively participating in the
current protocol run. The MD is able to verify FN’s signature based on the cross
certificate certHN (FN) received in the first protocol message. The FN is able to
verify MD’s signature after decrypting message 4, which contains the MD’s chosen
pseudonym certificate PC.
The key established during each protocol run is fresh as the ephemeral DH param-
eters are chosen by both parties for only this session. Explicit key confirmation
is achieved by the encryption of messages 3 and 4 with the fresh key K. Signatures
in message 3 and 4 provide entity authentication. Thus, mutual belief in the key K
is achieved.
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The use of K to encrypt b and PC in message 4 provides key confirmation from
the MD to the FN, as both b and PC have a well-known structure. The encryption
of h(b,PC) by the FN proves to the MD that the FN is in possession of the key
K, as the FN was able to decrypt in message 4 and able to encrypt in message 5.
Because the values K and b are fresh in every new connection, an attacker cannot
use a replay of an old EK(h(b,PC)).
The FN proves trustworthiness to a client of the HN by presenting the cross cer-
tificate signed by the HN in the service advertising broadcast message 1. The FN
proves identity to an MD by signing the public parameter sent by the MD with a
signature key corresponding to the verification key presented in the cross certificate
sent in message 1. The MD proves trustworthiness by presenting a certificate signed
by its HN.
Note that timely certificate revocation between the operators is required, but out of
the scope of this document.
Sec-2: The FN presents a cross certificate signed by the HN to the MD. The HD
will not issue certification on multiple identities for a single FN. The certificate is
issued on the signature key which is used during the connection setup, so that the
certificate of an FN cannot be used by an attacker. Thus, the FN must present its
own certificate, so that the MD can avoid an FN that has acted dissatisfactory in
the past.
Sec-3: At the end of the protocol run, a derivation of the established key tFMrMF is
used as MSK in the 802.11X four-way handshake. The following connection is CCMP
protected, and thus outsiders cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic (Confidentiality,
Integrity).
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy is achieved as the long-term keys (signature
keys by MD and FN) are not used to calculate the session keys. All the session
keys are created using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement mechanism, which provides
perfect forward secrecy.
Sec-5: Key Confirmation of K is achieved as described in the following: The MD
encrypts b,PC for the FN. The FN decrypts, hashes, and encrypts this data for the
MD. This proves to the MD that the FN is able to decrypt and encrypt. As b and a
hash of the PC is contained in the signatures by the MD and the FN, the contents
of the encryption can be compared to the contents of the signature. This provides
key confirmation for both parties.
Pri-1: The PC is a certificate issued on a pseudonym ID generated by the HN for
the MD (or generated by the MD and signed by the HN). The pseudonym hides
MD’s identity, thus achieving anonymity.
Pri-2: While the use of a single pseudonym creates anonymity, the use of many
pseudonyms also creates unlinkability. Therefore, the MD carries an array of PCs
and the MD can choose which of his PCs to use in each new session. In order to
stay unlinkable to an FN, the MD has to use a different pseudonym certificate on
every connection setup with the same FN. Using the same pseudonym with different,
non-colluding FNs does not lead to linkability when the FNs do not collude.
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Pseudonym certificates are never sent in the clear. Even when encrypted with a fresh
key, the pseudonym certificate will only be sent after the FN has authenticated to
the MD.
As a fresh payment init value b is required for each protocol run, the use of a proper
block mode for the encryption of EK(b,PC) ensures that no individual block of the
ciphertext remains constant, even when the same PC is used twice. E.g., ECB
mode with padding b to exactly one cipher block length would lead to a constant
encrypted PC. Therefore, CBC or counter mode should be used. With this strat-
egy, less pseudonym certificates can be used while retaining unlinkability. To stay
unlinkable, the MD also has to change its MAC address between two connection
setups. Otherwise, even passive eavesdroppers are able to recognize an individual
MD.
Pri-3: HN is not contacted during the setup phase, and b is only transmitted in
encrypted form, thus hiding it from anyone but the MD and the FN. Therefore, no
one can learn details about MD’s session with the FN (Information Privacy).
The practical goal of tariff negotiation is achieved in a similar way as in the direct
connection protocol as discussed in Section 3.4.3.
The goals for payment, Pay-1, Pay-2, and Pay-3 are discussed in Section 3.8
discussing the payment and clearing protocols.
3.7 Roaming with HN Oﬄine over a Hop
Like the HN online protocol described in Section 3.4, the HN oﬄine protocol de-
scribed in Section 3.6 can be extended to provide support for the MD (Hop) relaying
service to other MDs beyond the area covered by the FN’s access points. This section
describes the extension.
3.7.1 Scenario and Requirements
The HN oﬄine Hop scenario, the connection between the MD and the FN is es-
tablished over another MD, which will be called Hop in the following. The home
network of the Hop is called HN in the following, and the home network of the MD
will called GN (the naming is similar to the HN online scenario). There is no online
connection between the FN and the HN, and no online connection between the FN
and GN. The HN and GN only take part in the clearing phase. Figure 3.12 provides
a high level overview of the protocol suite in this scenario.
Our extended roaming protocol suite aims to meet the following goals:
Sec-1: Mutually authenticated key establishment between the MD, the Hop, and
the FN
Sec-2: The MD can avoid a Hop that acted dissatisfactory in the past.
Sec-3: Outsiders and the Hop cannot read or modify the MD’s traffic and out-
siders cannot read or modify the Hop’s traffic (Confidentiality, Integrity).
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Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy
Sec-5: Key Confirmation between the parties
Pri-1: The MD and the Hop must stay anonymous to anybody (Anonymity).
Pri-2: The MD must stay untrackable to anybody (Unlinkability).
Pri-3: No one can learn details about MD’s and Hop’s session with the FN (In-
formation Privacy).
Pay-1: The Hop will never have to pay for services it did not use, e.g., the services
the MD uses with the FN.
Pay-2: The FN and the Hop will be paid by the MD for the services the MD uses.
Pay-3: The FN and the Hop cannot charge more than negotiated with the MD.
3.7.2 The Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol
The HN Oﬄine Hop Protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.13. We reuse the notations
introduced for the two-party protocol in Table 3.5 with some modifications. Most
importantly, the MD was renamed Hop to avoid confusion with another MD con-
necting to the FN over the Hop. The Hop is directly connected to the FN, and the
MD is only directly connected to the Hop. The pseudonym certificate of the MD is
now called PC-MD to avoid confusion.
1.–5. Messages 1.–5. of the Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol establish a connection be-
tween the Hop and the FN before the MD appears. This phase of the protocol
is largely similar to the Oﬄine Setup Protocol without Hop as discussed in
Section 3.6.2, except for the following modifications:
The Hop’s pseudonym is no longer secret, and no longer chosen freshly for
each connection. Instead of a pseudonym certificate PC, a special certificate
indicating the Hop’s intention to act as a Hop is used, which is called Hopcert.
The Hopcert is signed by the HN, who ensures that Hop only has a single valid
Hopcert, i.e., when a new Hopcert is issued, the old one will be revoked13. The
Hopcert is still an anonymous certificate, i.e., it does not contain Hop’s real
name, but the Hop only has a single Hopcert. Therefore, the use of the Hopcert
makes the Hop linkable on purpose.
As in the Online Hop Setup Protocol, the tariff list sent by the FN is extended
such that the tariffs now also include rates for MDs that are using Hops, i.e.,
how much they have to pay directly to the Hop.
During the Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol, the Hop sets up a payment chain α to
pay the FN. Payment information from the Hop for the FN is renamed from
b to bHF for clarity. At the end of the setup protocol, a derivation of the
key tMHrHMmod p is used as the MSK by the Hop and the FN to secure the
WLAN connection.
13Like revocation of cross certificates, revocation of Hopcerts is handled by a mechanism between
FN and HN that is out of the scope of this document.
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Figure 3.12: Phases of the Roaming Protocol Suite (HN oﬄine during setup with
Hop)
6.–10a. The messages 6.–10a. of the protocol are new. They contain two entwined
runs of the roaming mechanism discussed in Section 3.6.2: The MD establishes
a connection to the Hop, and the MD establishes a connection to the FN.
Payment information from the MD for the FN is summarized in bMF , and
from the MD for the Hop in bMH . The initialization of the tick payment
chain β between the MD and the FN, and γ between the MD and the Hop is
straightforward and works as in the two-party case. Therefore, further details
on the payment initialization related parts of the messages are omitted in this
description.
In the following, messages 6.–10a. of the protocol are described.
6. The certificates and CRLs from FN’s service advertising broadcast message are
replayed by the Hop to the MD in a broadcast message. The MD will verify
the cross certificate certGN (FN) and the CRLs signed by the GN. Lacking the
public key of the Hop’s HN, the MD does not verify the Hopcert.
The broadcast includes a tariff list, which is a subset of FN’s tariff list, i.e.,
the Hop does not have to support all of FN’s tariffs. However, the Hop cannot
create new tariffs. The MD is now able to select a suitable tariff.
7. The MD chooses the private DH values rMF , rMH ∈R Zp, and calculates the
public DH values tMF = grMF , tMH = grMHmod p. The public DH value
tMF is meant for key establishment with the FN, and tMH is meant for key
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Figure 3.13: HN Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol, Signatures denoted red, changes to
Connection Setup Protocol (Fig. 3.7) in messages 1–5 denoted blue.
establishment with the Hop. The MD sends the public DH values to the Hop,
who forwards them to the FN.
8. The FN creates a private DH value rFM ∈R Zp and public DH value tFM =
grFMmod p for use with the MD. The symmetric key KMF shared with the
MD is calculated by the FN by a derivation from tMF rFMmod p. The FN
creates a signature of its public DH value and sends both to the Hop.
8a. The Hop creates a private DH value rHM ∈R Zp and public DH value tHM =
grHMmod p for use with the MD. The symmetric key KMH shared with the
MD is calculated by the Hop as a derivation from tMHrHMmod p. The Hop
sends its public DH value and the message from the FN to the MD.
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9. The Hop verifies sigFN to check the authenticity of FN’s public DH value
tFM . The MD chooses one pseudonym certificate PC-MD from its storage.
The symmetric key KMF shared with the FN is calculated by the MD as a
derivation from tFMrMFmod p. The symmetric key KMH shared with the Hop
is calculated by the MD as a derivation from tHMrMHmod p.
Using these keys, the MD generates encrypted blocks which both contain MD’s
chosen pseudonym certificate PC-MD and the payment initialization and se-
lected tariff data values bMF for the FN and bMH for the Hop. The MD creates
a signature of the ephemeral public parameters, the ID of the FN, the Hopcert,
MD’s pseudonym certificate, and hashes of the payment blocks bMH , bMF . The
Hop’s public DH value tHM for the MD is appended for the FN. This data is
sent to the Hop.
9a. The Hop decrypts MD’s payment blocks bMH , bMF , and the PC-MD, and
verifies their correctness. The Hop verifies that bMH and bMF both indicate
the same tariff.
Like the MD, the Hop creates a signature on all public DH parameters, the ID
of FN, the Hopcert, MD’s pseudonym certificate, and a hash of both payment
blocks bMH and bMF . This data is sent to the FN together with the message
sent by the MD.
10. The FN extracts the ID of MD’s home network GN from the encrypted PC-
MD. The FN verifies that it has a valid roaming agreement with the GN. The
FN verifies the signatures of the MD and the Hop, the payment data bMF ,
and the pseudonym certificate PC-MD.
When the verification succeeds, the FN generates a signature on all the public
DH values, the identifiers, and the hashed payment blocks. The FN creates a
new encrypted block based on the hash of the contents of the encrypted block
sent by the MD to prove its possession of the key.
The FN will now accept connections from the MD. To secure the connec-
tion to the MD over the Hop, an IPsec tunnel based on a key derived from
tFM
rMFmod p is initiated.
10a. The Hop verifies the signature of the FN. When the verification succeeds,
the Hop creates a new encrypted block based on the hash of the contents of
the encrypted block sent by MD to prove its possession of the key. The Hop
forwards the message of the FN to the MD. After sending message 10a, the Hop
starts providing service to the MD by starting a 802.11x four-way-handshake
association based on a MSK derived from tMHrHMmod p with the MD. The
Hop then relays packets sent from the MD to the FN and vice versa.
The MD will verify the signature by FN and the encrypted blocks by FN and
Hop. When the verification succeeds, MD starts a 802.11x four-way-handshake
association with Hop based on a MSK derived from tMHrHMmod p.
To secure the connection to the FN over the Hop, an IPsec tunnel based on a
key derived from tFMrMFmod p is initiated.
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3.7.3 Discussion of the Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol
The HN oﬄine authentication and key establishment protocol with a Hop is similar
to the roaming mechanism without Hops discussed in Section 3.6.2.
Sec-1: Entity authentication is achieved as all three parties include ephemeral
public keys from messages 2/3 and 7/8 within the signed parts of messages 3/4
and 9/9a/10. Therefore, all the parties are aware that the other parties are actively
participating in the current protocol run. The FN verifies the signature of the MD for
the Hop and the signature of the Hop for the MD. The FN confirms the correctness
of these signatures with its own signature in message 10. The FN confirms to the
MD that the Hopcert is valid by comparing the Hopcert in MD’s signature to the
one the Hop presented in message 4.
The keys KMH and KMF established during the protocol run are fresh, as the
ephemeral public DH parameters are chosen by all three parties for only this session.
Also, the keys are exclusive as they can only be calculated by a party that knows
the corresponding private ephemeral DH parameters corresponding to the public
ephemeral DH parameter it sent.
When the MD tries to use two different PCs to the Hop and the FN in message 9,
FN’s verification of message 9a will fail and the FN will abort the protocol.
Sec-2: The MD can avoid a Hop that acted dissatisfactory in the past.
The Hop announces its Hopcert in the service advertising broadcast message 6.
The Hopcert is confirmed and signed before the protocol run by the HN. There is
revocation mechanism for Hopcerts between the HN and the FN so that the FN
will not accept a new session using a revoked Hopcert. A Hop cannot change its
Hopcert. Therefore, the MD can avoid a Hop that acted dissatisfactory in the past.
It is in the duty of the HN not to allow multiple Hopcerts for a single Hop and in the
duty of the FN to care for updates of its list of revoked Hopcerts. The Hop cannot
present a different Hopcert to the MD and the FN, as the MD includes Hopcert in
its signature in message 9, which the FN can verify.
Sec-3: At the end of the protocol run between MD and FN, a derivation of the
established key tFMrMF is used to establish a tunnel IPsec tunnel which provides
encryption and integrity protection. Even the Hop cannot read or modify traffic
between the MD and the Internet, as it cannot obtain tFMrMF . Therefore, confi-
dentiality and integrity is achieved.
Sec-4: Perfect Forward Secrecy is achieved as the long-term keys (signature
keys by MD, Hop, and FN) are not used to calculate the session keys. All the
session keys are created using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement mechanism, which
provides perfect forward secrecy.
Sec-5: Key confirmation is achieved by the encryption using the key KHF in
messages 4/5, they key KMH in messages 9/10a, and the key KMF in messages
9/10. In all cases, no one but the intended recipient could have decrypted the first
message, and without knowledge of the plain text and the key, no one can create the
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encrypted second message. Thus, mutual belief in the keys KHF , KMH , and KMF
is achieved.
The Hopcert is broadcasted by the Hop to achieve linkability of the Hop to the
MD. This way, the MD is able to avoid using a certain Hop when service has been
poor before. The Hopcert is a single certificate issued by the Hop’s HN. It does not
contain a real name, so that the Hop stays anonymous, but is linkable.
Pri-1: MD’s certificate PC-MD is issued on a pseudonym ID generated by the HN
for the MD (or generated by the MD and signed by the HN). The pseudonym hides
MD’s real identity, thus achieving anonymity.
Pri-2: While the use of a single pseudonym creates anonymity, the use of many
pseudonyms also creates unlinkability. Therefore, the MD carries an array of PC-
MDs, and the MD can choose which of his PCs to use in each new session. In order
to stay unlinkable to an FN, the MD has to use a different pseudonym certificate
on every connection setup with the same FN or the same Hop. Using the same
pseudonym with different FNs/Hops does not lead to linkability (when they do not
collude in an attack).
Pseudonym certificates are never sent in the clear. Even when encrypted with a good
key, the pseudonym certificates will only be sent after the FN has authenticated to
the MD. With this strategy, less pseudonym certificates can be used while retaining
unlinkability. To stay unlinkable, the MD also has to change its MAC address
between two connection setups. Otherwise, even passive eavesdroppers are able to
recognize an individual MD.
Pri-3: HN is not contacted during the setup phase, and b is only transmitted in
encrypted form, thus hiding it from anyone but the MD, the Hop, and the FN.
Therefore, no one can learn details about MD’s session with the FN (Information
Privacy).
The practical goal of tariff negotiation is achieved in a similar way as in the online
Hop setup protocol as discussed in Section 3.5.3.
Tariff negotiation is done by the Hop sending a list of supported tariffs and the
MD committing to one of these tariffs. The Hop cannot steal the first tick payment
in bMF from the MD to the FN, as MD’s signature on it is bound to the intended
payee, FN.
More details and the goals for payment, Pay-1, Pay-2, and Pay-3 are discussed in
the section discussing the clearing protocol over a Hop, Section 3.9.
3.8 The Payment Protocols without a Hop
In the previous four sections, we have seen how connections are established in the
different roaming scenarios. We will now discuss how payment is handled during
connections and at the clearing phase at the end of each connection. Recall the goals
for payment in all the roaming scenarios:
Pay-1: The MD will never have to pay for services it did not use.
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Pay-2: The FN will be paid by the MD for the services the MD uses (Non-
Repudiation).
Pay-3: The FN cannot charge more than negotiated with the MD (Non-
Repudiation).
The idea of micropayment in roaming is that the MD pays one tick to the FN for each
small service interval before it is provided. Each tick corresponds to a small amount
of money. The worth is chosen so small that losing it without receiving service is not
a big issue for the MD. This is required as the MD pays first, and receives service
later. Because of the unreliable nature of wireless radio transmissions service could
be disrupted even with an honest FN, e.g., from interference.
The FN is able to cash in every single tick the MD has sent, even when the MD
disappears. The amount to be paid grows continuously in tick payment schemes,
which is a good match for our scenario. The payment protocol used here is similar
to the one suggested by Horn and Preneel [119] that was introduced in Section 2.6,
but the first tick payment is integrated into the setup phase. In our protocol, the
service unit (time or data volume), the size of the service interval, the number of
hashes per tick, and the monetary value of a single tick have all been agreed upon
during tariff negotiation in the connection setup protocol. The FN has offered a list
of tariffs, and the MD has agreed on one of them by signing its payment chain.
In the following, the hash function H is always used with an initialization vector
IV , but the IV is omitted from further descriptions. The parameter d describes
the amount of hash operations per tick. In the original micropayment protocol by
Pedersen [119], d can be varied during the protocol run. In our solution, d is fixed.
3.8.1 Tariff Negotiation
Each FN broadcasts a list of tariffs that it offers in its service advertising message.
These tariffs contain the monetary value per tick payment, the service interval type
and size, the amount of hashes per tick d, and the maximum amount of hashes T ,
e.g., 1 cent per tick, time based, 60 seconds per tick, maximum of 1000 hashes, 1 hash
per tick. The MD is able to receive the broadcast messages, and the recommendation
system on the MD helps the user select the best tariff based on the data available.
3.8.2 Initialization of Tick Payment
The tariff agreement results in the monetary value per tick payment, T , d, and the
service interval type and size. The MD uses this data to generates a hash chain α as
such: The MD randomly chooses α0, IV and calculates αi = H(αi−1), i ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
When pairs αi = αj , i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , T} appear, the MD starts over with new
random values.
α0 is the beginning of the hash chain and will be kept secret. αT is the end of the
payment chain and will be used in the first tick payment. The first tick is described
by αT and αT−d.
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Payer
MD
Payee
FN
1.Request New Tick
αT−i−d = H
T−i−d(α0)
i := i+ d
2.New Tick: αT−i−d
verify:
Hd(αT−i−d)
?
= αT−i
i := i+ d
Figure 3.14: Basic Tick Payment Protocol
The payment data generated by the MD is summarized in b in the following. b
contains the initial values of the payment protocol αT , IV , the ID(FN), a description
of the selected tariff, and the first tick payment (using d hashes) αT−d.
The MD commits to the payment data b calculating a signature on the hash of
b which is sent to the FN. The FN also receives b (in encrypted form for privacy
reasons). The FN verifies the first tick payment by testing Hd(αT−d)
?= αT . MD’s
signature is verified directly by HN in the online case, or by a certificate verification
in the HN oﬄine case. The FN then creates a new signature on h(b) for the MD.
Now, both parties are able to prove that the other party has committed to the tariff
contained in b.
The FN will now provide service to the MD until the first service interval expires.
The expiration is defined by the service interval size, which denotes the time or data
volume available to the MD.
3.8.3 New Service Interval
When a service interval is used up, a new tick payment is requested by the FN
as illustrated in Figure 3.14. After i ticks were used, the MD provides a new tick
payment to the FN by calculating αT−i−d = HT−i−d(α0) and sending αT−i−d to
the FN. The FN verifies that Hd(αT−i−d)
?= αT−i. Both parties increase i by d and
store i. This can be repeated until i > T , when the payment chain is exceeded. The
MD always has to keep track of the service it uses so that it cannot be overcharged
by the FN sending early requests.
3.8.4 Clearing Phase with HN Online During Setup
The direct connection without a Hop and HN online will be discussed first. The
modifications for use with the HN oﬄine is discussed in Section 3.8.6. The extension
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payer
MD
payee
FN
bank
HN
1. sigMD(ID(FN),h(b), sum) 2.EKMH (ID(MD)),h(b), sum,
sigMD(ID(FN),h(b), sum)
3. ok/nok
4. compensation
Figure 3.15: Basic Graceful Clearing Protocol after Online Setup (described in
Fig. 3.7)
payee
FN
bank
HN
1. b, i, αT−i, t∗, CSP Messages 4 and 5
2. ok/nok
3.Compensation
Figure 3.16: Basic Abort Clearing Protocol after Online Setup (CSP = Connection
Setup Protocol, see Figure 3.7)
to an MD connecting over a Hop is added in Section 3.9, including the HN oﬄine
variant.
The MD can actively close the connection to the FN by sending an ending message.
This called the basic graceful clearing protocol, which is shown in Figure 3.15.
The MD sends an ending message sigMD(ID(FN), h(b), sum), where sum is the total
monetary amount of service used. FN sends MD’s signature to the HN together with
all the data needed to verify the signature. The value h(b) is included in the signature
to allow the HN to recognize which connection the signature belongs to. The HN
has received and signed h(b) during the connection setup phase, after identifying
the MD.
The HN will not obtain knowledge of any details the MD and the FN have agreed
on. In the interest of MD’s privacy, the HN will only receive information on whom
to pay how much. When the MD tries to cheat by choosing a lower amount in the
ending message than it has to pay, the HN verification of MD’s ending message will
fail, as the sum to pay is transmitted by the FN to the HN. Then, the FN will
behave as if the MD aborted the connection.
When a connection ends without MD sending an ending message after i service
intervals, the basic abort clearing protocol is run. The FN is able to collect
compensation from MD’s HN as shown in Figure 3.16. During the authentication
phase as described in Section 3.4.2, the FN has obtained the billing information
b from message 4 and the signature sent from HN on h(b) from message 5. The
last tick payment αT−i was obtained from the MD during the tick payment phase
described above. Together, this data allows the FN to prove that the HN has to
pay for the services the MD used by using the signatures of MD and HN in the
connection setup protocol messages 4 and 5. The FN can prove to the HN that the
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MD is a customer of the HN, the amount of service the FN provided to the MD, and
the tariff the MD selected, which results in the amount to be paid. The HN does
not have to verify the signatures by MD and itself again; these can be implemented
as a database lookup when each successful verification is stored14.In this case, the
HN obtains the details about the tariff chosen by the MD and the amount of service
used by the MD.
In both cases, the HN will reimburse the FN and charge the MD. During clearing
and billing, the HN learns nothing about the time, date, and location of the service
used by its MD with the FN in this session. When the MD aborts without sending
an ending message, the HN will obtain knowledge of b and i, which includes the
tariff the MD and the FN have agreed on and the amount of service the MD has
used.
The HN knows the key KMH from the connection setup protocol and has stored it
together with h(b), so that it can decrypt EKMH (ID(MD)). As the HN has issued
ID(MD), the HN is able to resolve ID(MD) to the real identity of the MD, so that
the HN is able to bill the MD. To prevent the FN from double charging by using both
the graceful and the aborted redemption messages, h(b) is included in the graceful
ending message. This way, the HN can detect that these describe the same session.
The FN must not accept new connections with an h(b) that was used before. This
can be prevented using a lookup of previously used values, or by modifying T and
d in the offered tariffs.
The clearing between the FN and the HN can be done at anytime after the end of
MD’s service usage, e.g., the FN can clear all the connections for each HN at the
end of the day. The MD can also send the graceful ending message earlier, e.g.,
in regular intervals. Should the connection abort later, only the details about the
remaining shorter session are revealed to the HN.
3.8.5 Discussion of the Payment Protocol
Recall that a fundamental property of micropayment schemes is the very low value
of a single tick payment. Therefore, it is not a problem when the MD provides the
first tick payment during setup and the FN does not provide service. The same
holds when the connection aborts after a number of intervals, when the MD might
have paid for one more tick than it could use.
The security of hash chain based micropayment schemes is well researched. Given
αi, no one can calculate αi−j for any j > 0 because H is a preimage resistant hash
function. Therefore, new ticks to an existing chain cannot be forged (Pay-3).
The identity of the payer is bound to the payment chain because of MD’s signature
in message 4, which is validated by the HN (Pay-1). The identity of the payee is
also bound to the payment chain because the signature contains ID(FN), which is
confirmed by the HN. Therefore, payments cannot be stolen (Pay-1).
Because all payment chains generated by the MD are validated over the same HN,
contain a fresh value h(b) (inherited from the fresh values for αT , IV ), and as the HN
14and revocation is still considered
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payer
MD
payee
FN
bank
HN
1. sigPC(ID(FN), αT , IV, sum) 2. sigPC(ID(FN),αT , IV, sum),
PC,αT , IV, sum
3. ok/nok
4. compensation
Figure 3.17: The Basic Graceful Clearing Protocol after Oﬄine Setup (described in
Fig. 3.11)
payee
FN
bank
HN
1. sigPC
(
tMD, tFN , h(b),ID(FN),PC
)
,
tMD, tFN , b, i,PC,last tick αT−i
2. ok/nok
3. compensation
Figure 3.18: The Basic Abort Clearing Protocol after Oﬄine Setup (described in
Fig. 3.11)
keeps records of accepted clearing messages, a payment chain cannot be used more
than once (Pay-3). The FN cannot be tricked into accepting the same payment
twice as the signature in message 4 contains tFN , which is chosen by the FN (Pay-
2). The FN does not learn the identity of the MD during payment or clearing,
as only EKMH (ID(MD)) is disclosed to the FN, which is different for each session
(inherited from the fresh values tMH and tHM ).
The MD and the HN are able to collude to obtain free service from FN by HN
accepting bad signatures from MD. This is an inherent risk in roaming systems when
payment is done after the service was provided. The FN will detect this behavior
and is able to revoke the roaming agreement to no longer accept connections from
HN’s clients.
The FN and the HN are able to collude so that the FN can identify the MD. This
is discussed in Section 3.12.3 on lawful data retention.
3.8.6 Modifications for use with HN Oﬄine During Setup
The basic tick payment protocol operates exactly like in the HN online case.
Thus, the service usage phase remains unchanged. However, changes to the setup
and clearing protocols are required. The HN Oﬄine Connection Setup Protocol was
described in Section 3.6. The clearing protocols after the HN Oﬄine Connection
Setup Protocol are described in the following.
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Recall the fundamental difference to the online solution is that the MD does not
use a single signature key, but the one from the pseudonym certificate (PC) the MD
presented to the FN (and the HN) to set up this connection.
In the setup phase (described in Fig. 3.11), the FN is able to verify MD’s signature
directly, as the MD has presented its PC to the FN. The confirmation by the HN
is given implicitly by HN’s signature on the PC and by HN not having revoked the
PC.
In the clearing phase, the pseudonym certificate PC used by the MD in the HN
oﬄine setup protocol is forwarded to the HN by the FN. As the HN has issued all
PCs, the HN is able to resolve the PC to the MD. Therefore, the HN is able to
identify and bill the MD.
The basic graceful clearing protocol after HN oﬄine setup is shown in Fig-
ure 3.17. Compared to the online variant, the PC is used instead of the encrypted
identifier EKMH (ID(MD)). The MD creates a signature on ID(FN), αT , IV, sum.
This includes how much to pay (sum) to whom (ID(FN)) from whom (signature by
PC) and uniqueness (αT , IV ).
Figure 3.18 shows the basic abort clearing protocol after HN oﬄine setup.
It is executed when the connection ends after i service intervals, but the MD did
not send a graceful ending message, or when the HN rejects MD’s signature in the
basic graceful clearing protocol. The FN is able to prove to the HN that the MD
agreed on a tariff by replaying sigPC
(
tMD, tFN , h(b), ID(FN), PC
)
from the setup
protocol and by disclosing the payment data b and the PC to the HN.
To prevent the FN from double charging by running both the graceful and the abort
protocol, αT and IV are included in MD’s signature, as they are unique to each
connection. These are not normally required for the graceful billing, but do not
leak sensitive information regarding MD’s privacy: IV, α0 is randomly chosen by
the MD, and αT is calculated to HT (α0) in the connection setup protocol. As in
the connection setup protocol, the FN does not learn the identity of the MD.
3.9 Extended Payment Protocols with a Hop
When an MD is already connected to an FN, it is able to act as a relay for other
MDs and becomes a Hop. The Hop helps MDs that are not within radio range of
FN to connect to the FN. In the following, Hop refers to a device that is already
connected to an FN, and MD to a device that wants to connect over a Hop. Recall
that HN denotes the home network of the Hop, and GN denotes the home network
of the MD.
An important goal of the Hop solution is that no roaming agreement between the
HN and the GN is required. This is achieved by not requiring a connection between
them. In the online solution, they do not have to share an keys. In the oﬄine
solution, cross certification between HN and GN is not needed. The FN is trusted
by both the HN and the GN because of the roaming agreements. The FN acts as a
notary to verify the signatures by the MD and the Hop for each other.
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We will first discuss connections established with the HN online, and later with the
HN oﬄine (Section 3.9.5).
3.9.1 Tariff Negotiation with a Hop
Each tariff offered by the FN in the Hop solution contains an additional value, the
Hop incentive. The Hop incentive is the fraction of MD’s transaction costs that will
be paid to the Hop. The Hop can choose to offer not all but only some of the tariffs
offered by the FN. Like the FN, the Hop broadcasts a list of tariffs it offers, which
can be any subset of the tariffs the FN offers.
As in the direct connection scenario, the service advertising broadcast message is
received by the MD and evaluated with the recommendation system.
It is interesting to analyze what would happen if the MD selects different tariffs to
the Hop and the HN, which is not allowed in our protocols. The Hop and the FN
are still guaranteed payment by the MD for the tariff the MD accepted. However,
in the clearing phase, the payment is relayed from the GN over the FN to the HN,
and the FN only guarantees payment for Hops that relay service with tariffs that
the FN offered. When the FN verifies the tariff between the MD and the Hop in
the clearing phase, and rejects it, the Hop would not be paid. An attack by the
MD that exploits no integrity protection for FN’s tariffs and no tariff comparison
bMF /bMH would be executed like this:
• The MD modifies message 1 and inserts bogus tariffs.
• The Hop accepts false tariffs from the FN, but the Hop does not use them
itself with the FN.
• The Hop offers the bogus tariffs to the MD.
• The MD connects to the Hop, selects a bogus tariff, and uses services.
• After a while of service use, the MD aborts the session.
• The Hop runs the clearing after abort protocol, but the FN does not accept
the tariff in bMH .
• The Hop does not get paid by the MD. Thus, the MD has used Hop’s services
without paying the Hop incentive.
As we decided against integrity protection for FN’s tariffs, a mechanism is needed
to ensure that the MD has selected a valid tariff offered by the FN for use with the
Hop. This is achieved in the Hop setup protocols by having the FN verify the tariff
the MD selected for the FN, and the Hop verifies that the MD selected the same
tariff for both the FN and the Hop. Therefore, the tariff selected for the Hop must
be valid. Thus, the attack described above is prevented.
3.9.2 Tick Payment over Hops
The tick payment mechanism is based on the basic tick payment protocol without
Hop as described above, where a single payment chain α was established between
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MD Hop FN
1. request d ticks from MD
βT−j−d = H
T−j−d(β0)
γT−j−d = H
T−j−d(γ0)
j := j + d
2. d ticks for Hop: γT−j−d
3. d ticks for FN: βT−j−d
verify:
Hd(γT−j−d) = γT−j
j := j + d
verify:
Hd(βT−j−d) = βT−j
j := j + d
Figure 3.19: Extended Tick Payment Protocol with a Hop
the MD and the FN. Now, two different payment chains are used: β from the MD
to the FN and γ from the MD to the Hop. They are based on randomly chosen (but
different) β0, γ0 and IVβ, IVγ . Note that the MD must select the same tariff with
the Hop and the FN. In the following, the hash function H is always used with the
respective IV , but the IV values are omitted from further descriptions.
The payment chains are bound to the authenticated payer and the intended receiver
by MD’s signature in message 9 of the Hop Setup Protocol (Figure 3.9). As shown
in Figure 3.19, the FN requests d new ticks after a service interval has been used up
by the MD. The MD is paying to the FN and the Hop by sending ticks βj and γj .
As the same tariff is used with the Hop and the FN, the intervals with the Hop and
the FN will end at the same time, and the Hop does not have to signal to the MD
that a service interval is over.
The MD keeps track of its service usage so that it cannot be overcharged by the FN.
The Hop keeps track of MD’s service usage and verifies that tick payments γj arrive
in a timely fashion. The Hop and the FN verify the received ticks in the same way
using H. The Hop does not have to request tick payments itself, as the tariff chosen
by the MD includes the incentive paid to the Hop, which uses the same unit size
(time or data volume) and maximum number of hashes T as the connection to the
FN. Should the FN not request tick payments in a timely fashion, the Hop would
be credited too little. In this case, the Hop can abort the connection at any time.
3.9.3 Extended Clearing Protocols with a Hop
The FN is clearing the payments α from the Hop to the FN as described in Sec-
tion 3.8.4, where MD is renamed to Hop. Only the payments from the MD to the
FN β and from the MD to the Hop γ are cleared using the extended clearing proto-
cols, which are described in the following. As for the basic protocol, there are two
variants, depending on whether or not the MD sent an ending message.
The extended abort protocol is executed when the MD aborts the connection
as shown in Figure 3.21. The messages from the Hop Setup Protocol can be used
to prove to the GN (and an external party) that the MD has committed on the
payment chains to pay the FN and the Hop, as they contain MD’s signature on
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MD Hop FN
HN of Hop
HN
HN of MD
GN
1. payβ ,sigMD(payβ),
payγ ,sigMD(payγ)
1a. γend,
bMHop
2. payβ ,sigMD(payβ),payγ ,sigMD(payγ),
EKMG(ID(MD))
3. Compensation to FN/Hop, sumγ , ID(HN)
4. ID(GN), PID(Hop), sumγ ,
compensation to Hop, 1a.
5. Compensation for Hop
Figure 3.20: Extended Graceful Clearing Protocol after Online Hop Setup Protocol
(described in Fig. 3.9)
Hop FN
HN of Hop
HN
HN of MD
GN
1. j, γend, bMHop 1a. j, βend, γend, bMF , bMHop, Setup Messages 7–10
2. Compensation to FN/Hop, sumγ , ID(HN)
3. ID(GN), PID(Hop), sumγ ,
compensation to Hop, 1.
4. Compensation to Hop
Figure 3.21: Extended Abort Clearing Protocol after Online Hop Setup Protocol
(described in Fig. 3.9)
bMF , bMHop and GN’s signature of h(bMF ), h(bMHop). The GN does not have to
verify the signatures again; these can be implemented as a database lookup when
each successful verification is stored15. The Hop and the FN disclose bMF , bMHop
to the GN, who can verify them using h(bMF ), h(bMHop). The value j denotes the
amount of ticks paid by the MD to the Hop and the FN. The last tick payments are
βend and γend, i.e., Hj(βend) = βT and Hj(γend) = γT . By disclosing bMF , bMHop
and the last tick payment, the GN will obtain knowledge of the tariff the MD has
agreed on, and the amount of service used by the MD, which can be avoided by the
MD sending an ending message.
The extended graceful ending protocol is shown in Figure 3.20. When the MD
does not want to use further service, it sends an ending message to the Hop, who
relays it to the FN. The message is based on two signed payment strings,
payβ = sumβ, ID(FN), βT , IVβ, (3.6)
payγ = sumγ ,PID(Hop), γT , IVγ . (3.7)
15and revocation is still considered
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IVβ and IVγ are the random values used for the payment hash operations. βT and
γT are the first paid and last generated values in the payment chains: βT = HT (β0)
and γT = HT (γ0). They are sent to prevent double spending so that the Hop and the
FN cannot clear the same payment chain twice. sumβ and sumγ are the amounts
to be paid to the FN and the Hop in a real world currency. The Hop forwards
message 1, but also the last tick payment the Hop received γend to the FN. The
FN is forwarding message 1 to the GN with MD’s encrypted identifier used in the
Hop Setup Protocol. The GN verifies the signature of the MD and acknowledges the
claim. The GN will credit the FN (possibly later at the end of a billing period). The
GN cannot credit the Hop, because the GN might not have a roaming agreement
with the HN. Therefore, the GN sends payment for the Hop to the FN, and in
message 4 the FN forwards it to the HN, who credits the Hop in message 5.
The Hop has included γend and bMHop in message 1a to the FN, which the FN does
not forward to the GN in the graceful ending protocol. It is included so that the
FN can execute the Abort Clearing Protocol for MD’s connection without having
to contact the Hop again. This is needed in case the GN rejects MD’s signature
from message 1, i.e., when MD has created an invalid signature. The payment data
bMHop also identifies the connection with the MD. The other information needed to
run the abort protocol bMHop, βend, and the Setup Message 9, 10 are already known
to the FN from the Hop Setup Protocol.
As the Hop can lose its wireless link at any time, e.g., when the owner of Hop leaves
the range of the FN’s wireless network without ending the session, a mechanism is
required to prevent losing the payments from the MD to the Hop. The Hop could
initiate the MD to run the graceful end protocol when the Hop is shutting down,
aborting its own session, or starting to move. Also, the abort clearing protocol can
be executed by the Hop in regular intervals with a delay flag, which prevents the
FN from contacting the GN immediately. The FN will only proceed the clearing of
MD’s payments with the GN after the connection to the MD (and possibly the Hop)
has aborted. The abort protocol on the full amount can be executed when the Hop
connects to the same FN again. The GN can easily recognize a session with its MD
because γT is unique to each session.
3.9.4 Discussion of the Extended Payment Protocol
The tick payment chains from the MD to the Hop and from the MD to the FN are
both securely initialized in the Hop Setup Protocol. Each of the payment chains
provides the properties discussed in Section 3.8 such that the chains cannot be forged,
payments cannot be stolen and cleared by someone else, and payments cannot be
used or cleared more than once. We will now discuss how the payment security and
privacy goals described in Section 3.5.1 are achieved.
Pri-3: The GN does not learn any details about MD’s and Hop’s session with the
Hop and the FN when the extended graceful end protocol is executed correctly, as
the payment strings payβ and payγ only contain the amount to be paid and the
party to be paid. However, if the GN would wrongfully reject the MD’s signature, it
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can force the FN to reveal the details. The FN can detect this attack if it happens
often and cancel the roaming agreement with the GN.
Pri-4: The HN does not learn any details about MD’s and Hop’s session use with
the Hop and the FN, because the HN only receives ID(GN) and the payment strings,
which only contain the sum to be paid, Hop’s PID, and ID(GN).
Pay-1: The Hop is assured that it will not have to pay for the services the MD uses
with the FN, because the MD is using its own payment chain β with the FN, and
the FN counts the services used by the MD separately from those used by the Hop.
When the FN tries to overcharge the Hop, the Hop can abort the connection upon
receiving a wrongful tick payment request. The maximum risk for the Hop is the
value of a single tick payment.
Pay-2: The FN and the Hop are convinced that they will be paid by the MD for the
services the MD uses, because the MD has committed on one payment chain each
for both Hop and HN in message 9, which was confirmed by the GN in message 10,
which was confirmed to the Hop by the FN forwarding message 10 and providing
subsequent service to the MD. Every single tick payment sent by the MD can be
verified by the Hop and the FN immediately, and clearing does not rely on MD’s
cooperation.
Pay-3: The FN and the Hop cannot charge more than negotiated with the MD.
They cannot calculate additional tick payments in payβ and payγ , because H is a
one-way function. The FN and the Hop cannot clear the same connection twice,
as βT , IVβ and/or γT , IVγ will be the same as those cleared before, which will be
detected and rejected by the GN.
3.9.5 Modifications for use with HN Oﬄine During Setup
The extended tick payment protocol operates exactly like in the HN online case.
Thus, the service usage phase remains unchanged. However, changes to the setup
and clearing protocols are required. The HN oﬄine Hop setup protocol was described
in Section3.7. The clearing protocols after the HN oﬄine Hop setup protocol are
described in the following.
Clearing Phase
The FN is clearing the payments α for services the Hop used itself with Hop’s HN
similar the oﬄine protocol without Hops (Section 3.8.6). PC-MD is replaced by
Hopcert. The following describes how the FN is clearing the payments β for itself
and γ for the Hop with MD’s GN and Hop’s HN:
The graceful ending protocol is shown in Figure 3.22. It is executed by the MD
when it does not want to use more service. The MD creates the following components
for the ending message:
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MD Hop FN
HNHop
HN
HNMD
GN
1. payβ,sigPC-MD(payβ),
payγ,sigPC-MD(payγ)
1a. γend, bMH
2. PC-MD,Hopcert,payβ,sigPC-MD(payβ),
payγ,sigPC-MD(payγ)
3. ok/nok, compensation for FN and Hop
4. Hopcert,payγ , sumγ, compensation for Hop
5. compensation for Hop
Figure 3.22: Extended Graceful Clearing Protocol after Oﬄine Hop Setup (described
in Fig. 3.13)
Hop FN
HNHop
HN
HNMD
GN
1. j, γend, bMH
2. sigPC-MD
(
tMF , tFM , tHM , tMH , h(bMF ), h(bMH),ID(FN),
Hopcert
)
, j, βend, γend, bMH , bMF , t∗,Hopcert,PC-MD
3. ok/nok, compensation for FN and Hop
4.Hopcert, γend, sumγ , compensation for Hop
5. compensation for Hop
Figure 3.23: Extended Abort Clearing Protocol after Oﬄine Hop Setup (described
in Fig. 3.13)
payβ = sumβ, ID(FN), βT , IVβ, (3.8)
payγ = sumγ ,Hopcert, γT , IVγ . (3.9)
(Note that compared to the HN online clearing protocols, payγ contains Hopcert
instead of PID(Hop).) The MD generates a signature for each component and sends
the data to the Hop, who will forward it to the FN. The FN will add MD’s pseudonym
certificate PC-MD and Hopcert, and forward the data to MD’s home network GN.
The GN verifies the signatures created by the MD, and can indicate success or failure
to the FN. Hopcert is needed by the GN to verify MD’s signature on payγ and payβ.
In case of failure, the abort protocol is executed (described below). When successful,
the GN will grant the FN the funds spent by the MD.
The FN will then contact Hop’s home network HN to transfer the portion of the
funds paid by the MD to the Hop as indicated by payγ . Finally, the HN will add
the funds from payγ to the Hop’s account.
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As there is no connection between the Hop and the GN, the Hop has to clear the
payment γ from the MD using the FN as a payment gateway as shown in Figure 3.20.
When the FN has established a connection to the GN some time after the connection
to the MD was closed, the FN is forwarding MD’s payβ and payγ to the GN. The GN
is directly able to credit the FN, but not the Hop, because the GN might not have
a roaming agreement with the HN, and the signature is for an anonymous Hopcert
which only the HN can identify. Therefore, the GN sends payment for the Hop to
the FN, and in message 4 the FN forwards it to the HN. The HN identifies the
Hopcert by a database lookup and credits the Hop. Message 4 also contains payγ ,
so that the Hop and the HN can identify the connection for which the payment was
made when the compensation is received. Note that messages 2 and 4 may be sent
with a delay, e.g., clearing is done daily for all new connections.
The Hop is also sending γend, bMH to the FN in the graceful clearing protocol so
that the FN can later initiate the extended abort protocol without having to contact
the Hop again. γend is the last tick payment by the MD. bMH is used to identify the
connection.
When the MD aborts the connection, the extended abort clearing protocol is
executed as shown in Figure 3.21. In this case, the GN will obtain knowledge of
the tariff that the MD, the Hop, and the FN have agreed on, and the amount of
service used by the MD. The FN executes the direct connect abort clearing protocol
(described in Fig. 3.13). The Hop will send the amount of ticks j, the last tick
payment γend, and the payment initialization data bMH to the FN. The FN has
received the last tick payment βend and the payment initialization data bMF from
the MD. The FN will forward this data along with MD’s signature from message 9,
the Hopcert, PC-MD, and the public DH values t∗ to the GN. With this information,
the GN is able to verify the signature. (The GN can also perform a database
lookup instead of signature verification, as it already verified this signature during
the Oﬄine Hop Setup protocol.) The GN will send compensation for both γend and
βend to the FN, who will forward the compensation γend for the Hop to the HN.
Discussion of the Oﬄine Hop Payment protocol: The Oﬄine Hop Payment
protocols are largely identical to the Online Hop Payment protocols:
The signature given by the MD during initialization is almost similar. The pub-
lic/private key pair used to create MD’s signatures is not static to the MD, but
belongs to a pseudonym certificate PC-MD of MD. PID(Hop) is replaced by the
Hopcert. Both the PID(Hop) and the Hopcert are static and unique, but anony-
mous identifiers. In both setup protocols, the FN acknowledges to the Hop that the
signature by MD was correct.
The tick payment initialization and tick payment protocol is identical to the online
Hop Payment protocol discussed in Section 3.9.
The oﬄine hop clearing protocols with graceful end and abort are almost similar to
the online hop clearing protocols. Only the Hop’s static pseudonym ID PID(Hop)
is replaced by its static pseudonym certificate Hopcert.
The tick payment chains from the MD to the Hop and from the MD to the FN are
both securely initialized in the Hop Setup Protocol. Each of the payment chains
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Protocol Party Send Receive Forward
A B C
1
2
3
A 2 0 0
B 1 1 1
C 0 2 0
A B C
1, 2
2, 3
A 1 0 0
B 1 1 0
C 0 1 0
Figure 3.24: Counting Messages: Optimized Implementation of Multiple Messages
provides the properties discussed in Section 3.8.5 such that the chains cannot be
forged, payments cannot be stolen and cleared by someone else, and payments cannot
be used or cashed more than once.
3.10 Comparison of the Protocol Variants
We have presented protocol variants for connection setup with the HN online and
without participation of the HN, both for a direct connection between the MD and
the FN, and for a connection over a Hop. Also, payment and clearing protocols for
the solutions were presented. It is interesting to compare these protocols, especially
whether the approach with the HN online or oﬄine during connection setup is more
worthwhile.
The achieved security goals are common to all variants of the solution. The HN
online and HN oﬄine solutions both achieve the same security goals, and the direct
connection and the Hop solutions both achieve the same security goals.
Regarding achieved privacy goals, the solutions are mostly equal, except that in the
HN online solution, the HN will learn the time when the MD started the session.
The fundamental decision of an MD whether or not to offer Hop services influences
its privacy regarding unlinkability, but not whether the solution was setup with
the HN online or oﬄine. The loss of unlinkability for the Hop is a requirement
to ensure good service to other MDs. Information Privacy is reduced when the
MD disconnects a session without sending an ending message, as this forces the
FN to disclose to the HN the tariff that the MD and the FN have agreed on and
the amount of service used. The other privacy goals are achieved in all variants
of the solution: Information Privacy (all parties), Anonymity (MD and Hop), and
Unlinkability (MD).
Besides the achieved security and privacy goals, a comparison of the performance
of the variants is also interesting. Performance depends on the computation and
communication necessary the execute the protocol. These will be discussed in the
following.
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3.10.1 Estimating the Effort
The effort for a protocol run can be estimated by examining the protocol messages
for time intensive operations that are needed to prepare and process them. In the
following, the effort caused by executing a session using the proposed protocols will
be estimated by examining the protocol definitions for costly operations:
• Sending, forwarding, and receiving of messages over a network interface (wire-
less and wired). Forwarding a message does not allow any modification of
the message. Only reading data from the message is allowed. Therefore, for-
warding a message and modifying it in the process is considered one message
received and one sent. Appending data to a forwarded message can be con-
sidered as one message forwarded and one message sent. However, appending
data to a forwarded message can also be implemented and counted as one re-
ceive and one send operation as shown in Figure 3.24. In the implementation,
multiple message are collected before forwarding whenever possible.
In some instances, the protocol descriptions deliberately expected this, e.g.,
in the Online Hop Setup Protocol (Figure 3.9), only message 2 and 7 are di-
rectly forwarded. The messages 4 and 4a are sent together by the FN and are
therefore counted as one message received (message 4) and one sent (message
4 with message 4a appended). The same applies to messages 5/5a, messages
9/9a (Hop), messages 9/9a/9b (FN), messages 10/10a (FN), and messages
10/10a/10b (Hop). In the Oﬄine Hop Setup Protocol (Figure 3.13), it applies
to messages 8/8a, messages 9/9a, and messages 10/10a.
• Creation and verification of digital signatures. Asymmetric cryptography is
easily among the most CPU consuming task in everyday applications. How-
ever, depending on the cipher used, the verification of a signature can be many
times faster than creation of a signature, e.g., with the RSA signature scheme
when a short public exponent is used.
When the same party has to verify the same signature or certificate twice,
caching can be used. This replaces computational operations by storage oper-
ations. In the abort clearing protocols with the HN online during setup, the
HN/GN is presented the same signature created by the MD that the HN/GN
already verified and the same signature that the HN/GN generated itself dur-
ing the connection setup protocols. These verifications can be replaced by a
storage operation: The HN/GN stores the successfully verified/created signa-
tures, and is then able to look them up16. We will count these verifications as
actual signature verification operations in the estimate, but we did note where
this optimization is possible, i.e., in the abort clearing protocols. The same
principle applies to the HN/GN verifying PC-MD and HN verifying Hopcert,
which it signed itself. We did use this optimization, and therefore, did not
count these operations as signature verification operations. Other certificate
verifications are counted as signature verifications.
16Note that certificate revocation has to be considered, i.e., at every update of the CRL, the cached
signatures have to be checked against the new CRL entries.
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• Encryption and decryption using a symmetric cipher. Modern ciphers are fast
on current hardware, even on weaker devices. However, previously decrypted
blocks may be stored so that they need not be decrypted again when they are
needed in the clearing phase. This applies to the HN for EKMH (ID(MD)) in
the Online Setup Protocol (Figure 3.7), and to GN for EKMG(ID(MD)) in the
Online Hop Setup Protocol (3.9).
The following operations are not considered:
• Hashing operations: A modern desktop PC can easily compute more than 100
MB of hash input per second even with SHA-256. In the protocols, less than
10 kB is hashed at once. The most extensive hashing operation is the creation
of the payment chain, which is the same for the online and oﬄine protocols.
• Read and write access to RAM and local storage: RAM access is in the
nanosecond range, disc access is in the millisecond range. We do not con-
sider such operations, e.g., MD’s access on the hash chain it generated, or to
update the amount of money spent. It is also the same for the online and
oﬄine protocols.
• Database access: When the HN looks up the ID(MD), depending on the num-
ber of its customers, it will use a database that may contain dozens of entries,
or millions of entries. The database will have more entries in the HN oﬄine
setup case, as each MD has multiple pseudonyms.
• Precomputation: All operations that are required as a basis for the scenario
and not for every single protocol run are not counted. E.g., in the HN oﬄine
case, the MD carries an array of pseudonym certificates PC-MD that are known
to the HN. The generation, verification, and distribution of these PC-MD by
the MD and the HN is not counted in the comparison, as it is not specific to
each protocol run.
3.10.2 Effort of the Roaming Protocol Suite
A summary of the costly operations executed in all protocols with the HN online
during setup is given in Table 3.10, and for those with the HN oﬄine in Table 3.11.
The table will be explained exemplary for the direct connection setup protocol with
the HN online in the following:
• When the MD connects to the FN with an online HN, the following costly
operations are done by the parties to facilitate authentication, key establish-
ment, initialization of micropayment, and to send the first tick payment to the
FN: The MD has to send two messages, receive two messages (and a broadcast
message), create one and verify two signatures, certFN ), and calculate two
symmetric key encryptions and decryptions.
• The FN has to receive three messages, send three messages (and a broadcast
message), forward one message, create and verify one signature, and calculate
one symmetric key encryption and decryption.
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Messages Signatures Symmetric
Party Sent Receive Fwd Create Verify Enc Dec
pD
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ct
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Direct Connection Setup Protocol (Figure 3.7)
MD 2 ∗2∗ 1 2 2 2
FN ∗3∗ 3 1 1 1 1 1
HN 2 2 2 2 1 1
Basic Graceful Clearing Protocol (Figure 3.15)
MD 1 1
FN 1 2
HN 1 1 1 ⊕1⊕
Basic Abort Clearing Protocol (Figure 3.16)
FN 1 1
HN 1 1 ⊕2⊕ ⊕1⊕
C
on
ne
ct
io
n
ov
er
a
H
op
Hop Setup Protocol (Figure 3.9), Hop connecting to FN
Hop 2 ∗2∗ 1 2 1 1
FN ∗3∗ 3 1 1 1 1 1
HN 2 2 2 2
Hop Setup Protocol (Figure 3.9), MD connecting to Hop/FN
MD 2 ∗2∗ 1 1 3 3
Hop ∗3∗ 3 1 1 1 1
FN 3 3 1 1 2 1 1
GN 2 2 2 2 1 1
Extended Graceful Clearing Protocol with a Hop (Figure 3.20)
MD 1 2
Hop 1 1
FN 2 2
GN 1 1 2 ⊕1⊕
HN 1
Extended Abort Clearing Protocol with a Hop (Figure 3.21)
Hop 1
FN 2 1
GN 1 ⊕2⊕ ⊕1⊕
HN 1
∗ and one broadcast message = SSID
⊕ can be replaced by a database lookup
Table 3.10: Efficiency of the Online Protocols, Zeros omitted
• The HN has to receive two messages, send two messages (and a broadcast
message), create and verify two signatures, and calculate one symmetric key
encryption and decryption.
We can see that the setup protocol requires one signature creation for the MD
and the FN and two signature creations for the HN. The MD and the HN verify
two signatures, the FN verifies one signature. The amount of messages exchanged
represents the amount of messages required by the EAP encapsulation protocol.
The other protocols can be read just like the HN online direct connection setup
protocol.
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Messages Signatures Symmetric
Party Sent Receive Fwd Create Verify Enc Dec
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Direct Connection Setup Protocol (Figure 3.11)
MD 2 ∗2∗ 1 4 1 1
FN ∗2∗ 2 2 2 1 1
Basic Graceful Clearing Protocol (Figure 3.17)
MD 1 1
FN 1 2
HN 1 1 1
Basic Abort Clearing Protocol (Figure 3.18)
FN 1 1
HN 1 1 ⊕+1⊕+
C
on
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op
Hop Setup Protocol, Hop connecting to FN (Figure 3.13)
Hop 2 ∗2∗ 1 4 1 1
FN ∗2∗ 2 2 2 1 1
Hop Setup Protocol, MD connecting to Hop/FN (Figure 3.13)
MD 2 ∗2∗ 1 4 2 2
Hop ∗3∗ 3 1 1 1 1 1
FN 2 2 2 3 1 1
Extended Graceful Clearing Protocol with a Hop (Figure 3.22)
MD 1 2
Hop 1
FN 2 2
GN 1 1 +2+
HN 1
Extended Abort Clearing Protocol with a Hop (Figure 3.23)
Hop 1
FN 2 2
GN ⊕+1⊕+
HN 1
∗ and one broadcast message = SSID
+ and one self-signed PC-MD
⊕ can be replaced by a database lookup
Table 3.11: Efficiency of the Oﬄine Protocols, Zeros Omitted
3.10.3 Effort of the HN Online/Oﬄine Connection Setup Protocols
With the data from Tables 3.10 and 3.11, a comparison between the effort to run
the HN online and the HN oﬄine variations of the protocols is possible. Table 3.12
shows the results of the comparison for the setup protocols.
Instead of online verifications, authentication is granted via additional certificates
in the oﬄine variants. Therefore, more certificate verifications are needed for the
oﬄine protocols, and less symmetric encryptions are performed. The HN and the
GN do not take part in the setup protocols in the oﬄine case and therefore do not
have to perform any operations at all during the protocol run. Therefore, fewer
messages are exchanged.
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Messages Signatures Symmetric
Party Sent Receive Fwd Create Verify Enc Dec
Direct Connection Setup Protocol
MD +2 −1 −1
FN −1 −1 −1 +1 +1
HN −2 −2 −2 −2 −1 −1
Hop Setup Protocol, Hop connecting to FN
Hop +2
FN −1 −1 −1 +1 +1
HN −2 −2 −2 −2
Hop Setup Protocol, MD connecting to Hop/FN
MD +3 −1 −1
Hop +1
FN −1 −1 −1 +1 +1
GN −2 −2 −2 −2 −1 −1
Table 3.12: Comparison of the Oﬄine and Online Protocols, Positive Numbers In-
dicate more Operations when using Oﬄine Variants, ±0 Omitted
When the Hop connects to the FN with the HN oﬄine instead of online, the Hop has
to perform two additional signature verifications, and the FN has to perform one
additional signature creation and one additional signature verification. The HN does
not act as all, saving it two signature creations and verifications, and two messages
sent and received.
When the MD connects to the FN over a Hop, the MD has to perform three addi-
tional signature verifications in the oﬄine case. The Hop has to verify one additional
signature. The FN has to create and verify one additional signature. The GN does
not act at all and thus saves two signature creation and verification processes.
Which protocol variation achieves a faster connection setup depends on the signa-
ture algorithm, network performance, and the specification of the nodes used. A
fast network, quickly responding HN/GN, and slow signature verification will fa-
vor the online solution. Measurements of the implementation are discussed later in
Section 3.11.9.
3.10.4 Effort of the Clearing Protocols after HN Online/Oﬄine Setup
The clearing protocols are almost identical, because the messages exchanged follow
the same pattern and they contain contents with the same meaning. In all scenarios,
the MD has to create an extra signature to create the graceful ending message to
facilitate privacy preserving clearing compared to aborting the session. When the
connection was initiated over a Hop, the MD has to create two extra signatures
compared to aborting the session. These signatures (one per payee) also have to be
verified by the HN of the MD (called GN in the Hop case).
The difference between the effort of the clearing protocols lies in the verification
path of the signatures that make up the proof that the MD has to pay the FN when
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the connection was aborted. This task is done by the HN in the direct connection
case and the GN when the connection was established over a Hop.
When clearing aborted connections, the HN oﬄine solution is more efficient, as MD’s
commitment can be proven to a third party without the corresponding signature of
the HN of the MD. The verification of the used PC-MD is not counted for the HN
of the MD, as it has issued or certified the PC-MD in the first place.
During regular operation, i.e., when no proof to an external party is required, MD’s
HN will be interested in a quick verification. This can be aided by caching the
signatures verified during the connection setup. With this optimization in place,
the HN of MD does not have to verify any signature during the abort protocols.
3.10.5 Conclusion
The effort of running the solution depends on whether the HN takes part in the con-
nection setup or not and a number of parameters: The HN oﬄine solution reduces
the amount of messages sent (and the geographic distance the messages travel),
but the amount of cryptographic operations needed during the connection setup
increases. However, less cryptographic operations are needed for the clearing of
aborted sessions. Also, the HN oﬄine solution requires certificate revocation mech-
anisms to be in place that have not been considered in this comparison as they are
out of the focus of our roaming solution.
3.11 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, the implementation and its results are described. The goal of the im-
plementation is to verify that the performance of the proposed solution is acceptable
to use on current commodity hardware.
At first, we provide an overview over which of the protocol variants that we pro-
posed in this chapter has been implemented, how it is integrated into IEEE 802.11
WLAN, which services are implemented on the individual parties, and the basic
architecture of the code. Then, we describe the broadcast channel and the design
and implementation of the micropayment mechanism including the tariffs. Next, we
will give details on the implementation of the solution of the individual parties. The
performance will be measurement and results will be presented for the cryptographic
building blocks first, and finally, for a run of our new roaming protocol suite.
3.11.1 Overview of the Implementation
The Direct Roaming Protocol Suite with the HN online during setup as described in
Section 3.4 and the according payment and clearing protocols were implemented in
a bachelor thesis [142] by Andreas Straub and refined later. The results presented in
this section are based on these works. The HN oﬄine solutions and the connections
over a hop were not implemented so far. A suitable broadcast mechanism for the
certificate broadcast in the HN oﬄine solutions could not be found in WLAN. Fitting
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Supplicant
Client
Authenticator
AP
FN
AuS
HN
AuS
Service Advertising via SSID
802.11 association
EAP authentication, PMK agreement, payment initialization
PMK Transfer
4-Way Handshake on PTK
TK protected 802.11 traffic,
continuous tick payment
Clearing(optional)
Figure 3.25: Integration of Solution into 802.11i, Additions are Marked blue
even a single certificate into the 256 bit SSID is clearly infeasible. However, all of our
proposed solutions offer the same security and privacy goals, and the performance
of the other solutions has to be estimated using the results from the implementation
of the direct connection solution.
The components of the solution shown in Figure 3.1 are implemented in the IEEE
802.11 robust security network as shown in Figure 3.25:
1. A mechanism advertises the roaming Internet access service and its tariffs by
wireless broadcast, using a special encoding in the SSID.
2. A new EAP method is run immediately after the association of the client
to an access point of the FN, which is the authenticator. The client’s home
network (HN) takes part in the authentication and key agreement. The PMK
is established by the EAP method and used for the CCMP protection of the
established wireless connection between the MD and the FN.
3. A payment service is running on the MD and the FN to handle tick payments
requests during the service use phase.
4. Clearing protocols between the FN and the HN ensure that the FN is reim-
bursed for the services the Client used at the FN. The MD may or may not
take part in the clearing protocols.
The implementation of the wireless roaming solution was created for WLAN on
Linux PCs, where one PC acts as each party.
A graphical user interface (GUI) written in Java on the MD handles tariff recommen-
dation, traffic selection, and network selection. Custom Linux daemons were created
in Python for the roles of the MD, the FN, and the HN for the payment and clearing
functionality. These daemons run constantly. The MD daemon generates the tick
payments, monitors the amount of traffic transferred, provides the tick payments to
FN, and updates the client’s database about the money spent. This daemon also
provides an interface between the GUI and the Linux EAP client wpa supplicant17,
which was modified to include the new EAP method (written in C) which facilitates
the authentication and key agreement according to our connection setup protocol.
17http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/
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Figure 3.26: Overview of the Services Provided by the Parties
The FN daemon provides a traffic monitor, a tick payment handler, and a clearing
interface. As FN’s authentication server, a new EAP method was integrated into
the Linux WLAN daemon hostapd18 (written in C).
The HN daemon handles clearing with the FN, and HN’s backend server (written
in C) provides the authentication interface for the FN during connection setup.
3.11.2 Architecture of the Protocol Library
The daemons run by HN, FN, and MD for the connection setup, service use, and
clearing protocols use a common library for the functions required for the imple-
mentation of our proposed protocols [142]. These functions create and receive raw
protocol data. An overview of this design is shown in Figure 3.27. The library also
works independently from hostapd / wpa supplicant.
With this design, all the protocol components can be tested using a small amount
of glue code, which handles library calls and passes the generated packets directly
within the library. The lower layers (EAP/WLAN) are not required to verify the
protocol logic of all three parties, as they can be executed in a single program. This
allows a clear separation of the protocol logic from the integration into EAP/WLAN,
which proved helpful during tests and for measurement purposes.
The protocol logic was implemented and thoroughly tested first. Then, the library
functionality of the MD and the FN were encapsulated into actual EAP methods
using the EAP interface. A thin layer of glue code handles communication between
the EAP layer and the library, e.g., function calls, packet formats, and notifications
to the EAP layer.
The communication between the FN and the HN was implemented as a simple
client/server based network layer. The cryptographic operations were implemented
using OpenSSL 1.0.0e, which is handled using the M2Crypto 0.20.1 wrapper.
18http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd/
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Figure 3.27: Overview of the Protocol Library Design [142]
3.11.3 Tariff Broadcast
As a broadcast channel for the service advertising messages by the FN, the SSID is
used, which has a size limit of 32 bytes = 256 bits [1]. In the HN online-solutions,
the broadcast channel needs to carry the identity of the FN, the identities of the
allowed HNs, and the tariffs offered, which is possible, although the SSID becomes
rather cramped.
3.11.4 Micropayment
Recall that the payments in our solution are using a hash chain generated from
randomly chosen α0, IV as described in Section 2.6. The length of the hash chain
given by T is a part of the tariff as agreed with the FN. However, due to broadcast
space limitations, a fixed value for T is chosen to T = 1000 in the implementation.
When the MD has a session running with the FN, but the FN does not want to
provide further service, the FN can just stop requesting ticks and stop providing
service. The amount of hash operations per tick payment d is chosen to d = 1, so
that each hashing operation corresponds to one service unit. The service unit is
defined by the tariff that the MD agreed with the FN, which describes the unit price
and unit service size. The tariffs must be scalable so that a variety of time and data
units and a wide range of prices per unit can be offered to accommodate for future
price declines or rises, including effects of monetary inflation.
Unit Size Dimensions
Unit sizes are chosen to be human readable and to cover a wide range. Unit sizes
are either based on a time interval or an amount of data volume.
For time based tariffs, the unit sizes are chosen to 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute,
and 5 minutes. These are rather short to account for applications such as checking
emails, and to prevent a user from spending too much money on the first tick of a
potentially unstable wireless connection.
For data volume, the unit sizes are chosen to 100 kB, 1 MB, 10 MB, and 100 MB19.
With regard to the high data rates in WLAN, a unit size of less than 100 kB would
19We use base two meanings, i.e., 1 kB=1024 Byte and 1 MB=1024 kB.
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Figure 3.28: Possible Values for Unit Price in Euro cent
not make sense. As a margin for future price reductions and because of the high
speed of WLAN, 100 MB per tick payment is useful as the largest unit size.
The FN does not have to offer a tariff for all unit sizes. They are also free to offer
just data tariffs, just time tariffs, or both. Therefore, each FN can offer between one
and eight tariffs to the clients.
Unit Price Dimensions
The cheapest unit price is set to 0.1 Euro cent, which is a lower bound on the
transaction cost of the providers. Because of the space constraints in the broadcast
channel used (SSID, 32 bytes), an efficient encoding scheme for the tariff is needed.
We have decided to use a single byte for each tariff. However, the encoding scheme
should still be able to cover a wide range of prices, with fine grained steps between
prices. We decided to base the unit prices on a geometric progression, which is a
principle often used in engineering, e.g., for electrical resistors: Each higher unit
price shall be 20% more expensive than the next cheapest one.
With 0.1 Euro cent set as the cheapest possible unit price, the i-th unit price in this
series is calculated by 0.1 · 1.2i Euro cent. When 1 bit per tariff is reserved for its
type (data or time) and 2 bits for the unit size (four unit sizes for each type), 5 bits
are left for the unit price. Therefore, i can be between 0 and 25 − 1 = 31.
The following unit prices are available in this scheme: 0.10, 0.12, 0.14, 0.17, 0.21,
0.25, 0.30, 0.36, 0.43, 0.52, 0.62, 0.74, 0.89, 1.07, 1.28, 1.54, 1.85, 2.22, 2.66, 3.19,
3.83, 4.60, 5.52, 6.62, 7.95, 9.54, 11.45, 13.74, 16.48, 19.78, 23.74, and 28.49 Euro
cent. The values are plotted in Figure 3.28.
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Price per GB [e]
Data Unit lowest highest
100 kB 10.486 2988.4
1 MB 1.024 291.84
10 MB 0.1024 29.184
100 MB 0.0102 2.9184
12
Price per hour [e]
Time Unit lowest highest
10 sec 0.36 102.6
30 sec 0.12 34.2
1 min 0.06 17.1
5 min 0.012 3.42
Table 3.13: Tariff Space Offered by the Encoding Scheme
0x84(16) = 01000100(2)
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
price4 price3 price2 price1 price0 type size1 size0
01000(2) = 8 time 10(2) = 2
Table 3.14: Tariff Encoding and Presentation Example for Byte 0x84=01000100,
price(8)=0.1ct·1.28 = 0.42998ct, size(2)=10 sec
The maximum unit price of 0.1ct·1.2(25−1) = 28.49ct is larger than currently desir-
able for a micropayment scheme to accommodate for future inflation corrections.
The 20% step allows mapping of any chosen unit price into our scheme with a
maximum error of 10% as long as it is within the bounds covered by the lowest
and the highest unit price, e.g., when the FN wants to offer service at 3 cent
per unit, it can choose between 2.66 and 3.19 cent, one of which will be below
10% off: 1 − 2.663 = −0.1133 is more than 10% off, but 1 − 3.193 = 0.0633 is less
than 10% off. Thus, 3.19 cent will be used. (An alternate setup can be chosen to
0.1ct·1.1(2i−1) with 5% maximum error. This would lead to a maximum unit price
of 0.1ct·1.1(25−1) = 19.2 cent.)
Tariff Ranges
When applying the minimum and maximum unit price for all unit sizes, the offered
tariff space can be explored as shown in Table 3.13. For data tariffs, the price per
GB is between e0.0102 and e2988.4. For time tariffs, the price per hour is between
e0.012 and e102.60. This wide range together with the 10% maximum deviation
from an artificially chosen unit price and the efficient single byte storage makes the
encoding worthwhile. See Table 3.14 for a decoding example. Implementations can
also use a table lookup.
Other Tariffs
The proposed tariff encoding scheme is not required for the roaming protocol suite
to work. The deployer can choose a different encoding, e.g., offering free service, or
a flat rate model between HN and certain partner FNs. As the software on the MD
has to be able to decode the tariffs, operators who have a roaming agreement with
each other need to use the same encoding scheme. Otherwise, different software
would be required depending on the FN used, which negates the purpose of the
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Figure 3.29: Roaming Client Displaying the Available Tariffs and Corrected Ex-
pected Cost cec for five Usage Profiles
solution of easy and convenient roaming. When different tariff models are desired,
the specification can be extended to include a tariff model field, which would have
to globally assigned.
Free service can be offered by using the ASCII string „free“ (0x66 72 65 65(16))
instead of tariff bytes in the SSID, which is a reserved string. This does not coincide
with when operators want to offer a certain combination of regular, paid tariffs, as
the tariff represented by the ASCII letter „e“ appears twice in the string, which is
not required for regular tariffs.
Tariff Monitoring
The MD and the FN have to keep track of the amount of services used during
the connection. Depending on the tariff type, the time passed or the data volume
exchanged has to be monitored. Monitoring the time since the connection was
established is easy. Monitoring the traffic, however, is a bit tedious, because it
involves control traffic between the MD and the FN that is not forwarded upstream
by the FN and therefore not part of the service. Control traffic includes the tick
payment requests and replies and ICMP data, e.g., ping. Both parties run a traffic
monitor on the WLAN interface which counts the incoming and outgoing bytes. The
control traffic is recognized by both MD and FN by the IP address of the access
point as either source or destination. Thus, the traffic originating from the FN or
directed to the FN is regarded as control traffic and will not be counted.
3.11.5 Mobile Device (MD)
The MD receives FN’s service announcements and helps the user select a tariff using
a tariff recommendation system. The MD communicates with the FN during the
connection setup phase, the service usage phase, and optionally the clearing phase.
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The Roaming Client
The graphical user interface (GUI) of the roaming client is intended to be usable
by a broad range of users. It deals with all aspects of the roaming user experience.
The roaming client displays the available networks and the tariffs offered by them as
shown in Figure 3.29. It also contains profiles for different Internet usage scenarios.
The tariff recommendation algorithm is implemented as described in Section 3.3.3;
it calculates the corrected expected cost cec in each tariff and profile. Each tariff
is described in one line, and the cec for each profile in each column. The cheapest
tariff for each profile is colored green, and the second cheapest in light green. By
double-clicking a tariff, a connection with the respective FN at the selected tariff
will be initiated.
The GUI also allows an overview of past connections (balances). The profiles can
be managed within the GUI. Each profile consists of a name, an amount of data
volume, and an amount of time. Profiles can be renamed, added, deleted, reordered,
and their values can be manipulated.
The Roaming Client is connected to the MD daemon so that it can initiate new
connections, keep track of the cost of an ongoing connection, and to allow the user
to end an connection gracefully.
Connection Setup Phase
When the user activates a new connection with the roaming client, the roaming client
signals the SSID to use to the MD daemon, which contains the tariff data. The MD
daemon generates the tick payment chain α and signals the SSID of the WLAN
to use and parameters αT and αT−d for the first tick payment to wpa supplicant.
Also, the MD daemon starts waiting for tick payment requests from the FN. The
wpa supplicant associates to the WLAN using our new EAP method for authenti-
cation and key agreement with the FN as well as the first tick payment.
Service Usage Phase
The tick payment was implemented in Python in the MD daemon mdd.py. It mon-
itors the service interval (passed time or used data volume) and waits for requests
from the FN. The protocol specification was enhanced to support uninterrupted ser-
vice by sending ticks earlier than required. In the implementation, the next tick
payment is sent 3 seconds before the end of each service interval.
Clearing Phase
The graceful ending protocol is started on user request in the roaming client. The
MD daemon generates the ending signature and sends it to the FN daemon. For the
abort protocol, no action by the MD is required.
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Available units: 
[0] 1 kB             [1] 10 sec 
[2] 10 kB            [3] 30 sec 
[4] 100 kB           [5] 1 min 
[6] 1 MB             [7] 5 min 
Select a unit: 6 
Available rates: 
[0] 0.10             [1]  1.85 
[2]  0.12            [3]  2.22 
[4]  0.14            [5]  2.66 
[6]  0.17            [7]  3.20 
[8]  0.21            [9]  3.84 
[10]  0.25           [11]  4.60 
[12]  0.30           [13]  5.52 
[14]  0.36           [15]  6.63 
[16]  0.43           [17]  7.95 
[18]  0.52           [19]  9.54 
[20]  0.62           [21]  11.45 
[22]  0.74           [23]  13.74 
[24]  0.89           [25]  16.49 
[26]  1.07           [27]  19.79 
[28]  1.28           [29]  23.75 
[30]  1.54           [31]  28.50 
Select a rate: 19 
Hexcode: 0x9e 
Figure 3.30: Tariff Encoding Tool Example for 9.54 ct/1 MB
3.11.6 Foreign Network (FN)
The FN provides services to the HN during connection setup and clearing, and to
the MD during all protocol phases. Like in the other parties, the implementation
consists of a high level library which handles the protocol logic, and communication
code, which handles the encapsulation into lower layers.
Tariff Announcement
The creation of the service advertising broadcast messages for tariff announcement is
aided by a Python program gent.py, which has a command line user interface. It is
intended for the operator of the FN. It displays available unit sizes and prices, and
returns the corresponding encoding to the selected tariff as shown in Figure 3.30.
The operator of the FN can use the returned values to compose the SSID of his
networks. The SSID has to be configured manually in hostapd by the operator.
Connection Setup Phase
During the connection establishment phase, two separate parts are needed to connect
the protocol logic in the library function with the other parties: An EAP server to
support the EAP setup with the MD, and a backend client to for the communication
with the HN.
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The communication to the MD is implemented as a new EAP method in hostapd.
It generates the MSK for the following CCMP encrypted session.
For the communication with the HN, the backend client of the FN carries a list
of HNs with which the FN has a roaming agreement. Each list entry contains the
name, the IP, and the port number of the backend server. The FN expects the HN
to run a daemon on this port, and to open a socket for each new connection initiated
by the FN. The communication between the FN and the HN is performed using a
custom protocol. When the HN closes the socket prematurely, the FN recognizes
that the HN has aborted the connection setup. The FN will then abort the EAP
method with the MD accordingly.
Service Usage Phase
The FN daemon fnd.py implements FN’s part of the service usage phase. A tariff
analyzer is used to control MD’s service usage and requests new ticks from the MD
when the service interval is used up. When MD does not send correct ticks in a timely
manner, the tariff analyzer modifies the firewall settings to prevent connections
between the FN and the Internet for the MD. The MD can still communicate to the
FN, which is required for the tick payments. This allows a connection to be resumed
after a pause, however, there is a limit: The hostapd will disassociate the MD after
a timeout of 60 seconds.
The original tick payment protocol was enhanced to support uninterrupted service
by requesting ticks earlier than required and providing a grace period. Service will
be provided for 3 seconds when the FN daemon has requested but not received the
next tick payment from the MD.
Clearing Phase
The clearing part is implemented by the FN daemon. In the graceful ending protocol,
no cryptographic operations actions are performed by the FN; the signatures by the
MD are merely passed along. FN adds the sum to be paid to the message so that
the MD cannot cheat. The abort protocol will be automatically executed after a
timeout of 60 seconds when no data was transferred between the MD and the FN.
3.11.7 Home Network (HN)
The HN provides services to the FN during connection setup and clearing, but it
does not take part in the protocol suite during the service usage phase.
Connection Setup Phase
The Home Network runs the backend server, which communicates with the EAP
server hostapd running on the FN to provide the authentication of the MD during
the connection setup protocol. The backend server listens on a static port, and
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creates a new process with its own socket for each new connection with the FN.
The communication to the FN is realized with a custom protocol. Incoming packets
are passed to the library function that implements the protocol logic, and packets
created by the library are directly passed to the FN. When the protocol fails, the
socket is closed immediately.
The HN keeps track of the ID(MD) and the associated keys using an SQLite database.
Clearing Phase
Clearing is enabled by a custom HN daemon hnd.py listening on a dedicated port.
Like the connection setup, a new process is spawned for each new connection. After
verification of the graceful ending or abort ending, the clearing and payment data
is written into an SQLite database. Transferring of actual payment and billing the
MD is not implemented. To avoid integration issues of our connection setup and
clearing protocols into an existing accounting backend, a new daemon was created
from scratch.
3.11.8 Measurement Results for Cryptographic Primitives
After the description of the implementation of our roaming solution, we will now
discuss which operations are critical for its performance, and then run benchmarks
on different variations of these operations. The results will show a lower bound on
the effort to operate the roaming solution and will help in identifying appropriate
cryptographic algorithms for the measurements of the complete roaming solution,
which is described later.
The most costly operations in the roaming solution are the signature creation and
verification and potentially the large number of hash functions in the handling of
the micropayment scheme. In the following, we will describe benchmarks of the can-
didate functions on a test system, which is based on an Intel Xeon E5520 Processor
with 2.27 GHz and 8 MB 2nd level cache. The operating system we used is Ubuntu
12.10. The measurements were executed using Python 2.7.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.0e,
which is handled using the M2Crypto 0.20.1 wrapper. The same environment will
be used later for the implementation of the roaming protocol suite.
Hash Functions
In the roaming solution, calls to hash functions are used in great number for the
micropayment. When connecting to a network, the MD has to create a tick payment
chain, which means calculating T iterative hashes of a concatenation of two random
numbers α0 and IV . We have measured the time to create such hash chains for
T =1,000, 10,000, and 100,000. The same operation (iterated hashing) is performed
by the HN for the abort clearing protocols, when then HN has to verify MD’s last
tick payment H i(αT ) == αend, which requires i hash operations. All measurements
are averaged over twenty runs.
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Chain Hash Function
Length SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-512
1,000 1.26 2.01 2.45
10,000 12.19 19.87 23.99
100,000 121.27 197.68 239.75
Table 3.15: Hash Chain Creation Time [ms] using Python API
We have selected the SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 hash functions for our measure-
ments. The results are shown in Table 3.15. Even with T =100,000 and SHA-512,
creating the hash chain takes only 240 ms. With T =10,000, it takes 24 ms, which is
barely noticeable to the user. We can also see that the calculation per hash function
becomes minimally faster with larger T for all hash functions.
During the service use phase, each new tick payment sent by the MD has to be
verified by the FN. For this purpose, the FN calculates a single hash operation. We
have measured single hash operation of pseudo-random numbers as well, resulting in
46.08 µs (SHA-1), 53.67 µs (SHA-256), and 67.66 µs (SHA-512), which is so efficient
that it will not delay new service intervals.
Note that each individual hash operation takes significantly longer than a single
hash operation in a hash chain because of various optimizations used in computing,
e.g., caching and branch prediction. With SHA-256 and T = 10, 000, each hash
operation in the chain only takes 19.87ms10,000 = 1.987µs compared to 53.67µs when
hashing individual random values.
Signature Schemes
Digital signatures are complex public-key operations on large numbers, which are
among the most complex task in computing that are performed by regular users. In
our solution, signatures are created and verified by all parties during the connection
setup protocol. During the graceful ending protocol, the MD creates a signature
that the HN verifies.
We chose to test the ECDSA and RSA ciphers, with key sizes of 128, 160, 192, 224,
and 256 bit for ECDSA and 512, 1024, 1536, 2048, and 4096 bit for RSA. ECDSA
160 and RSA 1024 provide comparable security levels, and ECDSA 224 and RSA
2048, according to NIST [126]. We have measured the time needed to create and
verify signatures on 2048 bytes of random data with 50 iterative measurements. All
measurements are run with the SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 hash functions. We
did not count the time for key generation, as it is not part of the protocol operation.
The results for signature creation are shown in Table 3.16, and the results for signa-
ture verification are shown in Table 3.17. Note that some values in the table cannot
be filled. This is due to the fact that in order to allow for padding, the size of the
output of the hash function used in the signature generation has to be smaller than
the size of the input of the signature algorithm. As expected, the key size of the
cipher has a strong influence on the execution time. This influence is especially high
for RSA, although even the slowest signature (RSA 4096) is created in 26 ms.
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Signature Hash Function
Algorithm SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-512
ECDSA 128 269.30 276.74
ECDSA 160 397.84 411.70
ECDSA 192 478.22 483.60
ECDSA 224 744.06 752.20
ECDSA 256 763.48 778.64 772.88
RSA 512 145.08 149.28
RSA 1024 605.80 611.40 605.12
RSA 1536 1716.72 1728.26 1712.10
RSA 2048 3707.64 3716.18 3685.14
RSA 4096 25951.30 25918.44 25889.58
Table 3.16: Signature Creation Time [µs] using Python API
Signature Hash Function
Algorithm SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-512
ECDSA 128 290.60 299.64
ECDSA 160 443.46 455.78
ECDSA 192 528.54 538.68
ECDSA 224 868.08 874.04
ECDSA 256 870.52 887.10 874.12
RSA 512 39.06 47.60
RSA 1024 61.22 70.10 65.90
RSA 1536 93.20 102.60 97.49
RSA 2048 142.54 150.80 146.08
RSA 4096 457.60 468.88 463.00
Table 3.17: Signature Verification Time [µs] using Python API
On a similar security level, ECDSA is faster for creating signatures, but RSA is
faster for verifying signatures. When adding up the time for a signature creation
and a verification, RSA 1024 outperforms ECDSA 160, but ECDSA 224 outperforms
RSA 2048.
The selected hash function has little influence on the performance of the signature
mechanisms. Therefore, in the following, the implementation of the roaming protocol
suite will be measured only with a single hash function. Note that SHA-512 cannot
be used with RSA 512 or ECDSA with key sizes below 256 bit.
3.11.9 Measurement Results for the Roaming Protocol Suite
We have seen the times required for the cryptographic building blocks of the roaming
protocol suite. Now, we will measure the actual roaming protocol execution, i.e., the
direct connection setup protocol with the HN online, and the clearing protocols. The
results will help selecting cryptographic algorithms with a performance appropriate
for a deployment in the market.
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Signature Average x¯ Standard Deviation σ
Algorithm MD FN HN MD FN HN
ECDSA 160 1008.8 54.9 28.9 22.16 0.3649 0.04756
ECDSA 224 1017.3 56.9 30.2 52.60 0.4781 0.04634
RSA 1024 1002.3 54.7 28.6 21.77 0.3979 0.03883
RSA 2048 1015.6 66.1 36.3 22.39 0.4697 0.04119
Table 3.18: Protocol Execution Time for the MD, Computation Time for the FN
and the HN, during Connection Setup [ms], n = 100
The measurements were performed on the WLAN testbed in our lab. Our tests
setup consists of three desktop PCs. All of them feature 4GB RAM, Intel Xeon
quad core CPUs, Atheros AR5008 wireless Network adapters, and the Ubuntu 12.10
operating system.
• The first PC (Intel Xeon E5520 Processor, 2.27 GHz, 8 MB 2nd level cache)
runs the software for the MD.
• The software for the FN was run on a second PC (same hardware as the first
PC), connected to the MD over a wireless link. The PCs were placed one
meter from each other within the same room.
• The software for the HN was run on a third PC, connected to the FN via
Gigabit Ethernet. The third PC is equipped with a slightly different CPU, an
Intel Xeon E5410 Processor (2.33 GHz, 2x6 MB 2nd level cache).
We have measured the roaming solution using a the RSA signature scheme with
both 1024 and 2048 bit keys and the ECDSA signature scheme with 160 and 224
bit keys. We have seen in the previous section that the choice of hash function has
a minimal impact on performance, so we only use the SHA-1 hash function. All
measurements were performed using AES-128 as a symmetric cipher and 1024 bit
Diffie Hellman keys. In the micropayment, we used fixed values of T = 1000 for the
maximum amount of hashes of the payment chain α and d = 1 for the amount of
hashes per tick payment. Before the connection ends, i = 3 service intervals were
used. We have performed n = 100 measurements for each combination of signature
scheme and key size.
The tick payment protocol during the service use phase was not measured as it does
not require any costly operations.
Connection setup protocol: We have measured MD’s authentication time, i.e.,
how long it takes the user from issuing the command to connect to a certain FN
with a certain tariff to the first data exchange over the newly established secure
wireless link. This time includes the wireless setup time and the tick payment hash
chain generation. The authentication time is crucial for user acceptance, i.e., the
secure and privacy preserving solution shall not be considerably slower than widely
established solutions. The results for the connection setup are shown in Table 3.18.
Establishing the connection takes the MD between 1002 and 1017 milliseconds with
a standard deviation between 22 and 53 ms.
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Signature Average x¯ Std. Dev. σ
Algorithm MD HN MD HN
ECDSA 160 462 598 16.66 17.63
ECDSA 224 740 987 20.93 22.84
RSA 1024 677 127 73.50 16.60
RSA 2048 3763 214 172.7 15.47
Table 3.19: Computation Time During Clearing with Graceful End [µs], n = 100
Signature Average x¯ Std. Dev. σ
Algorithm HN HN
ECDSA 160 45.4 5.16
ECDSA 224 50.6 4.89
RSA 1024 39.8 8.10
RSA 2048 55.6 4.15
Table 3.20: Computation Time During Clearing after Abort [µs], n = 100, i = 3
For the FN and HN, the CPU load on the authenticators matters. Therefore, we
measured the time spent in cryptographic operations during the connection setup
phase. We found that the FN spends 55–66 ms in cryptographic operations with a
standard deviation of 0.36–0.47 ms, and the HN 29–36 ms with a standard deviation
of 0.039–0.048 ms. We can see that both the FN and HN spent very little time in
cryptographic operations. If the CPU is the bottleneck for FN in setting up new
connections, the FN could create up to
⌊
1
66ms
⌋
= 15 new sessions per second, and
the HN up to
⌊
1
36ms
⌋
= 27 new sessions per second.
The choice which signature scheme was used has little influence on MD’s connection
setup time, as most of the time is used to create the wireless link. However, for the
FN and the HN, the selected signature scheme has a greater influence, i.e., a factor
of 36.328.6 = 1.27 when using RSA 2048 instead of RSA 1024.
Graceful End Protocol: We have measured the time spent in cryptographic
operations during the graceful ending protocol by the MD and the HN. The FN
does not perform any cryptographic operations in this protocol. The results are
shown in Table 3.19. The MD spends 462–3763 µs with a standard deviation of
17–173 µs. The HN spends 127–987 µs with a standard deviation of 15–23 µs.
In this protocol we can see a big influence depending on the cipher scheme selected.
With the RSA cipher, the MD is slower and the HN is faster; and with EC, the
MD is faster and the HN is slower. The key size also has a great influence on the
performance. Nevertheless, this influence is only great in relation to another cipher,
not when compared to absolute values, as it is always below 4 ms.
For the MD, this additional time is no obstacle for creating a graceful end message,
as it is barely noticeable to the user. For the HN, the graceful end protocol is between
28.6ms
987µs = 30 and
36.3ms
127µs = 286 times faster than the connection setup protocol and
thus has only little influence in the total effort per connection.
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Abort Protocol: When the MD aborts the connection without sending an ending
message, the HN has to decrypt and verify b which is supplied by the FN, and the
HN has to verify the tick payment chain. The results of our measurements are shown
in Table 3.20. Completing the cryptographic operations in the protocol took the HN
40–56 µs with a standard deviation of 4.2–8.1µs. The MD does not take part in the
protocol, and the FN will only send data that it already has stored. Therefore, no
cryptographic operations are performed by the MD or the FN. This is quite efficient,
with up to
⌊
1
56µs
⌋
= 17857 operations per second. Compared to the graceful ending
protocol, the abort protocol has even less influence in the total effort per connection.
All measurements exhibit a standard deviation that is low compared to the average,
usually in the order of 120 . The measurements of the clearing phase after abort
(Table 3.20) has a relatively higher standard deviation, as the measured averages
(45–56 microseconds) are close to the measurement precision (1 microsecond).
3.11.10 Discussion
The implementation does not include all variants of the connection setup protocol,
but the results of the first variant already show that the additional functionality
over existing solutions can be achieved without sacrificing too much performance.
Executing our connection setup protocol takes the MD at most 1017.3 ms.
Our measurements are done in a friendly environment, i.e., the MD has excellent
reception of the FN’s WLAN signal. The HN is directly connected to the FN over
a Gigabit Ethernet link, thus faster than over the Internet over a possible large
distance and hence slow connection. However, these factors will influence all roaming
schemes; and it is difficult to establish a standard for mediocre wireless reception
or network delay to the HN. Therefore, we consider it fair to use the best possible
environment.
With these limitations in mind, we conclude that the implementation of the HN
online direct connection roaming solution proposed in this chapter offers usable
performance.
We did not implement the solutions with the HD oﬄine during connection setup,
as the broadcast channel needs to carry the cross certificates issued for the FN,
the CRLs for the cross certificates (one per HN), and the tariffs offered, which is
infeasible using the SSID as a broadcast mechanism. Therefore, another approach
has to be found for future work, e.g., a two-step approach: The broadcast channel
would only carry the list of allowed HNs (those who have issued cross certificates for
FN), and the tariffs offered. This allows the MD to find out if connecting to the FN
is desirable. When an MD starts an EAP session with the FN, the FN would first
send the cross certificates issued for the FN and the CRLs for the cross certificates
(one per HN).
The good results of the HN online direct connection implementation show great
promise for the performance of the other connection setup protocols.
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3.12 Further Concerns
In the following we will discuss some considerations about the use of the proposed
roaming protocol suite, many of which are fundamental to all roaming schemes.
3.12.1 Access of the FN to Transmitted Plaintext
The roaming protocol suite prevents identification of the users by mechanisms re-
quired during connection setup, payment, and clearing. However, as the FN routes
the traffic between the MD and the Internet, the FN is able to read and possibly
manipulate the traffic. Security and privacy critical Internet services can be pro-
tected with TLS, tunnels, and similar means, but the protection of traffic exchanged
between the mobile device and the Internet is out of scope in our roaming scenario.
3.12.2 Side Channel Attacks on Privacy and Confidentiality
The roaming protocol suite does not (and cannot) prevent attacks on the confiden-
tiality of the data exchanged and so-called side channel attacks on the user’s privacy.
In general, a side channel attack uses data leaked from a real-world system in an
unintended way, e.g., traffic patterns, timing, and power use. In our protocols, the
identity of the MD is hidden from the FN, and the MD is unlinkable to the FN (and
the Hop). The unlinkability of the MD can be attacked using a number of attack
vectors, as well as the confidentiality of MD’s traffic. These are not weaknesses in
our protocol, but general issues with Internet access providers which will be briefly
discussed here.
MAC Address of the Mobile Device
The most important and most obvious threat on unlinkability of the MD is the
MAC address of MD’s wireless network interface. The MAC address is set by the
manufacturer, globally unique, and usually never changes. Changing the MAC ad-
dress is called MAC spoofing. MAC spoofing is sometimes used to bypass access
control lists. A typical scenario is an open commercial WLAN network, where the
automatic redirection to the login page is disabled for devices with registered MAC
addresses. The attacker observers the traffic in the network until he has obtained
the MAC address of a device with a lot of traffic to the access point. Then, the
attacker spoofs its MAC address, thus obtaining access beyond the redirection page,
usually to the Internet [108]. To avoid interference with the legit owner of the MAC
address, the attack can be delayed until the legit user ceases activity.
There are no rules in the WLAN standard [1] about MAC spoofing. Therefore,
we recommend privacy aware users to randomize their MAC address before each
session, and before actively probing for available networks20. This prevents tracking
of the MD based on the MAC address.
20Probing can be done passively or actively to discover networks with hidden SSID. For the scope
of this solution, no active probing is required.
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Host Names
The same ideas about MAC addresses also apply to host names of any kind. Host
names are chosen by the user for his device, usually only once. There are many
services capable of communicating a host name to other parties on the network, e.g.,
the Network Information Service (NIS), the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP), the Domain Name System (DNS), the Server Message Block (SMB), and
the Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS)21. To facilitate unlinkability of
a mobile device to the FN, these services need to be disabled during WLAN sessions
(or blocked using a firewall), or the host name must be chosen randomly before
connecting to an access point operated by a foreign network.
TCP Timestamps
On the TCP layer, hosts can be identified by taking advantage of certain character-
istics of TCP timestamps: The timestamp clock rate is constant for a given host.
Therefore, the timestamp clock rate and boot time allow identification of the host
[92]. The same mechanism can be used to recognize that the same host has used an
access point before. This would allow tracking of the MD by the FN and the Hop,
and is therefore an attack on unlinkability. However, the characteristics of the TCP
timestamp depend on MD’s boot time. Therefore, an attacking FN cannot link the
MD when it was rebooted between two service uses at the same FN/Hop.
Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis is an attack on confidentiality by analyzing messages to recognize
patterns within the communication without requiring the contents of the communi-
cation [118]. Metadata like frequency, size, direction, and timing of packets can be
used. Website fingerprinting is the application of traffic analysis to recognize web-
sites accessed over an encrypted link. In the work of Herrmann et al. [76], previously
generated profiles of public websites are compared to the data accessed by the user
in an encrypted way. A detection rate exceeding 90% is achieved to recognize users
accessing an encrypted site using OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Stunnel, Cisco IPsec-VPN,
Tor, and JAP in a set of 775 previously selected web sites.
In our roaming scenario and any other Internet access service, this attack is possible
for the Hop and the FN when the MD uses an encrypted connection, e.g., using
IPsec or TLS. As a countermeasure, the MD can cause additional bogus traffic to
other sites.
3.12.3 Lawful Data Retention
In many jurisdictions, Internet access operators are required by law to keep records
of who accesses the Internet during which period of time using which IPs. This is
21Not all of these services are present and enabled by default in common end users operating
systems.
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commonly called data retention or data preservation, or „Vorratsdatenspeicherung“
in Germany. In the European Union, data retention is required [60].
In Germany, it is currently unclear whether operators of WLANs are responsible for
what visitors are doing [129]. This liability risk has lead to reluctance to provide
WLAN at all in restaurants, coffee bars, etc.
In the roaming solution presented in this chapter, it is possible to support lawful
data retention when the FN and the HN cooperate. In this case, the FNs need
to keep lists of the IPs assigned during which time for each encrypted pseudonym
EKMH (ID(MD)) that was used. The HNs already need to keep track of ID(MD),
KMH , and real identities for billing purposes.
When a court order is given to the FN to reveal the identity of the user behind
a certain IP and time period, the FN looks up the EKMH (ID(MD)) that used the
IP during that time and returns it to law enforcement. Law enforcement forwards
the request and EKMH (ID(MD)) to the HN. The HN discloses the real ID behind
ID(MD) and the original query to the requesting agency.
When a court order is given to the HN to reveal the IPs used at a certain time by
a certain user whose identity is known, the HN creates a list of EKMH (ID(MD))
values used by the user and a list of FNs with which it had roaming agreements
during the period in question. These lists are sent back to law enforcement. Law
enforcement forwards the list and the court order to all FNs listed by the HN. The
FNs respond by sending time periods and IPs for connections using matching values
of EKMH (ID(MD)) to the requesting agency.
3.13 Conclusion
We have presented a protocol suite for secure and privacy preserving roaming and
payment in WLAN networks with and without an online connection to a home
network. The mobile device and the foreign network only have to trust the HN. The
proposed solution introduces novel privacy guarantees and highlights tariff flexibility
for both users and operators, as users can select a tariff that fits their demands and
operators are free to modify their offered tariffs at any time.
The extension to use Hops retains the privacy and security goals of the basic protocol
suite: All parties are certain that they are communicating with the right parties,
the exchanged data is protected from eavesdropping, disputes about the tariff can
be resolved, a disclosure of long-term keys to an outsider after he has recorded a
session does not reveal session contents, the parties are certain that they established
the same keys, the HN does not obtain information about the tariff the MD and the
FN have agreed on or on how much service the MD has used, and the MD remains
anonymous and unlinkable to the FN. The only exception is that when the MD
offers Hop services, it will become trackable. This is a design choice to enable the
MDs to avoid certain Hops. Apparently, tracking is currently not seen as a threat by
many users, as changing the MAC of the WLAN interface on smartphones is rarely
used. Thus, we expect that this drawback will not influence the user acceptance of
the Hop solutions.
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The proposed solution retains tariff flexibility for the users, the Hops, and the oper-
ators, as the users can select a tariff that fits their demands, the Hops only have to
support tariffs they deem worthy, and the operators are free to modify their offered
tariffs at any time. The clearing protocols ensure that all stations can be billed and
credited correctly even when they disappear without advance notice.
An implementation of the protocol was done with current off-the-shelf hardware. We
have created a new EAP method for hostapd access points on Laptops, and a client
for Linux PCs running wpa-supplicant. The client software is user friendly and
recommends tariffs based on different Internet usage profiles, e.g., e-mail, chatting,
surfing, and video chat.
The solution presented in this chapter can help create better WLAN coverage, fos-
ter competition between paid WLAN operators, and end insecure and cumbersome
setup procedures.
In the future, the implementation can be extended to support Hops. After identify-
ing a suitable broadcast channel for cross certificates and CRLs, the implementation
can be extended to support an HN oﬄine during setup. A comparison of the setup
time between the HN oﬄine and HN online solution regarding the connection setup
would be interesting.
The roaming client can be ported to smartphones. While the roaming user interface
has already been implemented in Android in a Bachelor thesis by David Sosnitza
[139], the remaining functionality is future work.
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Chapter4
Electronic Health Monitoring
This chapter explores the connotation of privacy protection and authentication in
the context of continuous monitoring of bodily functions using a mobile phone as a
gateway. After an overview of the types of health monitoring systems and a review
of related work, we propose a solution which overcomes the security and privacy
shortcomings of current solutions. Security and privacy requirements are defined
and appropriate mechanisms are discussed. The implementation of the solution is
discussed and evaluated.
In the continuous health monitoring scenario, chronic patients wear sensors embed-
ded in their clothes which monitor various kinds of health related data, e.g., heart
rate and body temperature, and an accelerometer to detect falling accidents. This
data is used for alerts in case of emergency, and for long-term analysis, e.g., in the
case of a heart insufficiency. These systems can be used as an alternative to bed-
side medical monitoring devices to allow patient mobility. Mobile health monitoring
systems are sometimes also called telemonitoring systems.
In an aging society, living with health issues is becoming more common. For the
affected patients, retaining their personal mobility is a priority for their quality of
life. The technology required for mobile health monitoring systems has become
affordable and usable.
The technology used in health monitoring systems can also be used for athletes and
other health-aware persons: They can share the data with a personal trainer or other
athletes for review, advice, and competition. During competitive events, live data
from the athlete can be used by the trainer to discuss a strategy with the athlete.
Medical data is highly critical with regards to privacy, and many jurisdictions have
laws regarding the security and privacy of medical data. Therefore, a secure and
privacy preserving solution for mobile health monitoring is desirable. These prop-
erties must be achieved even though a wide array of technologies is used within
the solution. In a secure system, only entitled users can access the systems, only
authorized entities can create or modify data, the medical data cannot be accessed
by outsiders, even when long-term keys become known after the end of a session.
In a privacy preserving system, no unneeded details about the patient’s life shall be
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stored and the patient shall not be identifiable from the data. These security and
privacy goals are fully defined in the Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 of the preliminaries
chapter.
However, the mobile devices only provide limited capabilities, e.g., battery power,
computation speed, and bandwidth. Also, the usability must meet the requirements
of elderly users and athletes during a competitive event.
In many existing solutions, measured medical data is disclosed to a single operator,
often in full detail, which we want to avoid in our solution. Compared to the state
of the art, the users are able to share certain data sets from their body monitoring
systems with medical professionals and spouses, but can avoid disclosure of more
data to other authenticated persons. The users can select which kinds of data to
share with whom, i.e., various sets for various persons. In case of emergency, privacy
is disabled for nearby emergency physicians so that they are able to access all data
instantly.
HealthNet is an ongoing interdisciplinary project at RWTH Aachen university for a
mobile electronic health monitoring system, which started in 2007. In this chapter,
the novel design of a security architecture for HealthNet and its implementation
is described. Design choices for telemonitoring and electronic health monitoring
systems are discussed in Section 4.1. Existing telemonitoring solutions are discussed
in Section 4.2, including their security and privacy risks. In Section 4.3, our approach
to automatic continuous surveillance of vital parameters and its security and privacy
features is explained. Section 4.4 provides implementation details and a performance
evaluation. Finally, the conclusion is drawn and we provide an outlook on future
work in Section 4.5.
A part of this work has been published in [28]. The implementation on Symbian OS
was performed by Hakan Karahan in his diploma thesis [86].
4.1 Design Choices
Architectures of telemonitoring systems differ in the distribution of data storage, dis-
tribution of data processing, their security and privacy mechanisms, and in whether
they are real-time or store-and-forward systems.
Data mining for critical or otherwise significant data can be conducted in a decen-
tralized way on the devices in the patient’s domain, on a centralized infrastructure,
at the medical expert’s device, or (if there is no data mining in the system) by the
medical expert himself. The closer to the sensors the data is processed for the first
time, the less data needs to be transmitted, stored, and protected on systems out
of the patient’s control. Gay et al. [65] identify two general criteria for telemonitor-
ing systems, as they are either real-time or store-and-forward-systems, and either
centralized and decentralized systems. In the following, we will discuss these.
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4.1.1 Real-time vs. Store-and-Forward
Real-time telehealth systems constantly transfer health data in real time to a sys-
tem outside of the patient’s domain. These systems allow immediate response in
case of emergency, but have high communication and energy costs. The constant
surveillance may feel intrusive to some patients.
Store-and-forward telehealth systems record health data and will only transfer the
data at regular intervals to a system outside of the patient’s domain. Only then can
the data be accessed by medical experts. These are more efficient for data collecting
but are limited regarding emergency handling, as emergencies cannot be detected
promptly. Privacy is still an issue, as still complete data is transferred. An example
for a very basic store-and-forward system is data stored on the local memory of the
monitoring device, which is returned to the medical expert after a recording phase.
Data minimization: Some store-and-forward systems pre-process the data on the
patient’s home PC (or some other device with computing capabilities) to reduce the
amount of data sent. This has the drawback that the patient needs a connection to
his home PC. Other store-and-forward systems process the data on a mobile device
instead of a fixed PC. As the mobile device can always be connected to the body
health sensors, this enables real time emergency detection. As on mobile devices
communication is usually more expensive than calculation regarding energy, better
energy efficiency is achieved if the data is filtered before it is sent over a radio
interface.
Besides reducing the data volume, local data minimization can also be used as a
privacy feature, thus making the systems less intrusive. The system will only store
data variations that are interesting for the purpose of the therapy. Additional data
is removed. This prevents the reconstruction of a patient’s habits from sensor data,
e.g., sleeping times or sporting activities. While this may be useful for certain types
of therapy, in many others it is a threat to privacy. When these datasets are required
for the therapy, the systems may be configured not to filter them.
4.1.2 Centralized vs. Decentralized
A centralized infrastructure in a health monitoring system means that the data of all
patients is processed by a single party. This type of system enables easy sharing of
data among medical experts but takes control over the data away from the patients.
Because such data is also interesting for parties not trusted by the user (insurance
companies, employers, etc.) this may result in privacy concerns for some users.
In a centralized storage architecture, an intruder who is able to bypass the access
control of a medical data storage system infrastructure gains access to the data of
all patients.
In a decentralized storage architecture, the data is stored locally at the user, or at
a nearby medical expert he trusts. An intruder into such a system gains access
only to the data of a single user when local storage is used, or to the data of the
clients of a single medical expert. Even if the attacker is able to bypass the security
mechanisms of all decentralized storage systems, he still would have to identify their
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communication interfaces, e.g., scan IP ranges, steal mobile phones, etc, which makes
an attack to recover the data sets of a large part of the users infeasible. Local health
data storage also leaves the user in full control of his data. He may chose to delete
parts of his data and can rely on the fact that there are no other copies.
4.2 Related Work
After a brief look into the history of mobile health monitoring, we will discuss current
related works regarding the criteria discussed in the previous section. The concept of
telemonitoring was envisioned before the technology was ready for it. A patent filed
in 1974 [53] already describes a system that detects disconnected electrocardiography
(ECG) electrodes and relays the alarm over radio. In 1991, a patent was filed [59]
describing a system that combines telemonitoring with geographical patient tracking.
Because of the restrictions of the radio interface used, the range of this systems was
limited such that it allowed a patient to leave the bed, but not the hospital. In the
1990s, telemonitoring became a research focus for various research groups, academic
[97, 149] as well as industry [73, 79] and military [137] ones.
Some current commercial systems [79] have no clear security and privacy specifi-
cation at all and rely on security by obscurity by claiming diffuse security features
without disclosing how they are achieved. To better cope with user concerns and
legal requirements, a precise security and privacy specification is required.
Some store-and-forward systems without security and privacy features pre-process
the data on the patient’s home PC to detect anomalies in real-time, e.g., the systems
@Home [135] and PhMon [96]. These have the drawback that the patient needs a
data connection to his home PC. Alerts can only be given after the data was analyzed
on the PC, so for best results, the connection should be continuous.
Two well-described academic telemonitoring systems based on 3G cellular data ser-
vices that have completed tests with patients are the Australian Personal Health
Monitor [85, 97] and the European MobiHealth [149] systems. Both feature working
prototypes that have completed field tests on a number of actual patients.
Personal Health Monitor uses Bluetooth sensors to monitor the well-being of high
risk cardiac patients around the clock. The sensors are connected to a Windows
mobile smartphone, which will process the data. There is no permanent connection
to a health care center during regular operation. Personal Health Monitor uses data
processing on the mobile device to reduce the amount of data. The information
stored on the mobile device can be transferred to the central patient health record
via an Internet connection. In case of emergency, the mobile device displays a
warning, asks whether to call an ambulance which defaults to ”yes” after a timeout,
plays a voice message for bystanders with first help instructions, and sends SMS to
pre-assigned numbers. Communication to emergency services is realized via 3G or
any Internet connection available on the phone. There is no explicit specification for
communication or storage security in Personal Health Monitor. Secure web access
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is mentioned for remotely accessing the data [65]. However, the website1 where the
data is to be uploaded uses an insecure login mechanism, thus exposing transmitted
health data and user credentials to eavesdropping attackers. The user credentials
may be used by attackers to impersonate users and access their data. The authors
are aware that the Australian personal privacy protection in health care information
systems guidelines apply [49, 38], but do not detail how the system helps fulfilling
them.
The European MobiHealth project [107, 106] is a real-time remote health monitoring
system centered on a Java enabled mobile phone with a detailed backend system.
All measurements are transmitted in real time to medical experts who review the
data partly automated in their offices. No filtering or processing is done on the
mobile device.
MobiHealth is one of the few systems with an expressive description of security
requirements and at least some implementation details. MobiHealth relies on Blue-
tooth and ZigBee link layer security for communication to the sensors and uses
HTTPS mutual authentication and encryption for connections to the backend. The
backend to the physicians is protected using HTTPS and Java MRI (TLS/IPsec).
While authentication, confidentiality, and integrity are achieved, there are no mech-
anisms to support privacy. All sensor data is transmitted to the backend, where
it is out of the patients’ control and physicians may access it at any time. The
authentication allows identification as well as non-repudiation. The wealth of data
allows reconstruction of personal habits.
In summary, MobiHealth has a detailed security specification but no privacy features,
Personal Health Monitor achieves some privacy features but does not have a detailed
security specification. A direct comparison between the MobiHealth and Personal
Health Monitor projects can be found in [85]. In the following, our solution for
the RWTH HealthNet project is described which overcomes these shortcomings and
offers additional features for advanced security and privacy protection.
4.3 Proposed Solution for HealthNet
4.3.1 HealthNet Overview
The HealthNet project is a joint research project of several research groups at RWTH
Aachen University. The project is based on a sensor network embedded in clothing
[88]. HealthNet is a data-minimizing decentralized store-and-forward telemonitoring
system for electronic health.
A patient will be prescribed a wearable sensor shirt (shown in Figure 4.1) by a med-
ical expert. The data originates from sensors that are embedded in the shirt worn
by the patient. The sensors are exchanging data via a wireless an AES protected
ZigBee link to the central hub node that is also embedded in the shirt. This central
1http://personalheartmonitor.com/members/Login.aspx, last accessed December 18th, 2012.
Archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6D0Nfmhgj.
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Figure 4.1: HealthNet Shirt with Embedded Sensors
node is communicating wirelessly to a handheld device, usually a mobile phone or
PDA, via a Bluetooth link.
The handheld device processes the sensor data to filter out meaningless sequences,
which reduces the overall amount of data (data-minimizing). Using data mining
techniques, summaries of non-critical sensor readings are created which are stored
and transferred to trusted parties in regular intervals. As there is no need to trans-
mit, e.g., every single heart beat to a central data center in real time, the HealthNet
project conserves the energy of the mobile device’s batteries. The data flow is shown
in Figure 4.2.
Individual data sets may be transferred to other parties, such as medical experts,
emergency care services, and private parties trusted by the wearer himself, e.g., his
family. The patient controls who may access his data; however, emergency physicians
nearby the patient may access vital data without the patient’s individual consent.
Regular medical experts can only access sets of data that the user has cleared for
access by this person (decentralized system). The data is transmitted when the
patient is visiting his medical expert or over the Internet in sporadic intervals (store-
and-forward system). To protect the users’ privacy, there is no central data storage
server that stores data of all system users in our architecture.
The system is designed to support automated emergency calls when vital parameters
match predefined patterns. The system is not aimed at creating an infrastructure
among medical experts or health insurance companies. Cryptographic techniques
are used to prevent security attacks on wireless data transmission and stolen devices.
We show that our architecture is feasible on technologies currently available and large
parts of the implementation are feasible with consumer equipment that is readily
available. Only the wearable sensor shirt requires unique hardware.
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Figure 4.2: HealthNet App Data Flow
4.3.2 Use Cases
The following use cases are supported in the HealthNet project: The patient may
check his vital parameters and modify the settings of the system using a graphical
user interface on the handheld device. After the patient has approved certain trusted
other devices to access certain kinds of data on his device, these trusted other devices
may access the data on the patient’s handheld device at any time without new
interaction by the patient. Trusted devices are owned either by a medical expert,
by the patient himself, or by another person trusted by the patient, e.g., his spouse.
Data transfers from the patient’s device to other devices are achieved by wireless
transfers using the Bluetooth or WLAN interface. Cellular networks are currently
not used, but may be added at any time. The sensor nodes and the central node on
the shirt do not have a user interface.
Apart from this base scenario, the HealthNet architecture supports several additional
features:
1. The patient may run his own long-term data collection on his desktop PC, to
which the handheld device transfers data in regular intervals, especially before
exceeding its local memory.
2. When the patient’s handheld device detects a critical condition, it will auto-
matically contact an emergency dispatcher with the patient’s standing data
and the medical situation, sound an audible alarm, and establish a voice con-
nection.
3. In order to cope with emergency situations where the patient cannot clear
access to his data, i.e., unconsciousness, all emergency physicians within Blue-
tooth range may access the data on the patient’s handheld device using their
own special handheld devices at any time and without the patient’s explicit
consent.
4.3.3 Security and Privacy Requirements
After we have described the HealthNet scenario and use cases, we will now discuss
the security and privacy goals which are relevant for the proposed solution. The
132 Chapter 4. Electronic Health Monitoring
description is based on the definitions in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 of the preliminaries
chapter.
Sec-1: Secure mutual authentication and key establishment between the sensor
network and the patient’s device, and between the patient’s device and
trusted devices or emergency medical experts’ devices (Authentication).
The reading equipment of emergency medical experts must be remotely
revocable.
Sec-2: The recorded health data cannot be altered by unauthorized persons (In-
tegrity).
Sec-3: The recorded health data cannot be accessed by anyone unless they are
authorized by the patient (Confidentiality). The measured data is kept
confidential at all times: during collection, in storage, and during trans-
mission within and between all components of the system. To reduce the
risk of data extortion from stolen devices, secure authentication meth-
ods must be used both for wireless links as well as user interfaces on the
devices themselves.
Sec-4: The data stays secret even if an attacker records a connection and later
learns a long time secret used (Perfect Forward Secrecy).
Pri-1: The recorded data is reduced to avoid disclosure of details not required
for the therapy (General Privacy). No more data than required for a given
monitoring application shall be stored.
Pri-2: The patient must stay anonymous to anybody (Anonymity).
4.3.4 Security and Privacy Mechanisms
In our solution, the security and privacy goals described above are achieved using
the following mechanisms:
Sec-1 (Authentication and Key Agreement): All devices that allow user interaction
on medical data, such as the patients’ handheld device, the trusted parties’ devices,
and the emergency physicians’ handheld devices, require the user to authenticate to
the device. This is implemented using a password scheme, where reauthentication is
required after a short idle period. An authenticated session can also be terminated
by the user by logging out manually. Upon logout, the plain text data and the
relevant keys are erased from the memory in the patient device such that only the
encrypted data remains on the device’s storage medium. This prevents access to the
data on a stolen device.
In wireless connections to emergency physicians, all parties are identified using cer-
tificates for 2048 bit RSA keys, 224 bit ECC keys or a shared key of at least 112 bit
strength. The key lengths are chosen in accordance with current recommendations
of the NIST [126].
Shared key authentication is used for wireless connections to trusted parties and re-
gular medical experts who operate trusted devices. When the patient’s mobile phone
creates a wireless connection to a trusted device, the Balanced Password Key Agree-
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shared knowledge of password pi. parameters
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5. EZ(Cb)mod p
key confirmation of z
Figure 4.3: The IEEE P1363.2 BPKAS-SPEKE Password Authenticated Key Agree-
ment Protocol (1.–2.) with Key Confirmation (3.–5.)
ment (BPKAS-SPEKE) protocol is used, which is a password based authentication
and key agreement mechanism. Both parties have to enter the same password into
their devices to establish a secure connection. The resulting Diffie-Hellman key z is
used to encrypt the AES exchange key, which is generated by the patient’s device
using random data. The AES exchange key is used to encrypt the communication
between the devices and will not be reused for later connections.
The BPKAS-SPEKE protocol as shown in Figure 4.3 is defined in the IEEE P1363.2
standard for password-based public key cryptography [10]. It uses a shared password
pi to output a shared secret string z, which can be used to derive session keys Ki using
key derivation parameters Pi such that Ki = h(z, Pi). BPKAS-SPEKE is based on
the Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange method (SPEKE) [82], which is a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange using an appropriate derivation of the password S(pi) as
the exponentiation base g. The SPEKE protocol resists dictionary attacks, provides
perfect forward secrecy, and prevents attacks on the password with stolen session
keys. It was proven secure by MacKanzie [102].
Password based authentication is feasible in this scenario because connections are
usually only made between the patient and one to four other parties (medical expert,
long-term storage, and family). These parties do not change frequently, and they will
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Figure 4.4: Overview of Symmetric Keys in the HealthNet Application [86]
always personally meet the patient anyway, so password distribution is not an issue.
After authentication, these parties can access the patient’s data sets according to
the settings chosen by the patient. The patient can add and remove entitled parties
at any time using his handheld device, and can change which data sets each trusted
party may access.
The following keys and secrets are used: The AES sensor keys are used to en-
crypt individual measurements. New keys are generated for each type of data and
periodically for new time intervals. The AES key ring key is used to encrypt the
AES sensor keys. The key ring password is used to encrypt the AES key ring key.
The password is not stored on the device in the clear. Only a hash derivation of the
key ring password with a fixed random salt is stored. When the data is exchanged
to another device, the AES sensor keys is sent encrypted using the AES exchange
key. The encrypted data from the microSD card is sent in the same format as it
was stored, i.e., encrypted with the respective AES sensor key.
The handheld reading devices of emergency medical experts are equipped with cer-
tificates that enable them to read a patient’s device in their proximity at any time
without the patient’s consent. These certificates are issued by the employer of the
system. Certificate revocation is achieved through certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
downloaded by the patient’s handheld device in regular intervals. A CRL consists
of the serial numbers of revoked certificates, its validity period, and a signature by
the certificate authority (also see Section 2.4 of the preliminaries chapter). The cer-
tificate authority (CA) is trusted by the patient’s handheld device, i.e., its public
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key is preconfigured on the device. Thus, the patient is at all times in control of
his data, with the exception of emergency cases, where physicians within Bluetooth
range may read data if they have been authorized by a CA.
As a trust anchor for bootstrapping, the sensor shirt must be given to the patient
by a medical expert whom he trusts. Thus, when initially giving the sensor shirt to
a patient, the medical expert will take care of a secure pairing process between his
remote reading device and the patient’s handheld device, i.e., authorizing himself
as a trusted party on the patient’s handheld device before issuing it to the patient.
The medical expert who sets up the patient’s handheld device will verify that the
patient’s device knows the correct public key of the CA used for emergency experts
reading devices by comparing the CA certificate fingerprint on the patient’s device
to that on his own device. The patient will then setup the user authentication,
possibly with the help of the medical expert or his staff, so that from then on, the
patient controls who is able to read data from his handheld device.
Sec-2 (Integrity): All stored data is encrypted. Alterations of the ciphertext with-
out knowledge of the corresponding key result in plain text block that look like
random data. This can easily be detected when with message authentication codes,
which prevent the attacker from creating meaningful changes. Therefore, no error
correction codes are used.
Sec-3 (Confidentiality): Confidentiality during communication between the body
sensor network hub and the handheld device is achieved by using ZigBee AES-
128 encryption between the sensor nodes and the hub on the shirt, and between the
hub and the handheld device. These are both single hop connections with fixed
partners.
The Bluetooth encryption E0 would be available between the hub on the shirt and
the handheld device as well. However, the hub on the shirt does not have a display
or a numeric keyboard, meaning that it cannot be used to establish an authenticated
link key with another Bluetooth device. Therefore, we use our own AES encryption
on the application layer with pre-established keys on the devices, and do not rely on
the security features offered by Bluetooth. The keys are generated when the shirt is
first switched on at deployment, i.e., at the medical professional who prescribed it.
Confidentiality during data storage on the handheld device is achieved using
AES-128 encryption on the devices, so that no data can be recovered by an attacker
who has physical access to a device.
For confidentiality and integrity protection during communication between the
handheld device and the trusted devices (shown in Figure 4.5) we do not rely
on the security mechanisms of the technologies used, e.g., Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11
WLAN, and cellular service (UMTS). Instead, all data transfers apply AES-128 en-
cryption and message authentication codes on the application layer. The system
does not rely on security mechanisms of the wireless technologies used because the
data must not be revealed to the network operators, and because wireless technolo-
gies, i.e., GSM, UMTS, and WLAN, typically only encrypt the air interface. Also,
a receiving station may not detect if an incoming connection uses an insecure link
somewhere along the connection before the last hop to the receiver when relying on
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Figure 4.5: Overview of Communication with our HealthNet Application
link layer mechanisms. E.g., a WPA2 protected WLAN network seen by the device
could relay data over an unprotected WLAN network, which cannot be detected by
the device. Bluetooth might have been used with an insecure pairing method (see
Chapter 5).
Therefore, the patient’s device and every trusted device in our system is required to
use HealthNet’s own application layer security mechanisms.
Sec-4: (Perfect Forward Secrecy): For wireless sessions with trusted parties and
regular medical experts, a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman mechanism is used.
The key is not derived from the password. Instead, the password is only used for
authentication during the key establishment itself. This ensures that the knowledge
of the password does not reveal the key, or help the attacker obtain the key, thus
facilitating Perfect Forward Secrecy.
For wireless sessions with trusted parties and emergency medical experts, a certifi-
cate based authentication mechanism is used. The signature keys that the certifi-
cates are issued for are only used to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The signature keys do not help in recovering the Diffie-Hellman key, thus Perfect
Forward Secrecy for data transmissions is achieved2.
Pri-1 (General Privacy): The measured data is reduced on the patient’s mobile
device using a data mining algorithm according to the settings of the patient.
Nonessential data is discarded, thus it cannot be disclosed to anybody. With appro-
priate settings, the remaining data cannot be used to reconstruct details about the
patients life.
Pri-2 (Anonymity): The patient always stays anonymous, as his real name is not
used anywhere in the system. The stored and exchanged data does not contain any
information about the party other than the measurement values themselves.
2However, Perfect Forward Secrecy cannot be achieved for stored data.
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4.4 Implementation and Evaluation
This section presents details of the implementation of our HealthNet solution, includ-
ing used hardware and software, using the security mechanisms described above. The
implementation on Symbian OS was performed by Hakan Karahan in his diploma
thesis [86].
4.4.1 Body Sensor Network
The HealthNet sensor shirt (described in Section 4.3.1) contains various sensors and
a body sensor network hub. There are sensors the for heart rate, the body tempera-
ture, and accelerometers. The accelerometers enable recognition of posture (sitting,
standing, walking) and allow of detection falling accidents. The body sensors are
connected to the body sensor network via a wireless ZigBee link. The hub is based
on a Texas Instruments MSP430F1611 microcontroller with a clock speed of 8 MHz
powered by one or two 1.5V AA or AAA batteries [88]. A low power Texas Instru-
ments CC1101 transceiver is used for ZigBee communication on the license-free 433
MHz ISM band within the body sensor network. The Bluetooth communication is
implemented over a dedicated chip connected to the serial port of the microcon-
troller.
4.4.2 Patient Handheld Device
A touchscreen smartphone is used as the patient’s handheld device. At the time
project started (2007), the Symbian platform was the most popular smartphone
operating system. However, it was overtaken by Android in the year 2010 [64].
When Android devices became readily available, the smartphone client was ported
to Android. Thus, two separate implementations were created over the course of the
project. However, the Symbian application did not receive further updates after the
Android application was finished. Both hardware platforms support WLAN, cellular
data service, Bluetooth connectivity, cryptographic operations, storage operations,
a graphical user interface, and a touch screen for user input.
Local User authentication
After starting the application on the mobile device, the patient is asked to enter a
password to get access to its functions. The password is stored on the smartphone
as a SHA-1 message digest. Upon input of the password, the message digest is com-
puted and compared to the stored value. If the hashes match, the user is successfully
authenticated and gains access to the application. User interaction is monitored, and
after an idle time of three minutes the user is logged out automatically. He needs
to reauthenticate to use the application again.
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Sensor Data Storage
The microSD card is used to store sensor data. The sensor data is cached for a minute
before it is written to the file system to minimize the amount of write operations
for energy conservation. To achieve confidentiality, this data is encrypted with the
AES-128 cipher. The AES key used for this encryption is generated with the help
of a fixed salt (randomly generated during installation) and fresh random data. It
is called the AES sensor key. The AES sensor key is stored in the phone’s flash
memory in encrypted form. When the connection to the sensors is lost or when the
HealthNet application is terminated, the AES sensor key will be deleted from the
memory. For decryption of the data or encryption of new data upon reconnect to
the sensors, the passphrase must be reentered to decrypt the AES sensor key again.
Thus, data on a stolen device cannot be decrypted.
Data filtering on the device to reduce the amount of data and to protect the patient’s
privacy so far was only implemented exemplary for the heart rate: When the heart
rate is below a preconfigured threshold value, a default value is recorded. Data
mining on the medical data is the focus of another research group at RWTH Aachen
[93] working on the project. A new data mining algorithm can be implemented
without changes to the security architecture.
Connections to Trusted Third Parties
The patient device can be connected to trusted devices via Bluetooth. Therefore,
it is always in Bluetooth discoverable mode. Requiring the patient to interact in
the connection process would obstruct connections by emergency medical experts
to devices of unconscious patients. WLAN is only used for outgoing connections
to medical experts. Two patient devices cannot be connected over WLAN without
an access point, which avoids addressing issues. For both transmission technolo-
gies, mutual authentication between the patient’s smartphone and trusted third
parties, i.e., the patient’s long-term storage, medical experts or family members,
is achieved through a password-authenticated key agreement method. A shared-
password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used for session key agree-
ment and authentication to prevent eavesdropping and impersonation attacks, even
under a man-in-the-middle scenario. The implementation of the features for con-
nections by emergency physicians is work in progress, i.e., certificate handling, the
certificate based authentication scheme, and certificate revocation lists.
Forwarding stored sensor data to a trusted third party is implemented by directly
transmitting the cipher blocks from the patient’s microSD card to the trusted party’s
storage. The AES sensor key that was used for the encryption of this specific block is
also transmitted, but encrypted with the new session key. The trusted party stores
the AES sensor keys and the indices of the respective blocks in order to access the
data. This avoids re-encryption of the microSD card contents. The AES sensor key
is unique for each encrypted block such that a trusted party cannot decrypt other
data on the patient device, should it obtain access to the microSD card.
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Emergency Dial
To automatically contact an ambulance in case of emergency, an SMS is sent to a
regular land line emergency number. The SMS will be read out automatically by
the telephone service provider. The smartphone will then create a voice connection
to the emergency line. At the time of writing, there are no emergency dispatching
services accepting data connections, therefore, this is the best current solution.
Symbian OS v9.4
For the original implementation of HealthNet on Symbian OS, the Nokia N97 smart-
phone was used. The implementation on Symbian OS was performed by Hakan
Karahan in his diploma thesis [86]. It runs Symbian OS v9.4 with the S60 5th Edi-
tion software platform on an ARM 11 CPU with a clock rate of 434 MHz and 128 MB
SDRAM. Bluetooth 2.0 as well as WLAN 802.11b/g, including WPA2 (AES/TKIP)
are supported [18].
The HealthNet application is implemented as a MIDlet for the Java ME environment,
which requires a number of Java Specification Requests (JSRs) provided by the N97.
JSR 75 FileConnection is required to perform file system operations on the built-in
telephone memory and the exchangeable microSD memory card. JSR 82 Java API
for Bluetooth is used for Bluetooth connections to other devices. JSR 135 Mobile
Media API provides means of sending SMS and calling telephone numbers.
JSR 177 Security and Trust Services API provides basic cryptographic operations
like creating message digests with SHA1 or MD5, and symmetric encryption with
DES/Triple DES, which do not meet our security requirements. There is neither
certificate handling nor AES support. In addition, while asymmetric cryptography
to encrypt data is supported, asymmetric data decryption is not supported. To
address these problems, the BouncyCastle Crypto API for Java [146] is used. It
provides a collection of cryptographic APIs for Java and C#. The Java release is
divided into different providers, i.e., JDK 1.2-1.6, and Java ME. Nearly every current
cryptographic algorithm is supported by BouncyCastle, including RSA, AES and
X.509 certificate handling.
The Mobile Information Device Profile is part of the Java ME framework and pro-
vides the Record Management System (RMS). RMS manages the record store, which
is stored in binary files on the mobile phone’s file system. A record store can be
marked either as shared, so that any MIDlet on the phone can access the store, or as
private, so that only the MIDlets in the same suite that created the store can access
the store. We use a private record store for the storage of the key ring password
hash image and all other settings.
On the Symbian platform, sending SMS and initiating telephone calls always re-
quire user confirmation. It is impossible to set these permissions beforehand, neither
through setting MIDlet-Permissions in the JAD file during deployment, nor through
signing. Also, the Java ME platform cannot play voice messages to telephone con-
tacts. Furthermore, certificate verification is not supported in the BouncyCastle
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API. These limitations prevent a useful implementation of our desired features for
emergency dial and access by emergency physician.
The Symbian implementation was created in the course of a Diploma Thesis [86]
and is also described in [28].
Android v2.1
For Android, the HTC Desire (G7) was used. The HTC Desire runs Android 2.1
Eclair, which runs on a 1 GHz Qualcomm QSD8250 Snapdragon CPU with 576 MB
RAM. It supports Bluetooth 2.1 and WLAN 802.11b/g [68].
The user is logged out when the screen saver is turned on. The delay was set to 30
minutes, initially. Buffered writing is left to the OS. All keys are generated by the
cryptographically strong pseudo random number generator in Java, which is found
in the class java.security.SecureRandom.
During operation, the application password is stored in the RAM XORed with the
SHA-1 hash of the application password and the filename. While it cannot pre-
vent thorough attacks, it makes reverse engineering more difficult and thus impedes
password sniffing by other applications, should the memory protection mechanisms
in Android fail. The password is used to encrypt the file encryption keys. AES in
cipher feedback mode (CFB) is used.
To change the application password, the encrypted keys will be decrypted with the
old password and encrypted with the new password. Thus, the keys remain the
same, encrypted data files can still be decrypted, and all preshared keys will still
work.
To establishing a secure connection to another device, the own Device ID, the other
device’s ID, and a shared key must entered on both devices. The pre-shared secrets
are stored similarly to file keys, XORed with the SHA-1 hash of the application
password and the remote device ID. Thus, they can only be read in clear when
knowing the application password.
4.4.3 Performance of the System
Connection Time
On Symbian, the MIDlet needs about 12 seconds to start up. After that it is
running in the background. Switching back and forth between MIDlet and other
phone functions happens immediately. To connect to the central sensor node, a
manual discover-and-connect operation needs to be started from within the MIDlet
which takes about 15 seconds. The overall time before the MIDlet is fully initialized
and starts gathering data from the sensor nodes is under 30 seconds. This value is
rather negligible since the MIDlet only needs to be started once after the smartphone
was turned on. In a continuous monitoring application, the smartphone has to run
24/7.
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Sensor Type Frequency Precision Data Rate
Electrocardiography 5 Hz 848 bit 530 byte/s
Accelerometer 10 Hz 96 bit 120 byte/s
Body Temperature 1 Hz 64 bit 8 byte/s
Total 658 byte/s
Table 4.2: Data Rates of Health Sensors in RWTH HealthNet
On Android, the application takes 0.744 seconds to start up when launched for the
first time. Later, application switching happens instantly.
Battery Life
The Nokia N97 runs out of battery after 11 hours of data recording, which includes
a constant Bluetooth connection to the body sensor network, data processing, and
storing the data on the microSD memory card. When the battery can be charged
twice a day, our implementation is already adequate for a patient’s day-to-day use,
but there is room for improvement.
The Android device runs out of battery after about an hour in a field test at a
sporting event [134], where the application was modified to immediately forward
the sensor data to a server.
4.4.4 Memory Requirements and Uploads
The gathered sensor data consists of three different packages (see Table 4.2) which
amounts to 658 bytes per second = 759 MB per week. Data mining will be used to
filter uninteresting data, which will reduce the amount of data that will be stored
on the patient’s device. A 32 GB microSD card provides abundant storage space.
Even a much smaller microSD card would be sufficient. When the therapy does not
require more frequent uploads, one upload every two to six weeks is advised. The
time required for an upload depends on the length of the period, the reduction rate
by the patient’s device, and the technology used.
4.5 Conclusion
The HealthNet application fulfills the requirements for a secure and privacy preserv-
ing electronic health monitoring application within the scope of the RWTH Aachen
University HealthNet project: It ensures that the recorded data contains no un-
needed details about the patient’s life (Information Privacy). Only entitled users
can access the HealthNet system, and thereby, the health data and the settings in
the system (authentication). Only authorized entities can create or modify data
(Integrity). The medical data cannot be obtained by an attacker (Confidentiality).
Decryption of exchanged data by an attacker is prevented even when he obtains a
long-term secret (Perfect Forward Secrecy).
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Our solution is the first one to come with a full specification of security mechanisms
that is also preserving the privacy of the user. These privacy and security goals are
achieved through data avoidance, data minimization, decentralized storage, and the
use of cryptography. The solution offers security and privacy features that can be
adopted by other mobile health monitoring systems. This can reduce legal nuisances
and overcome user skepticism, which will help bringing more systems of this type to
patients, and thus, enhance their quality of life.
In the future, we would like to conduct long running field tests with our proto-
type equipment. In addition, adding biometric user authentication to the devices
may help avoiding password nuisances. As alternative to password based local user
authentication, near field communication (NFC) and distance bounding using the
radio wave propagation time between the smartphone and the sensor shirt would
be promising authentication mechanisms. A better integration of our solution into
public medical emergency handling services would be valuable, i.e., over an IP data
interface instead of SMS.
Chapter5
Excursus: Attacking Bluetooth 2.1+
Secure Simple Pairing in Passkey Entry
Mode
The HealthNet application we discussed in the previous chapter uses the Bluetooth
standard for personal area networks in the 2.4 GHz ISM band for communication
between the sensor hub and the patient’s mobile device. As described in the Pre-
liminaries Section 2.2.2, Bluetooth is used to connect mobile phones to headsets and
hands-free car kits, to connect personal computers to keyboards, mice, and printers,
for data exchange between two mobile phones, and many other applications. To
securely connect two devices, Bluetooth provides pairing mechanisms. Two devices
are switched into a special mode by the user, and are then able to connect to each
other and to establish a link key. A derivation of the link key will then be used
to encrypt the traffic subsequently exchanged between the devices. For later con-
nections, the same link key is reused such that the pairing process is only executed
when the devices connect for the first time.
A crucial consideration in the design of the HealthNet application is whether to rely
on the security mechanisms provided by Bluetooth. Therefore, we will discuss an
attack on Bluetooth in this chapter, although it is not primarily a privacy issue.
Therefore, it is an excursus from the general topic of this thesis.
Due to the serious security issues found in earlier Bluetooth versions, Bluetooth ver-
sion 2.1 (and later) uses a new pairing process called Secure Simple Pairing (SSP).
SSP allows two devices to establish a link key based on a Diffie-Hellman key agree-
ment (described in Section 2.4) and supports four pairing methods to authenticate
the key agreement. These four methods target devices with different combinations
of user interfaces such as keyboards, displays, or special pairing buttons as shown
in Figure 5.1. The Just Works mechanism provides no authentication. The Out of
Band mechanism delegates authentication to an external mechanism, e.g., near field
communication (NFC). The other two of these pairing methods claim to provide
authentication using integrated cryptographic mechanisms.
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One of these is called Passkey Entry, which uses a PIN entered on one or both
devices. This Passkey Entry method has been shown to be vulnerable against a
man-in-the-middle attack [99]. This attack allows an attacker that is able to record
the legitimate pairing process and is able to prevent its successful completion (e.g.,
by jamming the wireless channel) to replace the link key established between the
legitimate devices with a link key known to himself. As a consequence, the attacker
is then able to forward the data between the user’s devices (violates security goal
confidentiality), manipulate the exchanged data (violates security goal integrity),
and insert data he created himself (violates security goal data authentication). The
prerequisite for the success of this attack is that the user who pairs the two legitimate
devices reuses the same PIN on the second attempt when his first attempt to pair
the two devices has failed.
The attack is relevant beyond the scope of the HealthNet project because Passkey
Entry is the pairing method required for Bluetooth devices with keyboards since
2007 [12]. It is implemented in virtually all mobile phones, tablet PCs, and laptops;
and also in many wireless keyboards1. As the vulnerability lies in the standard, the
vulnerability will exist in all devices.
We have created an implementation of the attack to reveal the PIN to an observer.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of the attack, and
also the first implemented attack on Bluetooth since the introduction of version
2.1, which has mitigated previously implemented attacks. The implementation of
the attack was not straight-forward, as implementations of Bluetooth are closed
source and large parts of the functionality are implemented in hardware. Thus,
existing implementations of Bluetooth cannot easily be manipulated for the purpose
of security analysis. An implementation of Bluetooth from scratch requires a flexible
and freely programmable radio interface, which is hard to come by and often not a
finished product in itself.
In this chapter, we explore the difficulty of implementing and mounting this attack
in practice. Lacking devices with a reasonably programmable Bluetooth stack to
implement the attack upon, we first present Bluetrial: Our own standard compliant
implementation of the Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing process using the GNU
Radio platform on USRP devices. We then present and evaluate our implementation
of the man-in-the-middle attack on the Passkey Entry method on Bluetrial, and also
propose a fix to the protocol.
This work has been published in [32]. The implementation was created by Jian
Wang in his master thesis [151].
5.1 Secure Simple Pairing in Passkey Entry Mode
In this section we will describe in detail how the Passkey Entry pairing method works
during regular operation without an attacker present. The pairing is a mechanism
in Bluetooth to establish a shared secret key between two devices. Version 2.1
introduced Secure Simple Pairing (SSP), which allows two devices to establish a
1Some wireless keyboards use custom 2.4 GHz wireless technologies, e.g., those by Logitech.
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Capabilities of Capabilities of Initiating Device (A)
Responding Display Display and Keyboard
Device (B) Digits yes/no Keys Only
Display Digits Just Works Just Works Passkey Entry
Display, yes/no Keys Just Works Numeric Comp. Passkey Entry
Keyboard Only Passkey Entry Passkey Entry Passkey Entry
Table 5.1: Availability of Secure Simple Pairing Methods (Bluetooth Standard [12],
vol. 3, p. 207)
Term Definition
A Identifier of Device A
capsA Capabilities of A
PKax DH public value of A
DHkey Newly established DH key between A and B
ra PIN of A, 20 bit
rai i-th bit of PIN of A
NA Nonce by A, 128 bit
Nai Nonce by A for i-th round, 128 bit
Cai Commitment of A in round i, 128 bit
f1, f2, f3 Cryptographic one-way functions
Ea Authentication stage 2 value by A, 128 bit
Table 5.2: Overview of Terms in Secure Simple Pairing
shared secret key called the link key using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement (described
in Section 2.2.2). A run of the SSP protocol consists of multiple stages. The Diffie-
Hellman keys are transmitted in authentication stage 1 of SSP. In authentication
stage 2, these keys can be verified to prevent a man-in-the-middle-attack, as an
attacker could have replaced one of the keys by his own key.
There a four methods to implement authentication stage 1 as shown in Table 5.1.
One of these is the Passkey Entry mode which is used for connections where both
devices have keyboards, and for connections where one device has a keyboard and
the other has a display: The user either has to enter the same 6-digit PIN on both
devices, or one device displays a 6-digit PIN and the user has to enter it on the
other device. The underlying protocol is the same in both cases, except that in the
second case, the number is chosen by the device and not by the user. The PIN is
also called passkey. The pairing methods used for the other scenarios are described
in Section 2.2.2 in the preliminaries chapter.
In the Passkey Entry method, the 6-digit PIN is converted into a string ra1, . . . , ra20
of 20 bits. As shown in Figure 5.1, the two pairing devices commit to and verify the
PIN bit by bit in 20 rounds. In each round, the device A (device B) computes a 128
bit commitment value Cai (Cbi) as follows:
Device A: Cai = f1(PKax, PKbx,Nai, rai)
Device B: Cbi = f1(PKbx, PKax,Nbi, rbi)
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Device A Device B
DH public key: PKax
DH public key: PKbx
Simple pairing confirm: Cai
Simple pairing confirm: Cbi
Simple pairing number: Nai
Passkey accepted
Simple pairing number: Nbi
Passkey accepted
20x
Figure 5.1: SSP Authentication Stage 1 with Passkey Entry
Here, Nai and Nbi are 128 bit random numbers generated by the devices A and B,
respectively, which are exchanged in the clear after each commitment Cai and Cbi
(see Figure 5.1). The idea behind this gradual comparison of the passkey bits is that
each device commits on the next passkey bit before it opens the bit by revealing Nai
to the other party. Once in possession of Nai (Nbi), B (A) can compute Cai (Cbi)
using rai (rbi) and thus indirectly verify that rai = rbi. Only if all comparisons so
far succeeded, the next passkey bit is revealed to the other device. In particular,
none of the parties has to disclose the complete passkey to the other device at once.
The function f1 is a publicly known keyed hash function which outputs an 128 bit
commitment value (see [12] vol. 2, p. 898).
After authentication stage 1, authentication stage 2 is executed to confirm the DH
key and authenticate the nonces, the random numbers, and the pairing capabilities
supported by the devices. A sends Ea to B, B sends Eb to A:
Device A: Ea = f3(DHkey, Na,Nb, rb, capsA,A,B),
Device B: Eb = f3(DHkey, Nb,Na, ra, capsB,B,A),
where the function f3 is a publicly known function specified as the 128 most sig-
nificant (leftmost) bits of the output of HMAC-SHA-256 keyed with the DH-key
(see [12] vol. 2, p. 900). The same authentication stage 2 is used for all four pairing
methods.
In the final phase of the pairing process, both parties calculate the link key LK with
function f2 which is again based on HMAC-SHA-256 keyed with the DH-key:
LK = f2(DHkey,Na,Nb,A,B)
Derivations of the link key LK will then be used to protect to communication. The
link key will (usually) be stored when the connection ends, so that it is reused for the
next connection to the same device. Thus, the pairing does not have to be executed
again.
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Device A Attacker Device B
eavesdrop on following traffic
DH public key: PKax
DH public key: PKbx
Simple pairing confirm: Cai
Simple pairing confirm: Cbi
Simple pairing number: Nai
Passkey accepted
Simple pairing number: Nbi
Passkey accepted
20x
Figure 5.2: Eavesdropping on Passkey Entry to Obtain the PIN
While the Passkey Entry method was designed to be secure against man-in-the-
middle attacks, this does not hold if the the same passkey is used again after the
first attempt to pair two devices failed. In the next section we describe this attack
in detail.
5.2 Background to Attacking Passkey Entry
In the following, we describe the theoretical man-in-the-middle attack on the Blue-
tooth Passkey Entry method as presented in [99]. For the attack to work, the
attacker only needs to be able to control the radio channel between two Bluetooth
devices, and needs to be in possession of a device capable of communicating on the
Bluetooth channels. The attacker does not require access to the memory of the
devices or manipulation of the devices in any form.
5.2.1 Outline of the Attack
The attack targets the Secure Simple Pairing protocol in Bluetooth Version 2.1 and
higher when Passkey Entry is used in authentication stage 1. The attack works if
the PIN is reused in a second attempt to pair two devices after the first attempt has
failed. This is naturally the case if one of the devices uses a fixed PIN. But even if
this is not the case and the user chooses the PIN and enters them on both devices,
it seems plausible to assume that the user will reuse the same PIN when his first
attempt to pair the two devices has failed just a few minutes ago.
The attack consists of two major steps: At first, the attacker eavesdrops on an
SSP process between two legitimate devices as shown in Figure 5.2 and records
all messages exchanged during the initial DH-exchange and authentication stage
1. After recording Na20, the attacker interrupts the SSP session by jamming the
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wireless channel. Because of a design weakness in Passkey Entry, the attacker is
now able to calculate the PIN that was used in the legitimate pairing process.
Second, when the devices initiate a new pairing process and the PIN is reused, the
attacker uses it to impersonate device A to device B and vice versa. By acting as
a man-in-the-middle on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, the attacker is able to
negotiate link keys with each of the devices and can authenticate using the PIN. The
attacker is now able to forward the data sent between two Bluetooth devices such
that they appear to function normally. The attacker can eavesdrop on the commu-
nication between the two devices, can manipulate the data exchanged, and insert
new traffic. As the link key is reused for authentication of all future connections,
the attacker is additionally able to impersonate one device to the other even in the
absence of the second device.
In the following we detail the steps of this attack.
5.2.2 Obtaining the PIN
During the legitimate pairing process the attacker records the initial DH key ex-
change, i.e., PKax and PKbx and the Passkey Entry exchange, i.e., twenty Nai/Nbi
and Cai/Cbi values each for a total of 82 values.
Recall that the commitments Cai and Cbi are calculated by the legitimate devices
for every single bit rai and rbi of the PIN, as described in Section 5.1:
Device A: Cai = f1(PKax, PKbx,Nai, rai)
Device B: Cbi = f1(PKbx, PKax,Nbi, rbi)
f1 is a cryptographic hash function. All values in this equation are available to
the attacker, except for the individual bits of the PIN rai (by device A) and rbi
(by device B). Therefore, the attacker can deduce rai and rbi by „brute forcing“ if
they are 0 or 1 by calculating f1 on the known input and on both potential values
of the PIN bits. Thus, the attacker can easily determine the PIN as soon as he
has received Na20. If the attacker was unable to correctly receive all information
from both parties, he still has a chance to calculate the correct PIN by calculating
either rai or rbi for each i, because rai = rbi when the same PIN is entered on both
devices, which should be true in a legitimate pairing attempt. The attacker is now
in possession of the PIN used in the legitimate pairing run.
5.2.3 Using the PIN
To profit from knowledge of the PIN, the attacker has to prevent that the legitimate
pairing process succeeds. This can be done by jamming the communication channel
after Na20 was received by the attacker. Also, instead of jamming the connection,
the attacker could manipulate Na20 or Nb20 on the air, so that the verification by
B or A will fail. The attacker then has to initiate a new connection to the honest
devices. As shown in Figure 5.3, the attacker can now impersonate A to B (noted
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Device A MITM B‘ MITM A‘ Device B
DH public key: PKax DH public key: PKa‘x
DH public key: PKbxDH public key: PKb‘x
Simple pairing confirm: Cai Simple pairing confirm: Ca‘i
Simple pairing confirm: CbiSimple pairing confirm: Cb‘i
Simple pairing number: Nai Simple pairing number: Na‘i
Passkey acceptedPasskey accepted
Simple pairing number: NbiSimple pairing number: Nb‘i
Passkey accepted Passkey accepted
20x
Figure 5.3: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Passkey Entry Reusing the PIN
A‘) and B to A (noted B‘) using his own Diffie-Hellman values and reusing the PIN.
As a consequence, the attacker will share a link key with device A and (another) link
key with device B. Note that the devices will accept new DH values from previously
known devices as the Bluetooth standard explicitly states that „a device may, at
any time, choose to discard its public-private key pair and generate a new one“ ([12]
vol. 2, p. 889).
When the attack was successful, the attacker will forward the data from A to B
and back. The attacker is then able to eavesdrop on and manipulate the data sent
between the two Bluetooth devices, although they appear to function normally.
5.2.4 Countermeasures
When users are able to enter the PIN on both devices, the users can avoid this attack
by not using the same PIN twice. However, changes to the behavior of Bluetooth
devices or even changes to the Bluetooth standard would mitigate the reused PIN
attack even when the user is not aware that such an attack exists. We will now
describe two such changes.
A Stopgap Solution
The Bluetooth standard explicitly demands freshly chosen nonces each time the
protocol is repeated in the Numeric Comparison method (see [12] vol. 2 p. 891), but
fails to demand a fresh PIN each time the Passkey Entry method is run. In fact,
the standard gives no requirements about the PIN other that it has six digits („from
000000 to 999999”) (see [12] vol. 1, p. 60) and that it may be generated by a pseudo-
random number generator (see [12] vol. 2, p. 857). There is no minimum length, and
no guidelines how and when to choose the PIN.
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We suggest that devices that display a PIN that the user has to enter on the other
devices do not use a fixed PIN and always choose the PIN using a good random
number generator. User generated PINs should be verified by devices to be at least
20 bit with 1 as the most significant bit, and devices should not accept the same
PIN twice in Passkey Entry mode. The Bluetooth standard could easily be updated
to include these guidelines without breaking compatibility to existing devices, unless
they use a fixed PIN.
Fixing Authentication Stage 1 Passkey Entry
The DH key exchange is run directly before the vulnerable authentication stage 1.
It results in an unauthentic key DHkey shared between the parties which know the
corresponding private DH parameters. So far, the DHkey is only used in authenti-
cation stage 2 and the following link key calculation, but not in authentication stage
1 with Passkey Entry. We suggest that this DHkey should be used in authenti-
cation phase 1 when Passkey Entry is used. Transmitting Nai/Nbi only encrypted
with DHkey would prevent the attack discussed in this chapter. A passive observer
could not decrypt Nai/Nbi, and thus could no longer determine the PIN in a pas-
sive attack. Adding this change to a new Bluetooth specification would remove the
reused-PIN vulnerability for new Bluetooth devices connecting to each other.
However, guessing a fixed PIN would still be possible with an average of ten at-
tempts, as described by Lindell [99]. While this is obviously much more suspicious
for the user than two attempts, this is still a threat for automatically re-pairing
devices. Therefore, the above suggestions about choosing the PIN should also be
followed.
Using a standardized proven secure password authenticated key agreement protocol,
e.g., the IEEE P1363.2 BPKAS-SPEKE Protocol as described in Section 4.3.4, would
solve these issues completely, including the linearization attack on the PIN described
by Lindell [99]. However, such a change would be harder to implement compared to
the above suggestions, as it requires significant changes to the implementations of
the Bluetooth protocol.
5.2.5 Passkey Entry with Fixed PIN vs. Just Works
The security provided by Passkey Entry when used with a fixed PIN is the same
as that of Just Works: Active attackers will always succeed, and the devices cannot
prevent or detect the attack. However, the attack on Passkey entry requires two
runs of the pairing protocol, while the attack on Just Works requires only one.
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5.3 Related Work
5.3.1 Attacks on Bluetooth
Bluetooth 1.1 was the first major release. Bluetooth 1.2 was an update, and current
versions are still compatible to it. Bluetooth 2.0 added Enhanced Data Rate (EDR).
All these versions use the same insecure pairing process, which is examined in [84,
95, 138].
Bluetooth 2.1 introduced a new security architecture called Secure Simple Pairing, so
the old attacks do not work anymore. Lindell [99] described an attack on the Passkey
Entry pairing method that we implemented in this chapter. No implementation of
the attack was done. Lindell also proposed a fix of the protocol: Encrypting the
whole authentication stage 1 using DHkey. We created an implementation of the
attack and suggest a different fix to prevent the attack in Section 5.2.4.
The Numeric Comparison pairing method was proven secure in [100].
While Secure Simple Pairing is meant to provide protection against downgrading
attacks where an attacker replaces the capabilities for user input of the legitimate
devices, it does not resist a man-in-the-middle-attack when the attacking device only
supports the Just Works method as described by Hyppo¨nen [78]. Both legitimate
devices will pair to the attacker without requiring authentication. The attack is
called a no-input-no-output-attack, or NINO in short, because of the user input
capabilities of the attacking device. NINO attacks can be detected because no user
input is required for the pairing, and the legitimate devices know that the connection
is not authentic. Therefore, it can be considered as an attack on the way how the
security of Bluetooth connections is presented to the user in common devices. To
the best of our knowledge, the NINO attack was not implemented so far.
5.3.2 General Tools for Bluetooth Analysis
There are many tools for general purpose Bluetooth analysis. We evaluated them
regarding their applicability for attacking Passkey Entry, i.e., recovering the PIN
from an observed pairing or acting as man-in-the-middle during a live Passkey Entry
pairing session.
USB Protocol Analyzers (software or hardware) can be used to analyze the data
exchanged between a consumer Bluetooth USB dongle and the PC. However, it
does not help in attacking Secure Simple Pairing, since the pairing itself is executed
on the dongle and not in the Bluetooth driver on the computer. The same applies
to analysis of a Bluetooth driver within the operating system.
The Frontline FTS4BT [17] is a commercial closed-source wireless analysis tool in
USB dongle format that comes with a proprietary Windows software. It is designed
for companies developing Bluetooth products. It allows monitoring of Bluetooth
channels and sniffing of packets. Apparently, it is possible to manipulate certain
regular consumer Bluetooth dongles to make them work with the commercial wireless
analysis software of Frontline [115]. However, a pairing process cannot be monitored.
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GR-Bluetooth [140] was created by Spill and Ossmann in 2009 as a GNU Radio
implementation of the Bluetooth baseband layer. It is intended for experimentation
and teaching, but it does not include a complete software stack. Sniffing on packets
is supported, but there is no frequency hopping. We did not reuse any code from
this project.
None of these tools facilitate recovering the PIN during the Passkey Entry pairing
because they cannot be used to capture packets exchanged by other stations during
their pairing process.
Ubertooth One [19] is an open-source ARM Cortex-M3 processor-based USB dongle
with a CC2400 wireless transceiver. It supports Bluetooth monitoring mode, which
is the equivalent to Wi-Fi promiscuous mode, allowing the user to observe traffic
and read data sent over the air. Ubertooth One supports the basic data rate of 1
Mbit/s, but currently no packet injection or attacks on pairing, although it could be
possible with later revisions. The target audience of Ubertooth One are technically
interested persons.
5.4 Bluetrial: Bluetooth on USRP
While the attack described in Section 5.2 is well known since 2008, to the best of our
knowledge, the attack has never been implemented, such that a proof-of-concept
is still missing. The goal of our implementation is to close this gap. Lacking an
open source implementation of SSP and a truly programmable Bluetooth dongle
as described in Section 5.3.2, we implemented SSP and thus significant parts of
Bluetooth 2.1 in the GNU Radio software framework using the Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (URSP) as hardware. The implementation was created by Jian
Wang in his master thesis [151].
5.4.1 Testbed for the Implementation
Our „Bluetrial“ implementation is built on GNU Radio version 3.4. We did not use
the latest UHD (USRP hardware driver) in Bluetrial, as it was first released when
our project was already in development.
We use both the original USRP devices and newer USRP2 devices. For clarity, the
USRP device will be called „USRP1“ in the following. The USRP2 devices have
a Gigabit interface, while the USRP1 only offers a slower USB 2.0 interface. The
USRP1 is equipped with analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) supporting 64 million
samples per seconds (MS/s) with a 12 bit resolution, and digital-to-analog converters
(DACs) supporting 128 MS/s at 14 bit. The URSP2 has ADCs capable of 100 MS/s
at 14 bit and DACs capable of 400 MS/s at 16 bit. The URSP2 clearly outperforms
the USRP1 in terms of signal quality.
Despite the clearly superior specification of the USRP2, we used both types of
devices as the USRP1 has been available longer and is generally considered to be
more mature, i.e., less buggy. All tests were performed on both types of devices, so
we also created a comparison between the USRP1 and USRP2 in the process.
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The implementation involves two USRP1 and two USRP2 devices, and each one uses
a single RFX2400 daughterboard that is designed for the 2.4 GHz ISM frequency
band used by Bluetooth. During the measurements, each USRP is connected to one
PC.
5.4.2 Components of the Implementation
Our implementation covers the Bluetooth specification [12] parts required to execute
the attack described in Section 5.2. In particular, our implementation comprises all
steps of the pairing process, and the link manager, and physical layer.
Note that due to the limitations of the USRP1 and USRP2 hardware used in the
process, our Bluetrial devices work at a lower data rate and use a slower frequency
hopping scheme than Bluetooth itself. Therefore, our Bluetrial devices are currently
incompatible to off-the-shelf Bluetooth devices.
Bluetrial Baseband Layer
The baseband layer connects the Bluetrial Link Manager to the USRP. It consists
of a C++ and a python layer, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Bluetooth uses Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) to modulate and demod-
ulate, which is not supported natively by GNU Radio. We used Gaussian Minimum
Shift Keying instead, like the gr-bluetooth project [140], which showed that it works
with real Bluetooth packets. GMSK is a variant of GFSK in which the frequency
shift used for representing data is kept to a minimum. As described by [141], „the
Bluetooth modulation scheme is within this limit, so GMSK demodulation is a drop
in replacement for GFSK in this scenario.“
The DM1 packet shown in Figure 5.5 is a commonly used data type in the Bluetooth
link manager protocol, and we used it for all packets in Bluetrial. Its payload has
a length between 1 and 18 bytes, which includes the 1 byte payload header. At
the end of the payload, a 16 bit CRC is added. The whole DM1 packet payload is
encoded with 2/3 Forward Error Correction, which is a (15,10) shortened Hamming
code capable of correcting single bit errors and detecting double bit errors. The
packet is sent together with its 54-bit packet header.
Transmission errors are handled by the Link Manager Protocol (LMP) through the
automatic retransmission request (ARQ) scheme. Lost and broken packets are sent
repetitively until the sender receives an acknowledgment.
Secure Simple Pairing in Bluetrial
The implementation of SSP Passkey Entry is done according to a state machine for
all the phases discussed in Section 5.1, which are carried out on top of the Bluetrial
baseband. In each phase, both LM devices alternatively send packets, e.g., the
initiating LM starts the SSP by sending the IO request packets, then the other
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Figure 5.5: DM1 Packet Format [32]
device responses to this request. Then, the LM waits for the initiating LM to send
the P192 public key.
The SSP will fail upon a bad confirmation packet in Passkey Entry (Cai/Cbi), and
on a bad confirmation value for Diffie-Hellman key check in authentication stage 2
(Ea/Eb).
5.5 Evaluation of Bluetrial
In this section we evaluate our implementation and explore the limitations of the
USRP hardware. We start by evaluating the transmission quality for different trans-
mission rates of unidirectional communication between two USRPs. We then move
on to the transmission quality of bidirectional communication for different transmis-
sion rates and different frequency hopping rates. Finally, we evaluate the retrans-
mission rate for two USRP devices executing the SSP. Finally, in Section 5.6 we
evaluate the success rate of our Bluetrial implementation of the attack on Passkey
Entry to recover the PIN.
To evaluate the quality, we use the transmission error rate. The automatic retrans-
mission request (ARQ) mechanism in Bluetooth allows us to calculate the transmis-
sion error rate, because broken and lost packets will be resent until they are received
correctly. We count the number of packets actually sent s, and compare it to the
number of different packets intended to be transmitted t. In the following, we use:
retransmission rate = s−tt
Even with a very high retransmission rate the data will eventually be transferred
correctly. Dropped packets will always be counted like broken packets. High re-
transmission rates can therefore be considered as mostly a performance issue.
All parts described in the following were tested successfully according to Bluetooth
test vectors (see [12] vol. 2 p. 915ff) to verify the correctness of our implementation.
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5.5.1 Unidirectional Communication
We start with testing the reliability of communication between two USRPs using
Bluetrial. The Bluetrial kernel LMP generates DM1 packets, and sends them to the
baseband physical layer. Finally, the packet is sent over the air through the USRP
and is received by the other USRP (see Figure 5.4).
The test is carried out as follows: one USRP sends sequentially generated DM1 LMP
packets of type opcode 3 (with Payload length 2 bytes, plus 2 bytes CRC) and the
other USRP receives them. The DM1 packet type will be also used in SSP later.
The packets sent to the other USRP device are considered to be correct if there is
no error, or the forward error correction (FEC) is able to correct the error in the
packets, so that the CRC verifies correctly. For each data rate, 250 packets are sent
each round, and the results of twenty rounds are averaged. The resulting average
retransmission rate is used for our analysis.
The results are given in Figure 5.6, which show that the USRP1 best supports a
transfer speed around 900 kbit/s with a 1.4% retransmission rate. For the USRP1,
the retransmission rate grows above 15% below 500 kbit/s and above 1140 kbit/s.
The URSP2 clearly shows better results with a retransmission rate below 1% at
500 kbit/s and above, which is a promising result. Using these results, the following
tests focus on the middle range of the data rate, which is from 400 to 900 kbit/s.
156 Chapter 5. Excursus: Attacking Bluetooth 2.1+ in Passkey Entry Mode
1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0  8 9 0  k b p s  w i t h  F H 5 0 0  k b p s  w i t h  F H 7 3 0  k b p s  w i t h  F H 8 9 0  k b p s  w i t h o u t  F H 5 0 0  k b p s  w i t h o u t  F H 7 3 0  k b p s  w i t h o u t  F H
Ret
ran
smi
ssio
n ra
te (
%)
S l o t  t i m e  ( m s )
Slot time Frequency Hopping disabled Frequency Hopping enabled
(ms) 500 kbps 730 kbps 890 kbps 500 kbps 730 kbps 890 kbps
10 15.8% 9.4% 18.5% 78.1% 74.4% 80.4%
20 17.6% 11.9% 18.3% 38.2% 35.8% 46.8%
30 8.2% 2.8% 16.3% 23.6% 25.2% 38.5%
40 4.4% 1.8% 16.2% 20.1% 20.0% 33.7%
50 4.4% 1.7% 14.0% 17.0% 17.5% 34.0%
Figure 5.7: Retransmission Rate Depending on Data Rate, Interleaved Transmission,
two USRP1 [32]
The real Bluetooth protocol uses both transmitting and receiving on both devices,
so the previous result is only a lower bound on the retransmission rate of the com-
munication between two USRPs using Bluetrial.
5.5.2 Bidirectional Communication and Frequency Hopping
We have just seen the reliability of sending data from one USRP to another. Now
we will measure the retransmission rate when both devices alternate in transmitting
data, using a fixed time slot. The tests are executed with frequency hopping disabled
at first, and then enabled. All tests are executed between two USRP1 and two
USRP2, respectively.
When frequency hopping is enabled, the devices hop every other time slot, just as in
adaptive frequency hopping in Bluetooth. All results are computed on the average
of twenty runs, with 200 packets sent from both sides during each run. The results
are shown in Figure 5.7 for the USRP1 and in Figure 5.8 for the USRP2.
The results using the USRP1 show a higher retransmission rate than in the unidirec-
tional measurements done before. Frequency hopping increases the retransmission
rate, and even more so with high data rates and a smaller time slot. The results with
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USRP2 show a very low retransmission rate below 1% without frequency hopping,
but a higher retransmission rate than the USRP1 with frequency hopping. With
frequency hopping, the retransmission rate is always above 54%. Contrary to the
USRP1, the USRP2 is not affected much by the different data rates and time slot
lengths tested, both with and without frequency hopping.
Bluetrial could be compatible to Bluetooth (without EDR) in terms of data rate,
which is 1 Mbit/s. However, there is a large gap between Bluetrial and Bluetooth
with regard to the target time slot length of 625µs.
5.5.3 Secure Simple Pairing
In this test, two USRP devices execute an SSP session using Passkey Entry. The
test runs ten times each with different data rates and different frequency hopping
time slot lengths. The tests without frequency hopping use fixed time slots of 50 ms,
and the ones with frequency hopping use fixed time slots of 20 ms and 50 ms, which
are chosen according to the earlier test results. The result is shown in Figure 5.9
and Figure 5.10.
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With the USRP1, the middle data range is again the most reliable, and frequency
hopping increases the retransmission rate, although only by ca. 5% and not as much
as in previous tests. Again, the USRP2 shows better results than the USRP1 without
frequency hopping with a retransmission rate below 3% for the higher data rates,
and very high retransmission rates with frequency hopping greater that 63%.
5.6 Attacking Passkey Entry in Bluetrial
The attack against the SSP consists of two phases. The first phase is the eaves-
dropping on a SSP Passkey Entry pairing between two honest parties. The attacker
collects all the packets and computes the PIN, which is called the passive attack
phase. In the second phase, the attack becomes active by executing pairings with
the two legitimate devices as a man-in-the-middle. Since the later MITM attack
phase is exactly the same as two SSP pairing process at the same time, maybe with
added directional jamming or desynchronization, this is not tested here. The only
thing the attacker needs to make sure is that both pairing processes finish at the
same time, so that the legitimate user does not notice the attack.
Eavesdropping on Passkey Entry is tested with a time slot length of 50 ms between
two USRP1s executing a legitimate run of SSP Passkey Entry, and one USRP2
eavesdropping on the pairing process, which also computes the shared PIN between
the legitimate devices.
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The critical packets include the first two Diffie-Hellman key packets from both de-
vices containing PKax and PKbx, and the nonce values (Nai,Nbi) and the con-
firmation values (Cai, Cbi) from either the master device or the slave device during
all twenty rounds.
In total, 84 packets are sent which are interesting for the attacker: The PKax and
PKbx header packets and payload packets, and twenty rounds of Cai,Nai, Cbi, and
Nbi. PKax and PKbx must be obtained correctly, or the attack will fail. For each
Passkey Entry round, it is sufficient to capture one pair of (Cai,Nai) or (Cbi,Nbi),
since they both allow recovery of the i-th PIN bit. After the packet capture, the
shared PIN is calculated as described in Section 5.2. We tested different data rates
both with and without frequency hopping twenty times each.
The result of the tests are shown in Figure 5.11. The eavesdropper captures >94%
of the critical packets and succeeds in obtaining the PIN in at least 75% of the SSP
pairings for speeds >200 kbit/s even with frequency hopping.
The test result shows a high packet capture rate and a high success rate for the
Passkey recovery attack. A reason for this is the better performance of the USRP2
compared to the USRP1 without frequency hopping, which means that the USRP2
profits from retransmissions between the USRP1s. The attacker might not always
receive all packets correctly the first time they are sent, and he cannot request
retransmissions himself. With frequency hopping, the URSP1 performed better than
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the URSP2 (compare Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10), and thus, the attacker’s success
rate is reduced, but still very high.
5.7 Lessons Learned
5.7.1 Attack Evaluation
We have shown that the attack on Passkey Entry to recover the PIN is not only
theoretical, but works with reasonable reliability: 90% success rate at 890 kbit/s
with 50 ms frequency hopping. While it cannot yet be applied to Bluetooth devices
(1000 kbit/s, 625µs), it is only a matter of time until implementation issues will be
overcome or better hardware becomes available, with Ubertooth [19] and the Ellisys
BEX400 [57] being interesting candidates.
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5.7.2 Practical Hurdles
Here is a short description of challenges we encountered during the development of
Bluetrial:
Interdisciplinary Nature: The project requires a wide range of knowledge from
physics, math, software development, and cryptography, and a lot of patience when
developing software using beta software.
The documentation of GNU Radio is not as good as one would hope, and some
functions are not implemented at all, e.g., antenna selection, which caused us to
have poor results during earlier measurements.
The USRP platform is not a finished product and has its own difficulties. The
internal clock is not very precise. While the results shows the URSP2’s improvement
over the USRP1 and especially, the URSP2’s indifference to higher data rates, our
results when using frequency hopping with the USRP2 are significantly worse than
with the USRP1, which could be a bug in our code, in the library, or a hardware
issue in design or just in our devices. The FPGA core in the USRP is especially
difficult to use, with its unique programming paradigms centered around a hardware
description language.
Vendors of consumer Bluetooth devices rarely advertise the Bluetooth version
implemented and the security mechanisms supported. This made it hard to find
Bluetooth 2.1+ enabled devices supporting Passkey Entry in the first place early in
the project.
Frequency Hopping was introduced as a mechanism to make Bluetooth devices
resistant to interference. However, frequency hopping is sometimes misunderstood as
a security mechanism, which it is not. While it is a practical obstacle to manipulation
of Bluetooth communication, the hopping pattern itself is public information. In
fact, discoverable Bluetooth devices will send their internal clock value when queried,
and together with the address of the device the internal clock value gives the hopping
pattern.
Nevertheless, the retuning time on the USRP platform is an obstacle in making
our implementation compatible with real-world Bluetooth devices. A workaround
to frequency hopping could be jamming the 2.4 GHz band so that only a low
number of neighboring Bluetooth channels remains usable. After a short time, the
Bluetooth devices will only use the remaining few channels. The URSP2 has a
receive bandwidth of 25 MHz and is thus able to monitor 25 of the 79 Bluetooth
channels at once. With regards to interface bottleneck, leaving even fewer channels
usable seems advisable. So far, we have used the USRP2 as a jamming device,
jamming 25 out the 79 Bluetooth channels at once. By alternating the jamming
center frequency between channels 12, 27, and 42 every 100 ms, we were able to
prevent Bluetooth devices from using any of the channels 0–55, which we could
verify using the Frontline FTS4BT [17]. However, using a dedicated configurable
jamming device would be much easier, have much lower cost, and block all but 1–4
channels. While jamming devices for the 2.4 GHz band are already available as
consumer products, these are not configurable and mostly aim to disrupt all service.
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Another obstacle to Bluetooth compatibility of our Bluetrial project is the time
synchronization between the USRP and the target Bluetooth device.
Data Whitening in Bluetooth is also used as an optimization of the physical layer,
and not as a security mechanism. The whitening „key“ depends on the internal clock
value like the frequency hopping pattern, and this clock value will be sent by any
discoverable device when queried.
5.8 Conclusion
We have seen that a man-in-the-middle attack on the Passkey Entry method in
Bluetooth’s Secure Simple Pairing process is practical. In particular, in our im-
plementation the attack succeeded with a probability of 90%. While our Bluetrial
implementation of the attack is currently not interoperable with off-the-shelf Blue-
tooth devices, this is only an issue of the radio capabilities offered by the USRP
platform. It is only a matter of time until the retuning capabilities of this platform
will be improved, or a workaround is found, or new devices for Bluetooth analysis
appear. The attack should therefore be taken seriously and the countermeasures
suggested in this chapter should be taken into account.
As future work, the attack could be executed on a Ellisys BEX400 Bluetooth ana-
lysis device [57], which fulfills the retuning time requirement to capture all packets
even with frequency hopping at practical settings, i.e., with real customer Bluetooth
devices as targets for the attack. An evaluation of the re-pairing behavior of com-
mercial Bluetooth devices would be interesting, especially with wireless keyboards.
Bluetrial could be used to implement other attacks on Bluetooth 2.1, e.g., for a
man-in-the-middle-attack on the Just Works pairing method. Furthermore, custom
non-Bluetooth 2.4 GHz wireless keyboards are interesting candidates for security
analysis.
In the scope of the HealthNet project, this result means that we cannot rely on
the security mechanisms provided by Bluetooth. Therefore, we had to implement
additional security mechanisms regardless of the security mechanisms provided by
the transport layer in any of the technologies used in the project.
Chapter6
Time Synchronization on Wireless
Sensor Nodes
Wireless Sensor Nodes are inexpensive low-power devices which perform measure-
ments on environment data and which are able to communicate to each other. This
allows the deployer of the system to monitor a large area at low costs and with
no additional infrastructure, e.g., in a scenario to detect forest fires in rural areas.
In some scenarios, the nodes will be deployed in a hostile environment where they
cannot be physically maintained, i.e., their batteries cannot be charged or replaced.
Further details about wireless sensor networks are described in Section 2.3 of the
preliminaries chapter.
For many applications, the nodes in a network need to have a common time base,
e.g., to observe the path of a fast object through the network. However, production
spread and environment influences cause the clocks on different nodes to deviate from
each other. In other applications, transmissions between nodes are only performed
at regular intervals. When a node misses these intervals because of clock deviation,
it has to transmit or receive continuously, which greatly increases the power use of
the node, which disables the node prematurely. When sensors are used in metering
applications, an attacker can gain monetary profit from manipulating a sensor’s
clock. Therefore, a secure solution for time synchronization is needed. In scenarios
where the purpose of the wireless sensor network is to alert the operator of a single
event, the sensor network should hide its presence from observers by not exchanging
messages before the event, not even for time synchronization. Thus, the sensor nodes
should be undetectable to an observer during time synchronization.
In previous solutions for time synchronization [58, 62, 63, 98, 105, 143], all nodes
actively communicate in regular intervals, thus using additional energy. Also, during
active communication, the presence and the location of the sensor nodes can easily
be detected by an observer, which may violate the goal of the deployment.
The wireless sensors networks scenario imposes a number of challenges for a time
synchronization solution: Easy deployment of the nodes must be considered, i.e.,
the network graph is not known beforehand, and nodes may be added later. There-
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fore, pre-installing pairwise keys between neighboring nodes is difficult. Also, any
solution in this scenario must be energy conserving, i.e., because of the high costs of
communication, transmissions should be rare and short. There is very little memory
and storage space on a sensor node, and the computing abilities of the processors are
limited compared to modern PCs or mobile phones. Therefore, the use of security
mechanisms established in fixed computers is problematic.
In this chapter, we propose and evaluate a novel secure time synchronization protocol
that also provides privacy as it does not require individual nodes to transmit data.
Thus, it does not reveal the presence of the network to an observer, except for a single
node that may be placed at a distance to the other nodes of the network. Without
radio transmissions from the individual nodes, an attacker cannot locate and thus
cannot disable the sensor nodes by triangulating the radio signals of an idling sensor
network. The new protocol is called Secure Synchronization for Wireless Sensors
(SecSyWiSe).
This chapter deals with a different facet of privacy compared to the rest of this
thesis: Here, it is not personal information that is being protected; instead, the
existence of individual nodes is hidden. We show that our solution is at least as
fast and energy efficient as a well-established protocol when a reasonable selection
of ciphers and parameters is used, while achieving more security and privacy goals.
An implementation of our protocol was done as part of a diploma thesis [101] and
proves its functionality.
In the rest of this chapter, Section 6.1 gives an overview of our proposed solution.
Section 6.2 provides an overview of the challenges of using cryptographic mecha-
nisms on wireless sensor nodes and on related work of secure time synchronization
in wireless sensor networks. Section 6.3 explains the design and functionality of
our proposed protocol. Section 6.4 discusses the cryptographic primitives used and
the security and privacy features provided by the new protocol. Section 6.5 esti-
mates the performance of the protocol, provides a comparison to a state-of-the-art
time synchronization protocol for sensor networks, and shows results from an ac-
tual implementation of our protocol on TelosB sensor nodes. In Section 6.6, various
deployment options and potential optimizations of the protocol are discussed. The
conclusion is drawn in Section 6.7.
A part of this work has been published in [29]. The implementation was created by
Till Maas in his diploma thesis [101].
6.1 Our Approach
We assume a one-way communication scenario where a single source node, possibly
in a remote location, is able to broadcast authenticated and integrity protected mes-
sages to all sensor nodes of a network. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The
nodes do not require a communication channel back to the source node. The source
node shall not need to know if a certain node has received the message or how many
(if any) nodes have received the message at all. The source node uses considerably
more energy than the other nodes because it is transmitting data periodically such
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source node                              sensor nodes
Figure 6.1: Time Synchronization Scenario with External Source Node
that all the individual nodes are able to receive data, i.e., it requires great trans-
mission range. Our protocol does not stop regular nodes from mutually exchanging
data, except at the time and on the frequency used for time synchronization.
The basic working principle of our protocol is to achieve time synchronization on
a wireless sensor network by periodically distributing timestamps from a powerful
source node to all sensor nodes in the network independent of the timestamp format.
In particular, the protocol shall support continuous timestamps (i.e., timestamps
that always grow at the same rate) as well as non-continuous timestamps, such as
the time of the day without a date.
For our solution of time synchronization in wireless sensor networks, we assume
an adversary model where the attacker is able to receive all traffic, to transmit
messages with faked sender identity, and to block the channel. Furthermore, we
assume that any sensor node can be captured by an attacker, except for the source
node, either because it is physically protected or because it is not located in the
hostile environment.
Our protocol does not require nodes to have established keys with their neighbors.
A single static public key must be known to all nodes on the network. Our protocol
is immune to node capture. Incomplete or repeating timestamps are allowed; the
protocol preserves most security properties compared to linear growing timestamps.
The protocol accounts for dynamic networks: If nodes are added to an existing
network, they can use the periodic time synchronization message to synchronize
their clocks to the network without requiring additional messages for any nodes.
The functionality of the new protocol will be detailed after an overview of related
work.
6.2 Related Work
Synchronization protocols aimed at wired networks and large computers cannot be
used for sensor networks because they lack permanent Internet connectivity and have
to meet high constraints regarding energy efficiency and computational power. For
example, the standard time synchronization protocol for Internet-enabled devices
NTP [114] is not feasible for sensor networks because it requires certificate chains and
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Figure 6.2: A Successful Pulse Delay Attack on Time Synchronization
reliable two-way communication. As a consequence, designing time synchronization
protocols for sensor networks is an active research topic. Before discussing related
time synchronization protocols for sensor networks, we will first discuss attacks
specific to sensor networks and the use of security mechanisms in sensor networks.
6.2.1 Attacks on Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks
The following attacks are crucial for the design of a time synchronization protocol
for sensor networks. Other more general attacks have to be considered in general
protocol design [121].
In a node capture attack, the attacker is able to read all data stored on a node (in-
cluding keys) and to change its behavior. All secure time synchronization protocols
must be aware of nodes with knowledge of secrets who actively try to manipulate
the outcome of the protocol.
In a replay attack, the attacker transmits a message sent by a legitimate party that
he has recorded earlier. When the attacker suppresses the reception of the original
message, it is called a pulse delay attack, which is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Time
synchronization protocols must consider that authentic messages originally sent by
honest parties can be used for attacks.
6.2.2 Security Mechanisms for Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks
In the following, an overview of security mechanisms typically used in time synchro-
nization protocols in sensor networks is discussed as an introduction to related work,
which will be presented in Section 6.2.3. The overview also provides the motivation
for the use of digital signatures in our solution.
To prevent attacks, security mechanisms are required, which depend on the use of
keys. However, using keys in sensor networks is not trivial. If pairwise keys are
used, the nodes are required to share keys with each of their neighbors, or all other
nodes. Establishing these keys after deployment may lead to difficulties in hostile
environments as attackers may influence the key establishment process. Adding
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nodes to an existing network is another problem in both schemes, as the old nodes
do not have keys of the new nodes.
When only the keys with neighboring nodes are preinstalled, the nodes must be
deployed in a certain pattern so that they are within radio range of the nodes they
share keys with. This is also an obstacle to node movement. Pre-establishing keys
with all other nodes in the network is problematic because of the limited storage
capacity on the nodes. Also, when an attacker has captured such a node with all
these keys, it allows estimating the size of the network, and interaction with all other
nodes instead of a limited amount of nodes.
The asymmetric ciphers required for public-private-key schemes need greater amounts
of computation and memory than pairwise-key schemes. In general, they are often
considered as not fit for use with wireless sensor nodes. Therefore, protocols that
take attacks into consideration are usually based on symmetric cryptography and
explicitly avoid the use of asymmetric cryptography. These protocols use one of
two approaches: Message authentication codes (MACs) with pairwise keys or the
TESLA protocol [120]. The TESLA protocol is based on message authentication
codes with keys derived in a hash chain and delayed broadcast key disclosure.
The µTESLA protocol [122] is an adaption of TESLA for sensor networks, which
achieves message authentication with non-repudiation, which is a security goal typ-
ical for asymmetric signature schemes. However, µTESLA requires time synchro-
nization beforehand so that the MAC can be verified by the client with the right
key. After the key was disclosed, message authentication and non-repudiation no
longer hold, because the key used to generate the MAC is now public. Therefore, it
cannot be used for a secure time synchronization protocol as such.
The feasibility of signature verification on sensor nodes was shown, e.g., in the
estimate by Piotrowski et al. [125]: The 16 bit TelosB platform is capable of verifying
a 1024 bit RSA signature in 220 ms and verifying an ECDSA 160 signature in
1.02 seconds. Considering lifetime, 2 AA batteries (2500 mAh) will last 2.5 million
verifications with RSA 1024 bit and 543,916 with ECDSA 160 bit. We draw on
these results in both the protocol design itself and the evaluation of its performance:
Because public-private-key schemes offer security services not obtained by symmetric
key schemes, i.e., authentication of a message to a single sender by digital signatures,
instead of authentication of a message to both holders of the pairwise key in message
authentication codes, we pursue the design of a time synchronization protocol that
uses digital signatures.
Symmetric and asymmetric keys can be used for message integrity codes and en-
cryption, which can be used to thwart man-in-the-middle attacks. However, a node
capture attacker is able to use the keys known to the node, and thus, a man-in-
the-middle attack will succeed. When the attacker is able to impersonate a large
number of nodes, i.e., by acquiring access to their keys, a so-called byzantine traitor
attack allows him to convince the remaining nodes that his nodes are the honest
ones, and that the remaining nodes are attackers.
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6.2.3 Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks
Most of the time synchronization protocols suggested so far were not designed with
security in mind. The most well-known insecure protocols are the Reference Broad-
cast Synchronization [58], the Timing-Sync Protocol for Sensor Networks [62], and
the Flooding Time-Synchronization Protocol [105]. All of them are vulnerable to
node capture and impersonation [63, 104], i.e., a node that is controlled by an at-
tacker is able to impact the synchronization precision of neighboring nodes.
Only more recent protocols take countering certain attacks into consideration. Many
protocols designed with security in mind [63, 98, 143] use filters to avoid accepting
time synchronization messages that are inconsistent and therefore considered to be
either faked or delayed. This is done by defining a maximum derivation from the
local clock. A synchronization attempt that would change the local clock by a value
greater than the preset threshold will be aborted. While it can be used to thwart
any type of attack, this technique is often used to mitigate pulse delay attacks. Our
protocol reuses this idea and employs filters when continuous timestamps are used.
TinySeRSync [143] is a two-phase time synchronization protocol for TinyOS using
µTESLA. In the first phase, neighboring nodes establish a rough common time us-
ing pairwise synchronization protected with MACs. This requires preestablished
pairwise keys. TinySeRSync makes no attempt at preventing node capture attacks
in this phase. Pulse delay attacks on the first phase are limited by the use of a
maximum one-way transmission delay. However, there are no details given on how
it has to be chosen and how large the influence of an attacker can remain. After
the first phase (pairwise) was executed d times, the nodes have established a loose
time synchronization. The second phase is called global synchronization. Broad-
cast messages are used for synchronization that are authenticated with µTESLA.
Both phases are executed in intervals, with the pairwise phase being executed d
times before each global synchronization. Pulse delay attacks on the second phase
are claimed to be prevented by the synchronization established in the first phase.
However, by attacking the first phase, e.g., with node capture, an attacker could in-
troduce arbitrary data and other nodes would accept it as authentic data, especially
new nodes. We will compare the performance of our new protocol to TinySeRSync
using performance models later in this chapter.
With respect to the underlying network model, our protocol is most similar to the
insecure Flooding Time-Synchronization Protocol [105], which also uses continuous
unidirectional broadcast synchronization with time offsets for all nodes on the net-
work. However, the Flooding Time-Synchronization Protocol does not provide any
security.
Ganeriwal et al. [63] proposed a number of time synchronization protocols with
security features: The Secure Pairwise Synchronization Protocol (SPS) requires
preshared keys or a secure way to establish keys, which limits its use in hostile
environments. The Lightweight Secure Group Synchronization (L-SGS) and Se-
cure Transitive Multi-hop Synchronization (STM) protocols are vulnerable to node
capture. The Secure Group Synchronization (SGS) protocol is vulnerable to node
capture if more than one third of the nodes are captured. The messages in the SGS
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protocols grow with the size of the network, making it infeasible for networks with
more than 15 nodes [63]. Also, any node can initiate a network-wide synchroniza-
tion, causing all other nodes to act, which enables attackers to drain the batteries
of the nodes in a denial-of-service attack. Using filters, the SPS, L-SGS, and SGS
protocols limit the effect of a pulse-delay attack to four times the regular synchro-
nization error, and the STM protocol limits the effect of a pulse-delay attack to
twice the regular synchronization error [63].
Li et al. [98] propose a protocol that relies on pairwise keys and on nodes observing
their neighbors’ synchronization runs. It is able to detect misbehaving nodes, if at
least two thirds of the nodes are honest. Pulse delay attacks are bound by a filter
in the range of tens of µs.
Rahman et al. [128] propose the use of bilinear pairing functions to establish pair-
wise keys for a time synchronization protocol, which reduces the key storage size.
However, their protocol is vulnerable to node capture attacks, and there is no imple-
mentation of the protocol. An implementation of the (unrelated) TinyTate pairing
scheme on a MICAz sensor node was performed by Oliveira at al. [117], who mea-
sured 30.21s per pairing computation.
As opposed to the protocols previously discussed, our protocol is not vulnerable
to node capture (unlike [58, 62, 63, 98, 105, 128]) except for one node and it does
not require prior time synchronization (unlike [143]). Additionally, our protocol
supports non-continuous time stamps, which is not addressed in previous solutions
at all.
6.3 Proposed Solution
After an introduction to the scenario, the attacks and the security mechanisms in
sensor networks, and the previous solutions for time synchronization, we will now
describe our solution, which is called Secure Synchronization for Wireless Sensors
(SecSyWiSe).
6.3.1 Requirements and Scenario
The following security and privacy goals are required for a good time synchronization
protocol:
Sec-1: A sensor node shall not accept synchronization messages manufactured by
anyone but the legitimate source node (Authentication).
Sec-2: Captured nodes may not influence the outcome of the time synchroniza-
tion (Authentication) with exception of the source node.
Sec-3: The synchronization messages shall be protected against manipulation,
replay, and delay (Integrity).
Pri-1: An observer shall not be able to detect individual sensors nodes (Unde-
tectability) with exception of the source node.
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Also, as a practical goal, the synchronization process shall not amplify denial-of-
service attacks, e.g., it should recover quickly from a blocked channel.
6.3.2 Protocol Description
The source node is in possession of a private signature key. All nodes in the sensor
network are in possession of the corresponding signature verification key. The source
node periodically broadcasts time synchronization messages in fixed intervals to all
clients. Each of these messages m contains an ID to identify the source node, a
timestamp tsp, a counter value c, and a digital signature sigs over the hash of tsp
and c computed with the private signature creation key s of the source node:
m = (ID, tsp, c, sigs(h(tsp|c)))
The time stamp tsp is chosen such that it becomes current at the end of the trans-
mission of the message.
Let ∆sig be the time needed for generating the signature. Let ∆prep be the delay
for preparing the transmission and let δwave be the wave propagation delay between
the source node and a sensor node.
In the following, we assume that the source node starts transmitting m at T1 and
finishes at T2 (see Figure 6.3). The source node must start preparing the new syn-
chronization message at T0 such that the packet will be ready for transmission by
T1. T0 must be chosen such that:
T0 < T1−∆sig −∆prep
At T0, the source node performs the following actions:
1. Increase the message counter c by one.
2. Set tsp to be the timestamp of T2.
3. Calculate sigs(h(tsp|c)).
4. Assemble packet m = (tsp, c, sigs(h(tsp|c))).
5. Prepare the MAC layer for transmission.
6. Wait for T1.
7. Push message m to the channel with sufficient transmission power so that all
nodes on the network are able to receive it directly.
The counter value c is increased by the source node with every message sent. The
protocol uses a continuously increasing counter for each message that is included
and signed in every synchronization message. It allows for using more flexible data
formats for the timestamps, i.e., they may repeat or decrease. In applications that
use a continuously growing timestamp, the counter is not necessary, as the timestamp
itself is always increasing and can thus be used as a counter. The counter must be of
sufficient size such that it will not wrap around during the lifetime of the network.
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Network Synchronization Interval
Lifetime 10 seconds 1 minute 1 hour 1 day
1 day 14 11 5 -
1 month 19 16 10 5
1 year 22 20 14 9
3 years 24 21 15 11
10 years 25 23 17 12
100 years 29 26 20 16
1000 years 32 29 24 19
Table 6.2: Counter Size in Bit Requirement Depending on Network Lifetime
tsp=T2        sign           prep   wait
T0                                     T1  T2                                    source time T
m
=tsp,c,sig
s (h(tsp|c)))
t3                  receiver time t
verify    adjust by δclock {δwave
{Δsig        Δprep
at t3: δclock = t3T2
{
Figure 6.3: Timeline for Broadcast Synchronization to T2. The source node starts
creating the new message m at T0, starts sending m at T1 and finishes
sending m at T2. The receiver node has finished receiving m at t3.
E.g., when a new time synchronization message is sent every minute, a 24 bit counter
would last longer than 10 years (see Table 6.2). The clients will only accept messages
with a counter value greater than their internal counters.
The individual nodes intending to synchronize their clocks must already be listen-
ing when the synchronization message is pushed on the channel. All nodes will
receive the same signal at almost the same time, only limited by wave propagation
differences.
After receiving the message, the individual nodes will start to verify the message
m. The recipients will accept messages that contain a higher counter value than the
last message they received, as well as a valid signature over the timestamp and the
counter. Filters to prevent pulse delay attacks can be applied when the timestamp
is continuous.
To achieve greater accuracy, the difference δclock between the client’s own clock
and the freshly received signal must be calculated immediately after receipt of the
timestamp, i.e., before the signature is verified. This will ensure that the signature
verification time does not add to the synchronization error. Thus, different sensor
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hardware platforms that need a different amount of time for the verification will
synchronize to the same time. δclock will only be incorporated into the node’s system
time after signature and counter verification succeeded.
At t3 = T2+δwave, the message m has arrived at the receiver and is being processed
as follows:
1. Extract the timestamp tsp from the message m and compute the clock differ-
ence δclock = t3− tsp+ δwave.
2. Extract the ID from the message m and abort if it does not correspond to the
trusted source node.
3. For applications that use a continuous time format, abort if δclock exceeds a
threshold value (filter).
4. Extract the counter c from the message m, verify that the received counter c
is greater than the local counter and abort if the verification fails.
5. Extract the signature sigs(h(tsp|c)) from the message m, verify the signature
sigs(h(tsp|c)), and abort if the verification fails.
6. Set the local counter to c.
7. Adjust the local time by δclock.
The synchronization error is going to be in the order of δwave = t3− T2. The wave
propagation delay δwave between the source node and a sensor node is going to be
around 1 µs per 300 meter according to the speed of light. This delay can always
be predicted for a single node when its location is known. In some scenarios, it
can be predicted to be similar for all nodes in the network, e.g., if the source node
is located far away from a small network. In these cases, a signal for T2 + δwave
could be transmitted at T2 to increase the precision. Although it does not affect
the precision of the synchronization between the nodes, it increases the precision of
the synchronization between the nodes and the source time.
The internal counter must not be changed by the client before verifying the signature.
Otherwise, an attacker could increase the node’s counter, thus preventing the node
from synchronizing again in the near future. The internal counter must not be
changed after the client has set its clock, but right before it. Otherwise, an attacker
with the ability to abort the operation, e.g., by causing an interrupt or restarting
the node, would be able to replay the last message. Therefore, the only correct order
of action for the receiver regarding the counter corresponds to the steps 4.–7. in the
protocol description.
The counter starts at 0 for both the source node and the receiver nodes when they
are newly deployed at the same time. The counter may be set to 0 in new nodes
if they are to be added to a network where the presence of an attacker can be
excluded until the next synchronization happens. If nodes are to be added in a
hostile environment, the counter must be set to a value slightly larger than the one
in use at the time of deployment. If the source node fails and has to be replaced the
counter on the new source node must start at a value at least as big as the last one
used.
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6.4 Discussion of the new Protocol
After an overview of the functionality of our new protocol SecSyWiSe, we will now
discuss how it can be implemented and how it achieves the desired security and
privacy goals.
6.4.1 Using Cryptographic Primitives
When using asymmetric signatures, an attacker that can read a receiving node’s
internal data cannot impersonate the source node. An attacker that is able to
physically modify a receiving node cannot achieve more than to convince this single
node that messages sent by himself are legitimate.
Messages sent by the source node are authenticated by the use of digital signatures.
Therefore, the nodes must be able to perform asymmetric signature verification. As
the source node must transmit all synchronization messages, the hardware of the
source node may be designed to be more powerful than regular nodes, e.g., it may
have additional batteries and/or a more powerful CPU, or a power supply connected
to the electrical grid.
The asymmetric keysize must be chosen sufficiently large such that an attacker
cannot obtain the private signature key, but small enough so that the signature
handling is feasible on the sensor hardware. The actual keysize is left to the appli-
cation developer and depends on the selection of sensor hardware and the security
and lifetime requirements. The NIST considers 2048 bit for RSA and 224 bit for
ECDSA sufficiently secure through 2030. [26].
In our solution, only a single key must be stored on the individual nodes, which is
the public key of the source node. Storing a single public key is feasible because only
a single 2048 bit RSA modulus and a public exponent has to be stored. Usually, a
short verification key will be used, which can be as small as 17 bit without harming
security [37], i.e., 216 + 1 = 65537. Typical sensor nodes offer between 128 kB
(MICA) and 1 MB (TelosB) flash memory.
The public key must be stored in the clients before deploying them. This can be
done when first installing the software on the sensor nodes by the deployer. If the
private key is not compromised, there is no need to ever change the public key on
the sensor nodes. If the source node fails and has to be exchanged, the new source
node must use the same private key as the old source node used before.
6.4.2 Security Properties
In this section we examine how our protocol prevents certain attacks and how the
security goals described in Section 6.3 are met.
Sec-1: The source node calculates a digital signature on the next timestamp and
counter value that will be sent to the other nodes. An attacker cannot create a
valid signature as he does not have access to the private signature key. There are
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some attacks on authentication that are specialized on the wireless networks. We
will show that none of them defeat our protocol:
Our protocol is not vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle-attack, as the signature veri-
fication will fail on the receiver’s side when the message contents has been changed.
Also, a man-in-the-middle-attack will be more difficult to implement against our pro-
tocol compared to other protocols in practice, as the nodes do not actively forward
any information.
The wormhole attack does not apply to our protocol, as all the messages are sent
directly in broadcast and will not be routed at all.
Sec-2: In the proposed protocol, no secret information can be extracted from the
individual nodes, thus a node capture attack does not help the attacker to create
messages that will be accepted by other nodes. Also, individual nodes are not
required for a successful protocol run of any other node. Nodes trying to impersonate
the source node cannot create correct message signatures, so even a single remaining
node will be able to synchronize to the source node. Thus, our protocol is secure
against node capture as long as the source node remains uncompromised, which is
a requirement.
Sec-3: The counter in the protocol provides protection against an attacker replaying
old messages from previous synchronization runs (i.e., setting the clock back). If the
node has already received a newer message, it will not accept old messages. This
holds regardless of the message contents, i.e., also for non-continuous time formats.
An attacker that is able to block the radio reception of a sensor node over a sufficient
period of time would be able to make the sensor node accept old messages sent by
the legitimate source node after the start of the radio blocking in a pulse delay attack
as shown in Figure 6.2. In applications that use a continuous time format, the use
of filters on the nodes can provide some protection against pulse delay attacks. As
filters are a countermeasure that is based on timing precision itself they must be
handled with care, i.e., the threshold should be determined after a thorough evalua-
tion of the clock offsets experienced on the device under similar conditions without
the presence of an attacker before the nodes are deployed in a hostile environment.
Also, the filter has to be deactivated for the first synchronization of a client, i.e.,
when its internal counter is zero.
In applications that use a continuous time format, the use of filters on the nodes can
provide some protection against pulse delay attacks. As filters are a countermeasure
that is based on timing precision itself they must be handled with care, i.e., the
threshold should be determined after a thorough evaluation of the clock offsets ex-
perienced on the device under similar conditions without the presence of an attacker
before the nodes are deployed in a hostile environment. Also, the filter has to be
deactivated for the first synchronization of a client, i.e., when its internal counter is
zero.
Pri-1: Not requiring the receiving nodes to transmit any messages for our protocol
facilitates undetectability: An attacker is unable to detect the nodes, and thus the
attacker cannot count or locate the nodes.
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The source node does not need to be in the transmission range of the receiving
nodes. Therefore, if the source node is capable of a greater signal power, it may be
placed at a distance to the receiving nodes. This is particularly interesting if the
network itself is located inside a hostile environment, as then the source node may
still be located in a controlled environment (see Figure 6.1) to prevent node capture
attacks.
After a denial-of-service-attack using a blocked channel, the node’s clock will return
to the authentic time at the next legit synchronization after the channel is unblocked.
Thus, our protocol can recover from a channel blocked over a finite amount of time.
An attacker might also introduce a great number of arbitrary synchronization mes-
sages with valid counters and invalid signature data during a synchronization in-
terval. The receiver would then have to determine which synchronization message
is the valid one through a series of signature verifications. This would result in a
quick exhaustion of resources for the node. This can be avoided by verifying only
one signature per synchronization interval, which reduces the effect of the attack
from resource exhaustion to reduced clock precision.
The protocol meets the required security and privacy goals. Although no specific
timestamp format is required, the effective use of filters to limit pulse delay attacks
depends on the use of a continuous time format. To sum up, our protocol resists
more attacks than other protocols [63, 98, 128, 143] when continuous time formats
are used and allows nodes to skip synchronization phases to conserve energy. With
a non-continuous time format, pulse delay attacks cannot be defeated. So far, non-
continuous time formats have not been considered in other protocols at all.
6.5 Performance of the new Protocol (SecSyWiSe)
In this section, the performance of the new protocol will be evaluated. We will first
estimate the performance of our protocol using a new model. Then we compare
it to another protocol, which we model as well. Later, we describe and evaluate
our implementation of the cryptographic operations and of the new protocol. The
implementation was created by Till Maas in his diploma thesis [101]. Finally, the
synchronization precision of the implementation is examined. The performance is
always estimated and measured in time and energy needed.
In the following, a Crossbow TelosB device (also known as T-Mote Sky) is used,
which is a popular open source platform in research. It is available since 2005 at
prices around 130 e. Both version are equipped with an 8 MHz MSP430F1611
microcontroller, 10 kB RAM, a CC2420 250 kbit/s IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee radio with
an onboard antenna, 48 kB program flash memory, and an 1 MB measurement serial
flash [50].
The hardware is very limited because it is optimized to use little energy. General
computing only causes a 1.8 mA current draw in active mode, and 5.1 µA in sleep
mode (board). The radio unit draws 23 mA current when receiving, 21 µA in idle,
and 1 µA in sleep mode. The radio range is claimed to be 20-100 meters depending
on the conditions. The sensor node is powered by 2x AA batteries.
176 Chapter 6. Time Synchronization on Wireless Sensor Nodes
6.5.1 Modeling the Performance of the Protocols
The performance of the new protocol (SecSyWiSe) is compared to TinySeRSync
[143] (described in 6.2) regarding node workload and energy costs of a synchro-
nization run. TinySeRSync was chosen because it comes closest to our protocol
regarding its security goals, and because an implementation of the protocol is freely
available [144]. We used the implementation to derive a detailed specification of
TinySeRSync, e.g., the data types.
The goal of the performance model is a comparison of the time and energy needed
for time synchronization in both protocols. Our performance model is based on a
number of assumptions:
• All nodes are able to access the channel immediately, i.e., there is no waiting
for a free time slot.
• There are no transmission errors or collisions.
• Filtering to prevent pulse delay attacks takes neither time nor energy.
• Calculating and verifying MACs or a hash function takes neither time nor
energy.
• Waking up from sleep mode or returning to it takes neither time nor energy.
• Sleep mode consumes neither time nor energy.
• Messages are not padded or split into different packets.
• We do not consider the costs of the source node in our protocol, as it is a base
station.
These assumptions are made to simplify a comparison between two protocols. Many
of the operations not regarded are performed by both protocols equally, some make
communication less costly. Therefore, the results are influenced in favor of the
TinySeRSync protocol, as it is more communication intensive. Of course, the results
will be a lower bound on the actual time and energy needed by a real implementation.
We consider a global synchronization run, i.e., all nodes synchronizing to a source
node at the same time. The costs are estimated for a single node in one global syn-
chronization interval, i.e., the period between the end of one global synchronization
and the end of the next global synchronization. In the following, all computationally
expensive tasks and protocol messages are discussed.
The same data types as in the TinySeRSync implementation [144] are used: A 16
bit Node ID and a 32 bit timestamp. In addition, we use a 32 bit update counter
for our protocol.
The overhead per packet in TinyOS, i.e., the size of all headers and trailers, was
estimated as 288 bits [70]. This value is used in the following calculations.
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Performance Model of Our Protocol (SecSyWiSe)
A source node directly broadcasts a global synchronization message m to all nodes.
The costs of the source node is not considered in the following, because it is a base
station. Each sensor node must receive the message m once per global synchro-
nization interval. The size of m and the effort associated with it is computed as
follows:
• The message m contains ID, timestamp, counter, and signature. The total
size of m including the overhead is 368 bits plus the size of the signature. The
size of the signature depends on the signature scheme used, and varies from
320 in ECDSA 160 to 2048 bits in RSA 2048.
• Each node has to verify a signature by calculating a hash function on a 64 bit
input and has to perform a cipher-dependent public key operation.
• No message is sent by the nodes.
The total amount of bits sent s and received r by each node during one global
synchronization interval is summarized to:
s = 0 (6.1)
r = 368 + |signature| (6.2)
Performance Model of TinySeRSync
TinySeRSync depends on two parameters: the number of neighbors of each node
n and the number of pairwise synchronizations per global synchronization d. The
value of n depends on the network graph, i.e., the deployment of the sensor nodes.
In the original TinySeRSync paper [143], d = 2.5. In the implementation, it is set
to d = 20. Because the size of d has a strong influence on the performance, our
protocol will be compared to it with both values of d. Note that our protocol does
not depend on d or the number of neighbor nodes n.
Pairwise synchronization phase: In each of the d pairwise synchronizations between
two global synchronizations, each node sends a request message p1 to all of its
neighbors. This message includes the ID and a timestamp. The total size of p1 is 480
bits [144]. Each neighbor answers with a response message p2, which includes the IDs
and three timestamps. The total size of p2 is 544 bits [144]. As a consequence, in each
pairwise synchronization round, each node sends and receives (480 + 544)n = 1024n
bits.
Global synchronization phase: The global synchronization message g1 is protected
with µTESLA. The total size of g1 is 576 bits [144]. The key is disclosed with key
disclosure message g2 shortly after g1 was sent. The total size of g2 is 352 bits
[144]. Both messages are rebroadcasted by all other nodes. Thus during global
synchronization each node sends g1 and g2 once and receives g1 and g2 n times each.
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operation energy [mJ] time [ms]
transmit 1 bit 0.000153 0.04
receive 1 bit 0.000226 0.04
verify RSA 1024 2.700 220.0
verify RSA 2048 12.20 1000.0
verify ECDSA 160 12.41 1020.0
verify ECDSA 224 33.55 2760.0
Table 6.3: Measurements of Operational Costs on TelosB Platform by Piotrowski et
al. [125]
This amounts to sending 576 + 352 = 928 bits and receiving (576 + 352)n = 928n
bits in each global synchronization round.
The total amount of bits sent s and received r by each node during one global
synchronization interval is summarized to:
s = (n · |p1|+ n · |p2|) · d+ |g1|+ |g2| (6.3)
= (n · 480 + n · 544) · d+ 576 + 332
= 1024nd+ 928
r = (n · |p1|+ n · |p2|) · d+ n · |g1|+ n · |g2| (6.4)
= (n · 480 + n · 544) · d+ n · 576 + n · 352
= 1024nd+ 928n
Each node receives 2n+ 2nd messages per global round, with a total size of (480 +
544)nd + (576 + 352)n = 1024nd + 928n bits. Each node has to calculate 3n + 1
MACs with 416dn+112n+112 bit input. No hashing is done (beyond that involved
in MACs).
Calculating Modeled Results
Using the performance model and benchmark results from actual measurements
of basic operations, we can calculate a lower bound of the costs of running both
protocols on real hardware. For the costs of public key operations on the TelosB
platform, as well as transmission and reception, we rely on the data presented by
Piotrowski et al. [125] (see Table 6.3). An average transmission level of the TelosB
is assumed. Other authors estimate the costs of communication up to five times
higher [110]. To avoid a bias for our protocol, we favor TinySeRSync and use the
lower values. For the same reason calculating a MAC takes zero time and energy in
our model, as MACs are only used in TinySeRSync.
With Table 6.3 and equations 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, our protocol can be compared to
TinySeRSync regarding energy and workload per node per global synchronization
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Protocol neighbors n energy [mJ] time [ms]
SecSyWiSe (RSA 1024) any 3.01 225.6
SecSyWiSe (RSA 2048) any 12.75 1009.7
SecSyWiSe (ECDSA 160) any 12.57 1022.8
SecSyWiSe (ECDSA 224) any 33.73 2763.3
TinySeRSync (d=2.5) 2 2.50 52.1
TinySeRSync (d=2.5) 6 7.22 148.9
TinySeRSync (d=2.5) 10 11.94 245.6
TinySeRSync (d=2.5) 14 16.66 342.4
TinySeRSync (d=20) 2 16.09 338.8
TinySeRSync (d=20) 6 47.97 1009.0
TinySeRSync (d=20) 10 79.86 1679.2
TinySeRSync (d=20) 14 111.75 2349.4
Table 6.4: Modeled Global Synchronization Costs per Node
interval. The results are shown in Table 6.4, and plotted in Figures 6.4 (workload)
and 6.5 (energy use). Note that the values of RSA 2048 and ECDSA 160 overlap in
the plots because they are almost equally expensive in energy and workload.
Regarding the modeled time consumption as shown in Figure 6.4, TinySeRSync is
the fastest solution for d = 2.5, n < 9. SecSyWiSe with RSA 1024 is faster than
TinySeRSync with d = 20 for any n. SecSyWiSe with ECDSA 160 and RSA 2048
are faster than TinySeRSync with d = 20, n ≥ 6. SecSyWiSe with ECDSA 224 is
the slowest solution unless for d = 20 and unreasonably dense networks (large n).
Regarding the modeled energy consumption as shown in Figure 6.5, SecSyWiSe with
RSA 1024 is the most energy efficient solution for d = 2.5 and any n ≥ 3. With
RSA 1024, ECDSA 160, and RSA 2048, SecSyWiSe is superior to TinySeRSync for
d = 20 and any n. With ECDSA 224, SecSyWiSe outperforms TinySeRSync only
for n ≥ 4 and d = 20, or for unreasonably dense networks (large n and d = 2.5).
We can see that the performance of TinySeRSync depends largely on the density
of the network, i.e., the amount of neighbors the pairwise synchronization is done
with n and how often it is performed per global synchronization d. Our protocol is
independent of any such variables and will not cause additional workload or energy
use on the nodes for any network density. With RSA 1024, our protocol is more
energy efficient than TinySeRSync and still feasible within 225.6 ms per synchro-
nization. ECDSA 160 and RSA 2048 perform almost identically, using less energy
than TinySeRSync for growing values of d and dense networks. However, ECDSA
160 and RSA 2048 take more time in most combinations of d and n. ECDSA 224
requires 2763 ms per synchronization and will use more energy than TinySeRSync
in most combinations of d and n.
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Figure 6.4: Modeled Global Synchronization Workload per Node Depending on the
Number of Neighbors n
Figure 6.5: Modeled Global Synchronization Energy use per Node Depending on the
Number of Neighbors n
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The performance model used assumptions and energy usage data that both fa-
vor TinySeRSync, but the energy use results of SecSyWiSe are in the range of
TinySeRSync. TinySeRSync has better workload results.
Considering the signature scheme selection for SecSyWiSe, our performance evalua-
tion suggests that the RSA signature scheme is a better choice than ECDSA. In the
RSA signature scheme, signature verification is faster and less energy demanding
than signature creation. To speed up signature verification and to reduce the power
consumption associated with it, short public exponents should be used, i.e., those
with a low Hamming weight [37]. While signature creation remains quite costly
in RSA, signature verification is faster than in any other well-researched, feasible
signature scheme. In particular, signature verification is more costly with ECDSA
than with RSA on the same security level. For equal performance, an inferior secu-
rity level has to be chosen with ECDSA, i.e., on a TelosB node, a 160 bit ECDSA
verification is a bit slower than a 2048 bit RSA verification [125], while offering a
security level of 80 instead of 112 bit [26].
6.5.2 Implementation Results
SecSyWiSe was implemented by Till Maas in his diploma thesis [101]. This section
is based on his results.
Implementation Details
SecSyWiSe was implemented using nesC and TinyOS 2 on TelosB motes [50], which
very described earlier in Section 6.5.
The implementation of the cryptographic operations is based on TinyECC, which
was ported to TinyOS 2. The ECDSA signature scheme, the SHA1 hash functions,
and the arithmetic functions for large numbers from TinyECC were used. New
implementations of the RSA signature scheme, the square-and-multiply algorithm,
the Chinese remainder theorem, an efficient square algorithm, and the Montgomery
multiplication scheme [91] were created. Key generation was not part of the bench-
marking process. The RSA keys were generated using OpenSSL on a PC. The
ECDSA keys were generated on the motes using TinyECC.
An internal 32768 Hz counter was used as clock, which is the counter with the
highest frequency available on TelosB. TelosB supports packet sending with up to
102 byte of payload, which is too small for RSA 1024, 1536, and 2048. Therefore,
for these signature algorithms, the payload had to be split into multiple packets.
Measurement Setup
A PicoScope 5204 USB oscilloscope was used for the measurements, which supports
up to 1 billion samples per second.
To measure electric energy E, a shunt resistor RShunt = 3.9Ω (1% tolerance) was
soldered into the battery cable powering the TelosB. The voltage UShunt over this
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shunt resistor was measured using one channel of an oscilloscope. Thus, the electric
current can be computed:
IShunt =
UShunt
RShunt
(6.5)
The oscilloscope provides a 787.4 µV accuracy in measuring voltages, resulting in a
201.9 µA current accuracy when using RShunt.
To measure the time ∆t required for a synchronization run, the LED0 was unsoldered
from the TelosB board, and the second channel of the oscilloscope was connected to
its pins. When the LED is switched on by software at the start of an operation and
switched off at its end, a precise measurement of the time ∆t used is possible. The
oscilloscope was operated at 1 million samples per second, well below its specified
maximum of 1 billion samples per second, to avoid USB bottleneck issues.
The electric energy used during an operation is computed as such:
E = UBat · IShunt ·∆t = UBat · UShunt
RShunt
·∆t (6.6)
The voltage UBat provided by the batteries was initially measured during the com-
putations, but it proved to remain mostly constant (between 2.6 and 2.7 V ), so no
continuous measurements of the TelosB’s power supply were required to measure
the electric energy.
All measurements were executed 1000 times. In the following, the results are the
arithmetic averages of 1000 measurements each.
Signature Verification
Before measuring a full protocol run of SecSyWiSe, we measured its most complex
operation, which is the signature verification. The results for signature verification
with various ciphers and key sizes in our extended implementation of TinyECC are
shown in Table 6.5. The results are plotted in the Figures 6.6 and 6.7, where our
results are drawn in red and the estimates by Piotrowski et al. [125] are drawn in
blue.
Compared to the values from Piotrowski et al. [125], our implementation on real
hardware takes many times more time to execute than anticipated based on the
evaluation. The energy consumption also does not match the values from [125], but
is not as far off and, depending on the cipher, our implementation of ECDSA 160 is
more energy efficient.
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Cipher Energy [mJ] Workload [ms]
RSA 512 1.41 485
RSA 1024 4.87 675
RSA 1536 11.18 3746
RSA 2048 17.72 5919
ECDSA 128 10.67 3755
ECDSA 160 10.72 3642
ECDSA 192 16.46 5567
Table 6.5: Measurements of Signature Verification Costs
Figure 6.6: Measurements of Signature Verification Workload in our Implemen-
tation (red) and Estimate by Piotrowski et al. [125] (blue)
Figure 6.7: Measurements of Signature Verification Energy use in our Implemen-
tation (red) and Estimate by Piotrowski et al. [125] (blue)
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Regarding different ciphers with key lengths on equivalent levels of security [26],
RSA 1024 clearly outperforms ECDSA 160, using only 45% of its energy and 19% of
its time. RSA 1536 outperforms ECDSA 192, using 68% of the energy and 67% of
its required time. ECDSA 192 is a bit faster and less energy consuming than RSA
2048. However, only ECDSA 224 would offer the same security level as RSA 2048
(according to [26]). In general, the similar results of ECDSA 128 and 160 raises
the question of possible optimizations in TinyECC. The results show that signature
verification is possible and feasible on TelosB.
Synchronization Effort per Node
The results for a synchronization run of the full protocol including message reception
are shown in Table 6.6 and Figures 6.8 and 6.9. The energy use and workload with
ECDSA 128, 160, and 192 (drawn green) is below that of RSA 1024, 1536, and 2048
(drawn blue). Only RSA 512 is able to outperform the ECDSA ciphers.
As expected, the results are worse than the values from the performance modeling
comparison done earlier. For the sake of a simplified comparison to another protocol,
some tasks required by both synchronization protocols were considered to cause no
effort at all, although in reality they do cause effort. This is especially a problem for
RSA 1024+ signatures, which have to be split into multiple packets, which causes
additional transmission overhead. Strangely, RSA 2048 outperforms RSA 1024 and
1536. As seen before, the results for ECDSA 128 and 160 are almost on the same
level.
Synchronization Precision
To measure the synchronization precision, we first examined the drift experienced
on our sensor nodes. The drift was determined to be 20 µss on one node that we
measured in five independent measurement series over the course of 36 hours. Each
time, we found no significant changes in drift measurement after 40 minutes. A drift
of 20 µss means that the clock will be off by 1s after 13.9 hours.
Examining the drift of four other sensor nodes revealed their drift to be 2, 6, 8, and
10 µss .
Table 6.7 shows the synchronization precision from the implementation. Depend-
ing on the cipher used during the synchronization process, the clock deviation is
between 9.44 and 18.4 ms. Using ECDSA ciphers, the deviation is lower. This is
due to the shorter packets, which facilitates a shorter time between reception of the
synchronization message and the adjustment of the clock.
The standard deviation was between 22.5 and 95.0 µs, which is in the order of the
resolution of the counter, which is 132768s = 30.5µs. This can be explained by the
out of phase quartz oscillation between two nodes.
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Cipher Energy [mJ] Time [s]
RSA 512 25.41 0.508
RSA 1024 482.17 10.090
RSA 1536 693.18 14.453
RSA 2048 443.52 9.035
ECDSA 128 199.65 3.929
ECDSA 160 193.79 3.816
ECDSA 192 280.11 5.520
Table 6.6: Measurements of Synchronization in our Implementation
Figure 6.8: Measurements of Synchronization Workload in our Implementation
Figure 6.9: Measurements of Synchronization Energy use in our Implementation
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Cipher Average [ms] Standard Deviation [µs]
RSA 512 18.38 32.0
RSA 1024 18.19 39.3
RSA 1536 18.20 47.6
RSA 2048 18.14 95.0
ECDSA 128 9.44 28.2
ECDSA 160 10.65 22.5
ECDSA 192 11.84 36.6
Table 6.7: Measurements of Clock Deviation in our Implementation
6.6 Deployment Options and Optimizations
Our protocol allows for a lot of tuning to the special needs of individual applications,
even beyond wireless sensor networks.
6.6.1 Key Sizes and Network Lifetime
We consider 2048 bit RSA signature verification to be feasible for TelosB motes,
but different applications and platforms may benefit from different keysizes or even
other signature generation and verification functions. If no long-term security is
required, e.g., if the deployment is limited in lifetime, the use of 512 bit RSA allows
a 443.5225.41 = 17.5 times longer battery life (for time synchronization alone) compared
to the use of 2048 bit RSA (see Table 6.6).
6.6.2 Counter Logging
In applications that focus on data gathering with later oﬄine evaluation, pulse delay
attacks can be countered in another way than filters: The nodes shall record the
counter value of every accepted message together with their old internal time. The
source shall keep track of the messages it sent. After the sensor nodes (or the data
on them) are retrieved by the deployer, the log files can be used to detect pulse delay
attacks and to calculate the true time of the events recorded.
6.6.3 Client Synchronization Incidence
With continuous timestamps and a filter, the nodes may be allowed to decide them-
selves when they need to take part in the next time synchronization process. This
decision can be based on the clock skew experienced earlier, e.g., by ignoring one
more synchronization message than before if the clock offset is below a threshold
value, and one less (or none) if it is above another threshold value. Not synchroniz-
ing to every message achieves better energy efficiency at the costs of synchronization
precision. However, in applications with non-continuous timestamps, all nodes must
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listen to all synchronization messages and verify them because the tsp values are
unpredictable for the individual sensor nodes.
6.6.4 Source Node Synchronization Incidence
The time between two synchronization messages must be greater than the time re-
quired for the signature verification, and long enough not to clog the communication
channel and not to drain the batteries of the receiving nodes if they cannot decide
themselves whether to synchronize or not. Influencing factors are the accuracy de-
sired, the accuracy of the nodes’ internal clocks, the verification speed, and lifetime
considerations.
6.6.5 Communication Channel
The communication channel used for transmitting the synchronization messages can
either be a dedicated channel not used for other applications, or the regular com-
munication channel between the nodes. Dedicated channels may be used if special
hardware is available or if there is no communication between the receiving nodes,
e.g., radio controlled clocks in need of security. Message transmission over a regu-
lar communication channel requires a form of collision avoidance so that individual
inter-node communication will not interfere with time synchronization. Also, an
increased packet size sufficient to transmit the synchronization message in a single
packet helps to reduce the impact of certain denial of service attacks.
Low and medium frequencies in the kilohertz range may be used as a dedicated
channel because of the increased range and obstacle penetration, like the established
insecure public radio clock signals do, e.g., DCF77 operates on 77.5 kHz.
6.6.6 Broadcast Payload Types
Besides timestamps, other payloads may be distributed as well. This was briefly
discussed as non-continuous timestamps, which has implications on the security of
the protocol: Pulse delay attacks cannot be prevented without a timestamp in the
message. Therefore, the timestamp should not be removed, but additional payload
may be included. Application scenarios for a secure and privacy preserving broadcast
distribution protocol in a sensor network include certificate revocation, software
updates, and new rates for accounting and metering.
6.7 Conclusion
We have presented a protocol that allows for replay protected authentic and privacy
preserving distribution of timestamps in a one-way broadcast communication sce-
nario. An attacker cannot detect the nodes from observing the synchronizing process
alone; only the source node can be detected. This is unique for a time synchroniza-
tion protocol in sensor networks. Mobility is supported as long as the nodes remain
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inside the source node’s transmission range. The proposed protocol also scales very
well to large and dense networks, because no additional messages must be sent when
new nodes join a network. If the spatial size of the network increases, the source
node’s transmission power may need to be adjusted.
The protocol assumes the existence of a single source node that may not be captured,
that is able to create signatures, and that can transmit messages to all nodes on
the network. While this scenario is certainly not applicable to every sensor network
installation, it is feasible for networks of limited spatial size where a fixed power
source for the source node is available somewhere close the other nodes, e.g., indoor
applications, but also outdoor monitoring networks that use a gateway to a wired
network which provides a power source.
We have demonstrated that our protocol is energy efficient when compared to an-
other secure time synchronization protocol and causes a tolerable amount of work-
load on the sensor nodes, although the implementation could be improved. There-
fore, we conclude that security and privacy can be achieved even on such limited
hardware as an 8 MHz CPU with 10 kB RAM which is powered by two household
AA batteries. We have shown that the use of public key cryptography on compu-
tationally weak wireless sensor nodes with limited energy supply can be feasible in
certain scenarios.
Future work on time synchronization in wireless sensor networks includes improve-
ments of the implementation regarding the signature verification schemes. The clock
deviation after the synchronization can be reduced by anticipating the time needed to
receive the message, which was not included in the implementation. A modification
of the network layer to increase the maximum packet size would greatly improve the
performance of our protocol when the RSA signature verification scheme is used, as
this would prevent synchronization messages from being split into multiple packets.
The precision of the time measurements on the receiving sensor node can be im-
proved by having the node switch on one of its output ports at a certain point in
time. This output port can be connected to the oscilloscope, resulting in measure-
ments with a resolution of 75 ns instead of 30.5 µs. This will improve the results
for the synchronization precision, because they are currently in the order of the
measurement resolution for most signature verification schemes.
Chapter7
Conclusions
To conclude this dissertation, we will now recapitulate the main contributions, ex-
plain the improvements over related work, and provide an outlook for future work
to built on our results.
In the wireless roaming scenario described in Chapter 3, a mobile device is able to
access the Internet using a paid foreign network. The mobile device has a billing
relationship to its home network, which shares a roaming agreement with the foreign
network. The tariff for the service use is negotiated directly between the mobile
device and the foreign network without influence of the home network. The services
are paid by the mobile device during the service use.
Our solution provides novel privacy guarantees and security with only a minimum
additional delay to the connection setup. It is unique regarding its privacy features,
full cost transparency, and tariff recommendation and negotiation, which also en-
ables tariff transparency for users and tariff shaping for operators of wireless access
points. The solution consists of protocols for the connection setup, tick payment,
and clearing of the connection. It is implemented in a roaming client, a foreign
network daemon, and a home network authentication and clearing interface. The
roaming client suggests optimal tariffs out of those available on a per-connection
basis based on a novel tariff recommendation system, which is the first one applied
to a telecommunication system. The proposed solution is also unique as it allows
the user devices to act as relay stations (Hops) to improve the range of commercial
WLANs while retaining the privacy goals of the direct roaming scenario.
Future work in roaming includes an extension of the Hop roaming scenario to support
an arbitrary number of mobile devices acting as relay stations, which would require
updated solutions. This leads to a fusion of the classic roaming scenario with wireless
ad-hoc and mesh network scenarios, which provides interesting research challenges.
Our solution proposed in Chapter 4 on electronic health monitoring achieves the
desired security and privacy goals using a smartphone. Compared to previous work,
the solution has a detailed description of its security and privacy features. Secure
mutual authentication and key establishment, integrity protection, confidentiality
and perfect forward secrecy of recorded data are provided. Regarding privacy, the
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patient’s health data is reduced to avoid the disclosure of unnecessary details even
to trusted parties, and the patient stays anonymous.
In the future, it would be interesting to replace the password based authentication
mechanism on the patient’s device with a mechanism that does not rely on the
user’s capacity for remembering and that is not prone to circumvention, e.g., by
sticky notes. Candidates for such authentication mechanisms include biometric fea-
ture recognition and wireless distance bounding. Distance bounding would allow
automatic authentication when the device is within an arm’s length of the sensor
shirt and therefore, in control of the patient. It would also be interesting to build
a privacy aware emergency handling architecture for networked hospitals, and to
transfer the security and privacy goals of the mobile health monitoring system to
fixed medical devices.
During the design of the solution for electronic health monitoring, we analyzed the
security of Bluetooth. Our results are described in Chapter 5 on Attacking Passkey
Entry in Bluetooth 2.1. We have seen that it would be possible to execute the attack
described by Lindell [99] on Bluetooth standard complaint devices. It is also the
first implemented attack on Bluetooth since the introduction of Bluetooth 2.1 in
2007.
Our implementation of the attack on Bluetooth Passkey Entry can be improved
by making it work on regular, commercial Bluetooth devices. However, this would
require a radio interface with a much faster retuning time, which was not available
to us during this work. Such a device could also be used to implement other attacks
on Bluetooth, e.g., a man-in-the-middle-attack on the Just Works pairing method,
and the NINO attack to downgrade a pairing process between two input/output
capable devices to the Just Works pairing method.
In Chapter 6 on time synchronization in wireless sensor nodes, we have shown that
even computationally weak wireless sensor nodes can provide secure and privacy
aware services, which is confirmed by the implementation of the proposed secure
time synchronization protocol. Compared to related work, our solutions provides
undetectability of the sensor nodes to an observer of the wireless channel and pro-
tection against node capture attacks.
Regarding future work in the time synchronization scenario, additional public keys
can be preinstalled on the receiving nodes so that they can synchronize to multiple
source nodes. This can be done either simultaneously, where the source nodes may
be in different locations, or iteratively, so that a faulty or compromised source node
can easily be replaced by a new one. In the current solution, all receiving nodes need
to be updated when the source node is compromised. Also, the protocol can be used
for other wireless transmission technologies as well, e.g., to secure other unprotected
public radio transmitted time signals such as the American WWV and the German
DCF77 legal reference time radio sending stations. Another possible application of
the proposed protocol is public key distribution in broadcast scenarios, e.g., as used
in pay television.
We have shown for three scenarios that advanced security and privacy goals can be
fulfilled in a realistic and user friendly way: All new solutions hide the complexity
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of the underlying security and privacy mechanisms from the user. In the roaming
scenario, the user installs his home network’s roaming client on his mobile device
and will not have to authenticate in any way to use the roaming services. In the
health monitoring scenario, the user has a password to unlock his device, and he
can choose a new passphrase for each new connection to a trusted device, which
does not have to be remembered. The wireless sensor nodes are performing time
synchronization independently of any user actions.
There are a vast number of new applications handling sensitive data on mobile
devices, and user awareness is increasing. We hope that the developers of such
applications will adopt security and privacy guarantees and appropriate mechanisms
into future products. Our contributions show that this is feasible without a large
impact on usability.
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